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ABSTRACT 
 
This study illuminates the constructs of “nation” and “diaspora” as employed by artists, 
scholars, and state institutions that attempt to articulate a sense of belonging for the 
contemporary sub-Saharan African diasporas and the French nation-state. It is motivated by the 
following research questions: (1) How do material objects participate in telling stories belonging 
to a nation or to a diasporic community? (2) In what ways, if any, do the material objects’ 
participation in such narratives enable more inclusive forms of belonging? (3) How might 
turning attention to material objects in the scholarly analysis of narratives of belonging transform 
current models of human agency and subjectivity? Previous literature on France as a 
multicultural nation drew on theories of migration rather than diaspora. Meanwhile, literature on 
the African diasporas predominantely draws on Anglophone sources and focuses on transatlantic 
slavery as its foundational framework. Even though material objects and material history are 
crucial to both these literatures, there are few forays into theories of materiality that speak to a 
more-than-human agency. This study reaches across these gaps, braiding together relevant 
threads from each field.  
To explore these ideas, Unsettled Belongings begins with the National Museum of the 
History of Immigration [Musée national de l’histoire de l’immigration] located in Paris, France, 
reading this space with the work of Sara Ahmed’s migratory skin memories and Jane Bennett’s 
material agency in mind. Through an analysis of the material objects in the museum’s Gifts 
Gallery, I demonstrate how these objects subvert the museum’s narrative of colonial citizenship 
 xiii 
as the path to national belonging, as well as subvert a human-oriented understanding of agency. 
The next chapter investigates the kinship of humans and material belongings in two novels: 
Fatou Diome’s Kétala (2005) and Chris Abani’s Becoming Abigail (2005). The material objects 
in these novels, I argue, enable queer diasporic desires that enact the texts’ resistance to 
heternomative framings of diaspora and also invite a readerly empathy based not on shared 
identity but on a common materiality. The third chapter compares representations of slavery and 
colonialism as presented in Brett Bailey’s Exhibit B, performed in Paris, France in 2015, and the 
Cape Coast Castle Slavery Memorial site in Cape Coast, Ghana. This chapter contends that a 
more productive engagement with collective histories is made possible when visitors are invited 
to remember such traumas via the multisensorial, non-visual qualities of material environments. 
The final chapter—influenced by Edouard Glissant’s poetics of relation and Françoise Lionnet’s 
work on métissage—analyzes the multimedia work of Julien Creuzet, arguing that his use of 
personal belongings and his attention to the tactile relations of material objects produces an 
aesthetics of diaspora that invites solidarities while keeping, rather than erasing, differences.  
These findings prompt a rethinking of the relationship between nation and diaspora as 
collective identities, and a rethinking of the human and the nonhuman as actors vs. objects. My 
findings suggest, instead, that these two pairs are engaged in a process of ongoing, overlapping, 
and mutual constitution—that they are parts of a whole, rather than opposing constructs. 
Ultimately, this dissertation deepens our understanding of human practices of belonging, and 
challenges some foundational assumptions about nation and diaspora as collective identities. 
Moreover, this project makes a case for an interdisciplinary approach to Francophone narratives 
that combines museology, queer diaspora studies, affect theory, and object-oriented analysis.
 
 1 
Introduction: STORIED OBJECTS 
 
A Beginning: An Origin Story 
 
All stories begin. Most begin in a time, and in a place.  
 
 
By the end of Unsettled Belongings, I will be arguing that the beginnings—this origin in 
time and place—of the stories that I tell through these pages do not actually emerge in a specific 
time or in a particular place. Instead, it is the process of telling the story that sets up a beginning 
point; the beginning is a choice and a consequence of the storytelling, not the origin of the story.  
 
But, for now, let’s say that all stories begin.  
* * * 
In 2006, in Paris, the Musée du Quai Branly (MQB)1 prepares for inauguration. The 
Musée du Quai Branly, neighbor to the Eiffel Tower, holds an enormous collection of material 
culture from Africa, the Americas, Asia, and Oceania in a vast, intricate building set in a lush 
garden, the whole ensemble designed by renown architect Jean Nouvel. The then-president 
president of France—Jacques Chirac, the center-right candidate re-elected in 2002, defeating 
                                                 
1 The MQB was initially called the museum of “primitive arts” and then of arts premiers (first arts), the updated 
term for collections from cultures that were once regarded as “primitive” cultures. Eventually, because no suitable 
term could be found to describe the varied contents of the museum, and because there was great internal debate 
about whether the museum would be an art museum or an anthropologic museum, the name Musée du quai Branly, 
was settled on, in reference to pier along the Seine which flanks the museum. At its 10th anniversary, the museum 
was renamed Musée du quai Branly-Jacques Chirac. See Price (2006) and De l’Estoile (2007) for a comprehensive 
discussion of the debates and politics operating behind the scenes at this museum’s opening. Clifford (2007), 
Thomas (2008), and Vogel provide concise and provocative assessments as well.  
 2 
Jean-Marie Le Pen and his extremist party, Le Front National—had commissioned the Musée du 
Quai Branly as one of his legacy acts.2 The MQB, which claims to celebrate cultural dialogue, 
was set to open just a year after the highly publicized 2005 uprisings in the Parisian banlieue.3 
These protests and riots brought to the foreground the tensions between the inhabitants of the 
banlieue—largely minorities, and primarily of West and North African descent if not first-
generation immigrants themselves—and police forces. The museum was thus opening at a 
moment of high tension around issues of cultural and racial diversity. The government had 
tightened immigration policy, police brutality against people of color appeared to be mounting, 
and nationwide there was an increasingly hostile environment towards minorities of color and 
immigrants.4  
As the opening of the museum approached, the former prime minister of culture for Mali, 
Aminata Traoré, wrote an open letter decrying a paradox in the French state’s relationship to its 
former colonies: “Our works of art have the right to reside in the place where we, overall, are 
barred from entry” (2006 [Ainsi nos œuvres d’art ont droit de cité là où nous sommes, dans 
l’ensemble, interdits de séjour])5. Placing the shared origins of the unwelcome immigrants and 
                                                 
2 President Jacques Chirac was elected in 1995 as candidate of the center-right party Rassemblement pour la 
République (RPR). In 2002, after Chirac’s re-election, the RPR joined with other moderate-right parties to become 
Union pour la majorité presidentielle (UMP, soon to be renamed Union pour le mouvement populaire), in hopes of 
winning more seats in the Assembly and Senate in the upcoming legislative elections. In 2015, the UMP dissolved 
and remade itself under the name les Républicains, largely under former president Nicholar Sarkozy’s influence, 
who wanted to run again for president but could not do so under the same party.  
3 The slogan of the MQB is “The place where cultures converse” (“Là où les cultures dialoguent”).  
4 Chirac’s re-election in 2002, when he ran against Jean-Marie Le Pen, is seen as cultural turning point towards 
more conservative and nationalist politics. Though Chirac beat Le Pen handily, the fact both final round candidates 
were from the right, and that one of the candidate propagates racist and xenophobic beliefs and policies while 
advocating for a return to a ‘pure,’ Catholic nation, suggested a backlash against an increasingly racially and 
culturally diverse France. Though as Mireille Rosello points out in Postcolonial Hospitality: The Immigrant as 
Guest, there are many possible moments that could be accused as the beginning of the end of hospitality towards 
“others” in the post WWII era, such as President Valéry Giscard d’Estaing’s 1974 law that attempted to close the 
border to foreign workers.  
5 All translations in Unsettled Belongings, unless alternative bibliographic information is provided, are mine. 
 3 
the prized material objects under the spotlight allowed the latter to act as an accusation of not 
only how the French state represents their former colonial subjects but also of how it welcomes 
them—or fails to do so.  
This is where Unsettled Belonging’s story begins.  
Traoré phrasing demonstrates how using the same language to talk about the treatment of 
people and the treatment of objects brings to light the uneven ways in which cultural diversity is 
valued by state institutions as they define a common ground for living. It likewise brings to light 
the unequal treatment that different “bearers” of diversity receive, as some bodies are given a 
place in a national imaginary and some are designated as out-of-place. In addition, Traoré’s 
rhetorical choice suggests that bringing together the histories of people and material objects can 
help rewrite histories of cultural exchange that took place in uneven power relations. For 
example, what happens if we talked about the MQB’s collection, largely objects amassed during 
France’s occupation of the colonial territories, as having been kidnapped and now held hostage 
in the museum? What does this tell us about France’s relationship between the people in and 
from the former colonial territories?  
More than one political leaders of France, in fact, has reacted to the tensions of a multi-
racial, multi-cultural nation precisely by implementing new programs for the collections of 
material culture that once belonged to territories outside of present-day France. Chirac, as 
mentioned, began the MQB project in 2002, as a way to signal a new politics of immigration and 
integration. This project began right after he defeated right-wing extremist Jean-Marie Le Pen in 
the final presidential round. Now, in 2018, current president Emmanuel Macron has appointed 
two people to develop a plan to repatriate objects in France’s national collections to the object’s 
countries of origin. His announcement comes less than a year after he defeated Le Pen’s 
 4 
daughter, Marie Le Pen, who represented the Front National in the final presidential round. 
Another way to put it is that when Chirac won against the Front National, he built a house for the 
objects that had been taken from France’s former colonies. Having defeated Marie Le Pen (who, 
like her father, gained voter popularity by stoking anti-immigrant sentiment and nostalgic white 
nationalism), Macron proposes returning the collection to its rightful “home.” Chirac and 
Macron adopted opposing strategies for dealing with the material belongings of France’s empire 
but with the same aim: to reaffirm multiculturalism as a national value, while reassuring 
conservative voters that France belongs to the French. 
I suggest, then, that the way the French state manages material culture of other peoples is 
inextricably tied its attempts to manage national cohesion. Throughout Unsettled Belongings, I 
seek to articulate this unspoken connection that scaffolds the relationships between humans, 
institutions, and objects. I do so by making explicit this move of bringing people (human bodies) 
and objects (nonhuman material bodies) into the same field of action. Though I will call into 
action different types of nonhuman material bodies, not only those that are deemed to be cultural 
artifacts worthy of institutional collections, I hope to demonstrate how bringing the interactions 
between humans and objects to the forefront exposes the contours of the rocky terrain onto 
which collective identities are staked. In delving into the role of material objects in narrating and 
navigating collective identities, I argue, we gain a new field in which we can work on the 
shortcomings of existing discourses of collective identity.  
Each chapter investigates the origin story of a collective identity, exploring how humans 
and objects participate in making—or remaking—the story of the origins that enable them to 
claim an affinity to a place or people. In the first chapter, Arrive, I discuss the relationship 
between immigration and the “host” nation, investigating how the objects in one museum—
 5 
Paris’s immigration museum—participate in the story of the French nation. The second chapter, 
Return, considers the relationship between individual migrant subjects and the nation left behind. 
At the same time, the chapter Return considers how the predominant narrative framework of 
diaspora conditions these subjects’ gendered experience abroad and at home, through an analysis 
of two novels that rely on material objects as narrative agents: Kétala by Fatou Diome (2006) 
and Becoming Abigail by Chris Abani (2005). The third chapter, Remember, examines how the 
foundational events of the black African diaspora—the transatlantic slave trade and 
colonialism—are called into the present through the Cape Coast Castle Slave Memorial in Ghana 
and Brett Bailey’s performance-installation in Paris Exhibit B. This chapter asks what kinds of 
solidarities the two memorials’ material environments encourage. The last chapter, Encounter, 
considers what it means to be both a national subject and a diasporic subject, through an analysis 
of the use of texture in Martinican artist Julien Creuzet’s oeuvre. This chapter argues that 
Creuzet’s artworks re-imagine some of the prevailing metaphors of the relationship between 
migration and nation. Taken together, the four chapter offer multiple points of entry to 
understanding the narrative agency of material objects, how such agency has been harnessed in 
the discourse on human subjectivity, and what it offers for remaking a sense of being and 
belonging in the world, particularly for postcolonial, racially-othered subjects. 
Another Beginning: A Tetrahedron 
The beginning that I just laid out produces an origin story of its own. It points to an event 
(Traoré speech) that sets in motion a journey (mine, as the writing subject of this dissertation and 
the ideas in it). I place this story as the opening to Unsettled Belongings because I recognize its 
narrative force. It clarifies and distills the complex contexts and overlapping ideas explored by 
the dissertation into a single, short, anecdote. Additionally, it conveys the political and ethical 
imperatives of the questions the dissertation poses. However, at the same time, I want to resist 
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entering the chapters of the Unsettled Belongings through its (narrated) origins. While the 
narrative is seductive without being simple, it nevertheless flattens some concepts that I want to 
maintain in their three-dimensionality. I thus wish to offer, instead of an origin story, a 
tetrahedron.  
 
Figure 1 Tetrahedron 
A tetrahedron is a four-faced triangular polyhedron—think of a pyramid with perfectly 
congruent sides. In this type of pyramid, all the faces (or planes) are identical in size and angle, 
and its edges are of equal length. Any of the planes can serve as a base. At each of the corners, 
three of the faces converge. If one were to pull the three converging faces away from each other, 
opening the tetrahedron, so to speak, one would end up with a two-dimensional triangle with the 
same angles as the individual faces—three identical triangular petals sprouting from an identical 
central triangular. This flat triangle that can be folded back up into a tetrahedron is called the net.  
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Figure 2 Tetrahedron Net 
I propose that you think of the body of this dissertation as a tetrahedron, and the 
introduction as its open net. The four faces of the dissertation-as-tetrahedron are: what material 
objects do in lived experience (i.e. in the “real” world); what they do in narration; how what they 
do changes according to the medium of the narrative; and what I, as writing subject, do with 
material objects. The surface area—what the dissertation and the introduction cover—is the 
same. The volume, however, is not. In the net (the introduction), the planes create a surface that 
can be organized into four contiguous parts that can be encountered one after the other. In the 
tetrahedron (the dissertation), the four planes operate at the same time. Let me put it this way: 
imagine that you, reader, or that I, writer, holds up a tetrahedron and looks through one of its 
faces—which ever face we choose to consider as the foundation at that particular moment. If the 
tetrahedron is made of transparent matter and our eyes have the ability to see, you or I will be 
able to look at our surroundings through the face of the tetrahedron that is before our eyes. As we 
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look through this plane, however, the other faces of the pyramid will cut into the field of vision, 
clouding what we see.   
This is precisely what I want to happen. In critical scholarship, we often speak of the 
lenses through which we read our primary materials and write about then. I suggest that this 
dissertation reads its primary materials through a tetrahedral lens. In the introduction, I will first 
look at each “Face,” one by one, as parts of the same a two-dimensional area; in the 
dissertation’s chapters, I will look at while at the same time looking through each of the four 
“Faces” that (in)form it. In other words, in the chapters of the dissertation, all of the “Faces” will 
refract my readings, working against any semblance of singular vision than an isolated lens could 
offer. In yet other words, by proposing a tetrahedron as the opening metaphor for Unsettled 
Belongings, I hope that instead of fixing it to an origin point, I make tangible the points of 
convergence and the splitting of visions that give this book its shape. 
One Face: Objects in Lived Experience 
One plane that shapes Unsettled Belognings is the question of what are, exactly, 
nonhuman material bodies? How are they related to things and objects and stuff? What do they 
to a human’s lived experience of the material world, and why should or could we (humans) care 
about them anyway? Entering this dissertation through such ontological relations between human 
and nonhuman material bodies introduces questions about subjectivity in a postcolonial and 
racialized world. It looks at objects in their “real” world surroundings—that is, the material 
world outside the pages of a book. This face strives to account for how an understanding of 
human subjectivity is created via a negation of nonhuman subjectivity. This is the “Face” I will 
address here. 
In Unsettled Belongings, I use the term nonhuman material bodies to refer to discrete 
entities of organic and inorganic matter that are considered to be devoid of the autonomy and 
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intentionality that we ascribe to humans. Nonhuman material bodies are the things and 
environments that can be acted upon (by humans) but, in predominant (Western, Enlightenment) 
understandings of the material world, cannot act on their own.6 However, these material entities 
interact, often intimately, with the human body. Nonhuman material bodies clothe, house, 
comfort, transport, identify, feed, placate, harm, heal, and do much more to, with, and for 
humans. As these bodies assume roles, functions, and identities in their interactions with 
humans, they become objects: a pillowcase, a bridge, a piece of driftwood, an airplane, a castle. 
These named objects open, close, and shape possibilities for human action and thought, and 
humans rely on them to express, communicate, and understand human action and thought.7   
It is a relationship, one could say, that mediates lived experience. My project, thus, 
strives to understand “raw” materiality and its mediations. I trace how, through interactions with 
humans, nonhuman bodies become objects that are deployed to tell human stories of being and 
belonging in a postcolonial Francophone world. Nevertheless, in my analysis, I balance attention 
to how humans act upon material bodies with attention to how materiality acts upon the human 
experience. In other words, I engage in scholarship’s nonhuman turn8 in that I strive to listen to 
                                                 
6 As Susan Pearce outlines it, “the role Western philosophy has allotted to material culture, […] can be described as 
subordinate or secondary, in which objects are seen as merely the outcome or product—or even the detritus—of 
primary thinking, feeling and acting which is carried out elsewhere” (1992; 17). 
7 Pearce again, arguing that, “social ideas cannot exists without physical content, but physical objects are 
meaningsless without social content. […] It would be impossible to say which came first: the abstract idea of, for 
example, hammering, or the mental image of a hammer-shaped thing doing its job. ‘Think’ and ‘thing’ are not 
seuqentioal because our thinking can only be explicit, and no matter how abstract this may appear to be, in fact it 
inevitably takes material form” (1002; 21-22).  
8 Contemporary examples of the nonhuman turn, understood as a decentering of human subjectivity as the prism for 
understanding the world and its human condition, include Sara Ahmed’s Queer Phenomenology and Strange 
Encounters: Embodied Others in Postcoloniality; Jane Bennett’s Vibrant Matter and The Enchantment of Modern 
Life; Graham Harman’s object-oriented ontology as seen in “The Well-Wrought Broken Hammer,” Towards 
Speculative Realism, Guerilla Metaphysics: Phenomenology and the Carpentry of Things, among other works; 
William Connolley’s A World of Becoming; Heather Davis and David Turpin’s Art in the Anthropocene (2015); 
Richard Gursin (ed) The Nonhuman Turn (2015); Diane Coole and Samantha Frost (eds) New Materialisms: 
Ontology, Agency, Politics (2010).  
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both humans and nonhuman material bodies as agentic beings or actants.9 I excavate how 
nonhuman material bodies arrange and participate in human interactions, and note how humans 
engage with material objects to interact with the world around them. I thus follow Jane Bennett’s 
lead to “depict a world populated not by active subjects and passive objects but by lively and 
essentially interactive materials, by bodies human and nonhuman” (2012; 224). My project 
plunges into the moments in which it becomes no longer possible to distinguish subjects and 
objects within a material assemblage, even though particular qualities of individual bodies within 
the assemblage may still be identified.10  
Ultimately, I am interested in the effects and affects of the multi-bodied assemblage as it 
operates in literary and exhibitionary narratives.11 More precisely, I seek to understand what 
these effects and affects do to a human experience of being and belonging when the grounds of 
collective identities—race, gender, language, geography—undergo seismic shifts. I will return to 
the notions of narration and belonging in the other “Faces” of the introduction. Before that, 
however, I want to acknowledge a simmering tension in my own work, which is that the 
nonhuman turn of this project has nonetheless a deeply human concern. This project aims to use 
the findings that result from paying attention to the role of nonhuman material bodies’ 
                                                 
9 Jane Bennett (2010) contents that all material bodies, are actants (a term she borrows from Bruno Latour). Actants 
are “a source of action that can be either human or nonhuman; it is that which has efficacy, can do things, has 
sufficient coherence to make a difference, produce effects, alter the course of events” (Bennett 2010; viii). Drawing 
on Spinoza, she furthermore argues that actants—and actants working together in an assemblage—are connative 
bodies: they enhance their power and possibility for action though alliances (conscious on not) with other bodies.  
10 I borrow the term assemblage from Deuleuze and Guattari, who deploy it to name the networked nature of human 
agency. Bennett’s reading of their work, which (contrary to Graham Harman’s reading of it) contends that “despite 
their robust attempts to conceptualize groupings, Deuleuze and Guattari also manage to attend carefully to many 
specific objects, to horses, shoes, orchids, packs of wolves, wasps, priests, metals, etc.” This reading aligns with my 
interpretation and use of assemblage—a interdependent congregation whose individual parts nevertheless contribute 
in precise ways. Narrative assemblages are the conglomeration of entities out of which stories emerge; this would 
be, for example, the words of a text and the pages they are printed on in the hands of a reader located at a particular 
time and place.  
11 I will define my understanding of literary and exhibitionary narratives in another section of the Introduction, but 
for now, literary narratives can be understood as written texts (novels in particular), and exhibtionary narrative as the 
storylines that structure the displays of material objects in museums, memorial sites, and art installations. 
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participation in (narratives of) lived experiences of migration in order to broaden our 
understanding of human belonging, and to think more creatively about the sources and resources 
that foster belonging. How humans treat objects, or how humans mobilize objects in their 
treatment of other humans, then, serves as an avenue for me to think though the implications of 
and strategies for human cohabitation (with other humans, animals, objects, in built and natural 
environments).  
In that sense, though I am receptive to Graham Harman’s argument that an object-
oriented critical approach should not reduce objects to their relations, and that the interactions 
between nonhuman material objects are just as worthy of attention as the relations between 
human and nonhuman material bodies, it is not the method that I take in this project.12 I do not 
disagree with Harman’s point that objects cannot be reduced to their relations. Neither do I 
disagree with his claim that the interiority and the relations of any object cannot ever be fully 
apprehended. Indeed, my project does endeavor to make space for the autonomy, integrity, and 
opacity of the objects it encounters. However, like Bennett, I suggest that “perhaps there is no 
need to choose between objects or their relations” (2012; 227). Not only is there no need to 
choose between objects and their relations, but in this particular project, I place the relations 
(effects, affects, and interactions) between human and nonhuman material bodies at the center. 
                                                 
12 Harman contends that critical approaches that have espoused a material turn tend nevertheless to keep human 
concerns at the center of their methods and questions. Solely the interactions between human and material objects 
are explored, at the expense of the relations between nonhuman material objects. Harman suggests that Object-
Oriented-Ontology (OOO), a trend in philosophy related to the movement of speculative realism, differs in that it 
explores the relations between objects absent of a human presence. Moreover, he argues, OOO stands in stark 
contrast to the relational turn in literary and cultural criticism, which Harman describes as understanding texts, 
identities, and cultures as products of relational contexts with no essential traits. He describes OOO as “a frank 
realism which views objects or things as genuine realities deeper than any of the relations in which they might 
become involved” while nevertheless acknowledging that “the autonomy and integrity of the object in no way 
implies the autonomy and integrity of our access to the object” (2012; 196; 200). The question that animates an 
OOO-influenced approach is to identify what in an object persists regardless of its particular relations at a moment 
in time and place, all the while holding space for the changing nature of its interactions. Though I do attend to the 
opacity, irreducibility, and elusive persistence of nonhuman material bodies, for this project, this attention is a 
method rather than the ultimate question. 
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For the purposes of this book, I am interested in what the materiality of objects and their 
relations reveal about the human condition of belonging.13  
In making this statement, I also acknowledge that I fall into the apparent contradiction 
raised by Harman that practioners, so to speak, of the nonhuman turn, tend to nevertheless 
privilege human concerns and human experience above those of the nonhuman entities they 
bring under the spotlight. I say “apparent” because I argue that it is only a contradiction if we 
continue to accept the notion that the things we call humans are entirely distinct from the things 
we call objects insofar as their capacity to propose ways of knowing and making change in the 
world.14 If we see a continuity of agentic capabilities across these different material bodies—if 
we reject what Pearce calls “the entrenched duality of Western (and in some respects also non-
Western) thought”—then human concerns have also nonhuman consequences and vice versa 
(1992; 17). Because of this, my own interest is pursuing an object-oriented analysis of narratives 
of (un)belonging falls much closer to Bennett’s (2001; 2010; 2012) and Richard Gursin’s (2015) 
motivations. Gursin argues that: 
A concern with the nonhuman can and must be brought to bear on any projects for 
creating a more just society. If following Latour and others we take society as a 
complex assemblage of human and nonhuman actors—not as an autonomous 
entity or realm that can be appealed to in order to explain why things are as they 
are, or that can be somehow changed apart from changing the way things are—
then the question of political or social change becomes a question of changing our 
relations not only to other humans but to the nonhuman as well (xviii) 
                                                 
13 This is not to say that nonhuman conditions, practices, and strategies of belonging could not be explored, but 
simply that such an exploration runs tangent to the concerns of this project and thus will not be addressed in these 
pages. 
14 As Achille Mbembe argues, “The segregation of human rationality and the division of the mind between an 
unconscious grounded in the biological (and thus subject to its own laws), and an autonomous reason lodged in 
consciousness is at the core of modern Western humanities.  It is this segregation that allows modern human 
sciences to think of reason both as the repository of interpretation and free will, and as the sovereign instrument of 
self-knowing in the pursuit of perfection (Kant). Is this kind of philosophical anthropology valid for every single 
human culture or region of the planet?” (5; 2016 “The Planetary Library: Notes on Theory Today,” unpublished 
paper circulated at AHAW) 
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This ethical and political claim animates my choice of using an object-oriented method, though 
my claim is more modest. I would not say that a concern with the nonhuman must be brought on 
every project for a more just society. Rather, I claim that an attention to nonhuman material 
bodies, when brought to bear on an analysis of human relations in a racialized world, provides a 
way to attend to the constructed nature of race. It provides a path for attending to the 
construction of racial categories while holding on to the possibilities and limitations that 
inhabiting each of our particular bodies, located in a specific place and time, affords.  
An object-oriented mode of reading can contribute to existing studies of race and 
racialized belonging for several reasons. The injustices produced by racialization, particularly in 
a postcolonial context, have been predominantly framed as a problem of subjectivity and agency 
closely linked to representation. People of color, it has been demonstrated, were positioned 
within dominant regimes of representation that systematically called into questions their ability 
to think, to feel a full range of human emotions, and to participate in social life.15 This 
positioning is described as a process of objectification—a stripping away of the personhood of 
colonial subjects and people of color—that structures not only how members of the dominant 
(white) culture saw colonized and racialized persons, but how the colonized and racialized 
persons see themselves. As Stuart Hall argues:  
“[Dominant regimes of representation] had the power to make us see and 
experience ourselves as ‘Other’. Every regime of representation is a regime of 
power formed, as Foucault reminds us, by the fatal couplet, ‘power/knowledge’. 
And this kind of knowledge is internal, not external. It is one thing to place some 
                                                 
15 An exhaustive list of the scholarship that demonstrates this idea or takes it as a premise would be impossible to 
cite. In addition to the work that I quote from in this introduction, I will only point attention to some of the works 
that have been particularly influential for this book. Examining Blackness and subjectivity, Michelle Wright’s 
Becoming Black: Creating Identity in the Black Diaspora (2004); with a focus on intimacy, Christina Sharpe’s In 
the Wake: On Blackness and Being and Candice M. Jenkins’ Private Lives, Proper Relations: Respectability, 
Intimacy, and Sexuality in African American Women’s Narratives (2007). On how gender and race intersect, and the 
strategies of autobiography in rewriting the regimes of representation, Françoise Lionnet’s Autobiographical Voices: 
Race, Gender, Self-Portraiture (1989). 
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person or set of peoples as the Other of a dominant discourse. It is quite another 
thing to subject them to that ‘knowledge’, not only as a matter of imposed will 
and domination, but the power of inner compulsion and subjective conformation 
to the norm. 70-71  
The cultural turn of scholarship, particularly the studies that analyzed the social conditions and 
creative expressions of postcolonial people of color, either in their country of “origin” or in the 
diaspora, strove to understand, contest, and deconstruct this dominant discourse by paying 
careful attention to its contexts of enunciation and reception.16 Studying the institutional systems, 
temporal location, social and economic circumstances, and cultural codes that produced and 
disseminated such (literary, cinematic, artistic, musical) representations helped reveal the process 
of objectification and its consequences.  
My current project is indebted to this earlier work, but proposes that the materialities 
operating in the contexts of enunciation and reception must also be examined. This attention to 
the materialities at play in regimes of representation will help scholars, I suggest, “expose, 
connect, and remake the forms of our desire for an ordered reality” (Samantha Pinto 16). Such a 
remaking may allow us to put into practice more inclusive ways of producing knowledge and 
being in the world, and articulate collective identities that favor an intersectional empathy. 
Moreover, I tend to agree with Bennett’s claim that “if a set of moral principles is actually to be 
lived out, the right mood or landscape of affect has to be in place,” (Bennett 2010; xii). To 
demonstrate this how attention to materialities opens new readings of racialized being and 
                                                 
16 As Chambers puts it, “Members of postcolonial societies and those engaged (mainly in Western societies) in the 
struggles of women and Blacks or of sexual minorities or marginalized ethnicities are faced with the following 
political situation: (1) they are not ‘in power’ (although they are to various degrees and in various ways 
empowered); (2) their ‘identity’ has been constructed by dominant power structures and in the interests of those 
structures; and (3) it is necessary to change the reality that has been constructed this way, but starting—because 
there is no alternative—from the way things are now, that is, from within the ‘given’ situation of power” (Room for 
Maneuver, xi) 
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belonging, I will call on this method to read a passage from one of the seminal texts in critical 
race and postcolonial studies: Peau noire, masques blancs by Franz Fanon.17  
In this text, Frantz Fanon speaks compellingly of the objectification of black and 
colonized subjects. He sets the scene: 
‘Sale nègre !’ ou simplement : ‘Tiens, un nègre !’ 
J’arrivais dans le monde, soucieux de faire lever un sens aux choses, mon âme 
pleine du désir d’être à l’origine du monde, et voici que je me découvrais objet au 
milieu d’autres objets. 90 
‘Dirty nigger’ Or simply, ‘Look, a Negro!’ 
I came into the world imbued with the will to find a meaning in things, my spirit 
filled with the desire to attain to the source of the world, and then I found that I 
was an object in the midst of other objects. Markmann 1986, 109 
When Fanon is seen and named by another human through his skin color, his sense of self 
disappears under his sense of being-objet. This objectification, if we follow the next few pages of 
Fanon’s text, commits violence in that it 1) undermines Fanon’s lived experience and 2) 
destabilizes his relationship with the material world. These two actions render the reality of 
Fanon’s lived experience invalid. Objectification, Fanon is suggesting, renders him passive, 
immobile, unable to act upon the world, unable to “faire lever un sens aux choses” (90). For 
                                                 
17 Fanon’s project, in Peau noire and in Les Damnés de la terre was to develop the tools and methods that colonized 
and racially-Othered persons could take up to liberate themselves from the state of objectification that impeded their 
sense of being and belonging—and thus their agentic capacities—in the world. He speaks of the ontological 
impossibility of being a Black subject, given that one only becomes Black in the face of a White subject, but facing 
a White subject, the Black person will always already be depersonalized into non-being, into what he considers 
objecthood. Fanon says: “Il y a dans la Weltanschauung d’un peuple colonisé, une impureté, une tare qui interdit 
toute explication ontologique. […] L’ontologie, quand on a admis pour une fois pour toutes qu’elle laisse de côté 
l’existence, ne nous permet pas de comprendre l’être du Noir. Car le Noir n’a plus a être noir, mais à l’être en face 
du Blanc. Certains se mettront en tête de nous rappeler que la situation est à double sens. Nous répondons que c’est 
faux. Le Noir n’a pas de résistance ontologique aux yeux du Blanc” (90-91; [In the Weltanschauung of a colonized 
people there is an impurity, a flaw that outlaws any ontological explanation. […] Ontology—once it is finally 
admitted as leaving existence by the wayside—does not permit us to understand the being of the black man. For not 
only must the black man be black; he must be black in relation to the white man. Some critics will take it on 
themselves to remind us that this proposition has a converse. I say that this is false. The black man has no 
ontological resistance in the eye of the white man] Markmann 109-110). 
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Fanon, objecthood is the inability to make things meaningful—to articulate a sense of being with 
and through the material world around him as experienced through his body—and thus 
objectification dehumanizes the racialized subject.  
What I suggest, contra predominant readings of this passage in Fanon, is that though 
Fanon appears to equate objecthood with dehumanization, it does not have to produce this effect. 
Instead, latent in Fanon’s very decrying of objectification, is the suggestion that in fully 
embracing the materiality the human body, many more avenues for making meaning with other 
material bodies, human and not, open up. This is because humans and objects share physicality. 
As Pearce writes, “Objects are lumps of the material world. They share this nature with all living 
things, including ourselves […] The physicality which we and objects share creates a 
relationship between us, of which we have to take account as we move around in our lives, and 
their lengths, breadths, volumes, and degrees of hardness or softness, and their differing abilities 
to absorbs light which means that we see them as multicolored, define this relationship” (15-16). 
I propose that what Fanon points to—though he does not come to fully articulate it—is that the 
very process required to “faire lever un sens aux choses” is inextricable from the physicality we 
share with material objects. Becoming-object is thus not necessarily objectification, if we rethink 
the human-object relation.  
In predominant readings of Fanon, objectification can be understood as the systemic 
erasure or denial by a dominant group/individual of another individual or group’s ability to enter 
an agentic relationship with the world and people that inhabit it. In Peau noire, Fanon analyzed 
how language and interpersonal relations participate in this objectification, and strives to imagine 
a way, through language, of being and belonging for racialized and colonized persons. In Les 
Damnés de la terre, Fanon turned his attention to culture in addition to language, and to 
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racialized and colonized persons’ (individual and collective) relationship with the nation-state, in 
addition to their interpersonal relations. He articulates how culture and nationality need to be 
deconstructed and reformulated if colonized peoples are to liberate themselves from the state of 
objectification these systems produced. Ultimately, Fanon argues that culture and language can 
be deployed by marginalized peoples to reconfigure the interpersonal and state relations that 
negated their sense of being and belonging.  
Fanon’s work broke new ground, animating scholarship for decades. However, I am 
proposing here that there is another avenue for coming into a postcolonial racialized sense of 
being that was overlooked in Fanon’s work and the work of those that followed him. I propose 
that we rethink objectification in terms of becoming-object, a becoming-object that is a 
recognition of the limitations of any human’s autonomous will and agency due to a physicality 
shared by all humans and nonhuman material bodies. Becoming-object, while recognizing the 
limitations of human agency, I suggest, will point to new alliances that can be formed to increase 
the potential of making change in the world. In other words, in addition to rethinking the 
colonized, racialized person’s relation to (white) subjects and systems wielding colonial power, I 
contend that Fanon also opened a door into a rethinking of the colonized, racialized person’s 
relation to materiality and the material world around them. This avenue was latent, I suggest, but 
never fully articulated in Fanon’s writing; Unsettled Belongings steps in that direction.  
To demonstrate what I mean, I will quote at length from a short series of pages in Peau 
noire that begin with the quote excerpted in the previous paragraph. Fanon declares: 
Enfermé dans cette objectivité écrasante, j’implorai autrui. Son regard libérateur, 
glissant sur mon corps devenu soudain nul d’aspérités, me rend une légèreté que 
je croyais perdue et, m’absentant du monde, me rend au monde. Mais là-bas, juste 
à contre-pente, je bute, et l’autre, par gestes, attitudes, regards, me fixe, dans le 
sens où l’on fixe une préparation par un colorant. Je m’emportai, exigeai une 
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explication... Rien n’y fit. J’explosai. Voici les menus morceaux par un autre moi 
réunis. 90  
Sealed into that crushing objecthood, I turned beseechingly to others. Their 
attention was a liberation, running over my body suddenly abraded into nonbeing, 
endowing me once more with an agility that I had though lost, and by taking me 
out of the world, restoring me to it. But just as I reached the other side, I 
stumbled, and the movements, the attitudes, the glances of the other fixed me 
there in the sense in which a chemical compound is fixed by a dye. I was 
indignant; I demanded an explanation. Nothing happened. I burst apart. Now the 
fragments have been put together by another self. Lam 1986; 109 
Here, Fanon speaks of the colonial gaze rendering his human body into nonhuman substances (a 
compound fixed by a dye) and exploding it into disaggregate pieces. Fanon spends much of Peau 
noire analyzing this gaze, its origins and effects, with the expectation that understanding it will 
give him the means to overturn it. Much exceptional scholarship followed his lead, exploring the 
instances and implications of looking in relations of power, particularly between dominant 
cultural groups and the (disenfranchised) minorities that cohabit with them.18 I, on the other 
hand, suggest that instead of examining this human-to-human transaction that takes place 
through the visual plane, we turn our attention to the transaction between the human and 
nonhuman material world.  
What I am trying to demonstrate, then, is how intimately the material world figures in 
Fanon’s reflections. The excerpt cited previously describes how Fanon’s material human body 
disaggregates into nonhuman material things in the process of objectification. Yet, in, the 
following page, he gives an eloquent description of how the human body is constituted through 
intimate interactions with nonhuman material bodies. He states: 
                                                 
18 Some of the most widely-read examples include Edward Saïd’s Orientalism; Mary Louis Pratt’s Imperial Eyes: 
Travel Writing and Transculturation; Laura Mulovey’s “Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema,” Homi Bhabha The 
Location of Culture. The “white gaze,” the “male gaze,” and similar uses of the “gaze” as shorthand for a dominant 
culture’s perception that structures the expression and reception of the cultural production of marginalized 
populations has enough common currency that it can be found in mainstream critical writing. 
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Dans le monde blanc, l’homme de couleur rencontre des difficultés dans 
l’élaboration de son schéma corporel. La connaissance du corps est une activité 
uniquement négatrice. C’est une connaissance en troisième personne. Tout autour 
de corps règne une atmosphère d’incertitude certaine. Je sais que si je veux fumer, 
il me faudra étendre le bras droit et saisir le paquet de cigarettes qui se trouve à 
l’autre bout de la table. Les allumettes, elles, sont dans le tiroir de gauche, il 
faudra que je me recule légèrement. Et, tous ces gestes, de les fais non par 
habitude mais par une connaissance implicite. Lente construction de mon moi en 
tant que corps au sein d’un monde spatial et temporel, tel semble être le schéma. 
Il ne s’impose pas à moi, c’est plutôt une structuration définitive du moi et du 
monde—définitive car il s’installe entre mon corps et le monde une dialectique 
effective. 
[…] J’avais créé au-dessous du schéma corporel un schéma historico-racial. Les 
éléments que j’avais utilisés ne m’avaient pas été fournis par ‘des résidus des 
sensations et des perceptions d’ordre surtout tactile, vestibulaire, cinesthésique et 
visuel’ (Lhermitte, L’image de notre corps; 17) mais par l’autre, le Blanc, qui 
m’avait tissé de mille détails, anecdotes, récit. Je croyais avoir construit un moi 
physiologique, à équilibrer l’espace, à localiser des sensations, et voici que l’on 
me réclamait un supplément. (91-92) 
In the white world the man of color encounter difficulties in the development of 
his bodily schema. Consciousness of the body is solely a negating activity. It is a 
third-person consciousness. The body is surround by an atmosphere of certain 
uncertainty. I know that if I want to smoke, I shall have to reach out my right arm 
and take the pack of cigarettes lying at the other end of the table. The matches, 
however, are in the drawer on the left, and I shall have to lean back slightly. And 
all these movements are made not out of habit but out of implicit knowledge. A 
slow composition of my self as a body in the middle of a spatial and temporal 
world—such seems to be the schema. It does not impose itself on me; it is, rather, 
a definitive structuring of the self and of the world—definitive because it creates a 
real dialectic between my body and the world. 
[…] Below the corporeal schema I had sketched a historico-racial schema. The 
elements that I used had been provided for me not by ‘residual sensations and 
perceptions primarily of a tactile, vestibular, kinesthetic, and visual character,’ but 
by the other, the white man, who had woven me out of a thousand details, 
anecdotes, stories. I thought that what I had in hand was to construct a 
physiological self, to balance space, to localize sensations, and here I was called 
on for more. Markmann 1986; 110-111 
Fanon here draws attention to how a sense of a material self—one’s body—emerges out of 
interacting with other, not necessarily human, materialities. The act of reaching for a box of 
lighters in a drawer and cigarettes on a table, moving one arm and lightly leaning back, shapes 
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his bodily sense of space and time. He slowly breaks down the steps that a seemingly automatic 
gesture entails.  
Through this slowing down of the interaction with the objects that hover near him, Fanon 
demonstrates that the simple act of reaching out is made possible by the deeply embodied 
knowledge of his material self and material surroundings. This knowledge is built through tactile 
sensations, kinetic perceptions, and visual interactions over time. It is the most real knowledge 
he has, and yet, it is disrupted by the White gaze that weaves Fanon into a self that he has not 
lived. A collection of anecdotes, details, stories (e.g. multiple forms of representation) are 
ascribed to him as if he had lived them out, and make him question the reliability of his lived 
experience:  
‘Maman, regarde le nègre, j’ai peur !’ Peur ! Peur ! Voilà qu’on se mettait à me 
craindre. Je voulus m’amuser jusqu’à m’étouffer, mais cela m’était devenu 
impossible. 
Je ne pouvais plus, car je savais déjà qu’existaient des légendes, des histoires, 
l’histoire, et surtout l’historicité, que m’avait enseignée Jaspers. Alors le schéma 
corporel, attaqué en plusieurs points, s’écroula, cédant la place à un schéma 
épidermique racial. (92) 
‘Mama, see the Negro! I’m frightened!’ Frightened! Frightened! Now they were 
beginning to be afraid of me. I made up my mind to laugh myself to tears, but 
laughter had become impossible. 
I could no longer laugh, because I already knew that there were legends, stories, 
history, and above as historicity, which I had learned about from Jaspers. Then, 
assailed at various points, the corporeal schema crumbled, its place taken by a 
racial epidermal schema. Lam 1986; 112 
In other words, this gaze attacks and shatters Fanon’s unique and embodied history of lived 
perceptions, experiences, and sensations, replacing it with “un schema épidermique racial” (92).  
Fanon (and a number of subsequent scholars) honed in on the gaze as the site for 
deconstructing the racial epidermal schemata. I, on the contrary, suggest 1) that the racial 
epidermal schema must be read as a narrative assemblage that includes the gaze, the “mille 
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details, anecdotes, récits” (e.g. representations) woven together, but also the material bodies of 
the imagined White interlocutor as well as Fanon; and that 2) the corporeal schema—the sense of 
being and belonging constructed out of a bodily interaction with the human and non-human 
material world—may be an equally, if not more, productive site for destabilizing the racial 
epidermal schema that attempts to overwrite it. The remaking of the world may be located 
precisely in the remaking of the human’s relationship to it materiality.  
What I propose, then, is to dive head first into this sense of being that is not visually-
oriented nor human-centered, but, rather, tactile and constructed out of lived experiences of 
materialities—our own and others. Representations, be they literary, historical, or artistic, 
certainly do participate in this lived experience and push and pull at our sense of being, 
belonging, and the possibilities of action being and belonging afford. While Unsettled 
Belongings continues to think about representations of the experiences of migration, 
displacement, and the people who undergo them, it approaches these representations as part of 
narrative assemblages that comprises the humans who make and see them, as well as the material 
objects and environments in which they are embedded (see the following “Faces” of this 
Introduction). While Fanon’s critique of the racial epidermal schema as objectifying the 
postcolonial, racialized subject was groundbreaking and opened a powerful line of critique, I 
now suggest that we reimagine the becoming-object not as a negation of being and belonging, 
but as an avenue for a mode of being and belonging that enables a more just and effective way of 
remaking the world. This is not to erase the violence of de-personalization enacted by 
colonialism and systemic racism to this day, but to think about the problem differently.  
In arguing for tragedy as the narrative lens through which we must envision a 
postcolonial future, David Scott contends that “what is at stake is something like a refusal to be 
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seduced and immobilized by the facile normalization of the present” and that “the way one 
defines the alternative depends on the way one has conceived the problem” (2; 6). If we conceive 
of the problem of racialization as one of representation and visuality, we lose out on other 
sources and senses for imagining an alternative to the present reality of system racism. Similarly, 
if we conceive of the problem of losing a sense of being and belonging as one of objectification, 
we lose out on the possibility of bringing in nonhuman materialities as allies in the remaking of 
(systemic and interpersonal) oppressive human relations. In a nutshell, this dissertation proposes, 
firstly, that instead of the gaze, we explore how senses such as touch, smell, sound, and taste 
participate in relations of racialized (un)belonging. Secondly, it proposes that objecthood does 
not necessarily equal dehumanization, and that, perhaps, becoming can even be an avenue for re-
humanization understood as an expansion of empathy for the human and nonhuman material 
bodies that inhabit the planet.  
Like tragedy, a nonhuman, material turn in the analysis of being and belonging in a 
racialized society will, I suspect, invite: 
neither a complacent acquiescence to the totalizing language of modern reason, 
nor the fantasy of an exit or escape from the modern conditions that have 
contributed definitively (if not comprehensively) to making us who we are. […] 
tragedy is centrally concerned with our constitutive openness to luck, to fortune, 
to chance. It shows us in a dramatic and vivid way our very mortal vulnerability 
to the contingencies of our worldly life and physical embodiment. It urges us to 
appreciate that we cannot make ourselves entirely immune to the vagaries of 
misfortune, to calamities, say or loss or bodily desire. Scott 190; 182  
Material objects are stubborn things. They occupy space, elicit senses, touch and interact with 
our bodies in ways that we cannot fully master nor anticipate.19 In butting heads against objects, 
scholars seeking to understand racialized being and belonging in a postcolonial world might yet 
                                                 
19 As Susan Pearce puts it, “The materiality of objects means that they occupy their own space, and this is how we 
experience them. Whether we bark our shins against them or put them in our pockets, we understand that where one 
of them is, nothing else can be” (1992, 16).  
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push against some of the entrenched ways of knowing that condition the shape of the present, as 
well as of the thinkable future.  
Another Face: Objects in Narration 
There is another tetrahedral face through which I can enter Unsettled Belongings. A face, 
for example, that forges a line of inquiry into the narration of lived experience, rather the world 
in which lived experience takes place (not that these can be cleanly cut apart). Such a beginning 
would need to address the question of why look at the narrative power of material objects? And 
why look at them specifically in stories of migration and diaspora? This is the “Face” of the 
tetrahedral lens that I want to look at now.  
I’ve already hinted at how material objects shape the lived experience of social 
belonging. Turning attention to the materialities at play in narratives of migration and diaspora 
serves to heed the embodied nature of these experiences of (un)belonging.20 Moreover, teasing 
out how the narration in migration and diaspora stories collaborates with different human and 
nonhuman material bodies, reveals the way gender fractures the experience of place and 
movement between places. As Mireille Rosello demonstrates in The Immigrant as Guest, 
“Political and ethical discourses tend to privilege discussions of the migrant as a metaphor for a 
group whose gendered characteristics are less significant than other markers (not only racial and 
cultural differences, but also numbers and movement)” (119). That gender and sexuality fracture 
a shared experience of racialization and displacement must be accounted for. This is true not 
only in narratives of migration, but in diasporic ones. Not only are “nation” and “homeland” 
often gendered in discourse, but as human bodies move across these spaces, they become marked 
                                                 
20 Nancy Scheper-Huges’ formulation captures my use of the term “embodiment” perfectly: “Embodiment concerns 
the ways people come to inhabit their bodies so that these become in every sense of the term ‘habituated.’ All the 
mundane activities of working, eating, sleeping, having sex, and getting sick and getting well are forms of body 
praxis and expressive of dynamic social, cultural and political relations. 
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through gendered values. Ayo Coly argues, for example, that in postcolonial African narratives, 
“While the homecoming migrant male body is almost always welcomed as a warrior body, its 
female counterpart is marked as a soiled and useless body” (9). Understanding this process of 
ascribing difference and valuing differently requires, I contend, interrogating the sensory, 
material interactions (between human bodies and between human and nonhuman bodies) that 
produce narratives of migration and diaspora. 
In other words, this dissertation strives to pick apart the narration of belonging by 
understanding migration and diaspora as embodied, sensory experiences with the material world. 
I draw on Sara Ahmed’s argument that “home is also the lived experience of locality, its sounds 
and smells. [..] The journeys of migration involve a splitting of home as place of origin and home 
as the sensory world of everyday experience. What migration narratives involve then, is spatial 
reconfiguration of an embodied self: a transformation in the very skin through which the body is 
embodied” (89-90). Ahmed points to how the sensory associations of a human body accrue and 
acclimate as it moves through different locations—and how the sensory experience of a place 
can fracture one’s affective attachment to it. She calls the sensory associations that influence an 
individual’s relationship to place skin memories: the traces of interactions with the social and 
material world—worlds that cannot be neatly separated, according to Ahmed. These skin 
memories shape future interactions with other human and nonhuman material bodies. 
What does a critical attention to skin memories do to a critical reading practice of stories 
of migration and diaspora? Particularly considering that skin is one of the primary coordinates 
through which race is marked? I will point to two theorists that narrate the formation of skin 
memories (though they do not label them as such) into their critical analysis of the experience of 
being and belonging in migration and diaspora. Their attention to the sensory embodiment of 
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these experiences, I suggest, contributes to the forceful critique of the intersections of race and 
gender that they articulate. Furthermore, what I find particularly fascinating, is how these 
critiques enact hesitant gestures of solidarity that mark both the risks of reaching out and the 
limitation of shared lived experience, while remaining drawn to and desirous of such practices of 
belonging.  
The first scene comes from Chandra Mohanty, who narrates an instance in which her 
sensory embodiment of home shifts and splits. In 1992, during one of her journeys “home” to 
India, she finds that anti-Muslim violence, committed in the name of Hindu nationalism, has 
transformed “her” city: “The smells and textures of my beloved Mumbai, of home, which had 
always comforted and nurtured me, were violently disrupted. The scent of fish drying on the 
lines at the fishing village in Danda was submerged in the smell of burning straw and grass as 
whole bastis (chawls) were burned to the ground” (132). The odor produced by the materials 
(straw and grass) that composed the homes of Mohanty’s Mumbai fractures her ethical, political, 
and religious affiliations with the city. Mohanty describes that she had thought she could reject 
the rigid hierarchies and authoritarianism of Hinduism while holding on to its rituals and 
identity. After the 1992 clashes, she writes, “I could not assume a distanced posture toward 
religion anymore. Too many injustices were being committed in my name” (131). Because anti-
Muslim rhetoric was seen as the mark of loyal Hinduism, and Hinduism was considered a sign of 
commitment to the nation of India, Mohanty finds an increasingly diminished space in which she 
can feel at home in Hinduism without being in direct contradiction with her other (political, 
ethical) affiliations that formed her sense of belonging to a home.  
Furthermore, Mohanty’s position as an “outsider” (being a U.S. Resident) and as a 
woman leads members of her (Hindi, Indian resident) community dismiss her protests that 
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Muslims belong in India. She is told she just does not understand, because she is not really living 
in Mumbai. That her home, in other words, does not belong to her. Clearly, there are intersecting 
social and political tensions shaping the way Mohanty asks and answers the questions of “What 
is home?” in her essay. However, what I want to highlight is that the political setting of the 
questions is inseparable, in Mohanty’s narration, from the scents and textures that disrupt her 
sense of being and belonging to (one of) her home(s). Her perception of home, and her place in 
it, changes through her sensory experience of the topography that was once familiar to her. As 
the space becomes unfamiliar, so Mohanty, too, becomes unfamiliar in the space 
I wish to highlight, then, how a body belongs to a home (a place and community, which 
may or may not be in the same geographic location) through its senses and affects; how it 
belongs through its ways of touching and being touched by the world around it, materially as 
well as metaphorically—or perhaps, more accurately, metaphorically through particular material 
interactions. In Ahmed’s words: “The lived experience of being at home hence involves the 
enveloping of the subjects in a space which is not simply outside them: being at home suggests 
that the subject and space leak into each other, inhabit each other” (89). The tactile interactions 
in a space imprint themselves on bodies. In Mohanty’s case, her sensory perceptions of smoke 
and acrid air rearranged her relationship with the place she called home in the past. It is not that 
she “gives up” Mumbai as a home-space, but that it inhabits her differently, more uneasily, than 
before. The sensory experience transformed both her home and her body. 
Bodies can also carry these sensations with them into future interactions, affecting how 
they inhabit new spaces they encounter. In “Eye to Eye: Black Women, Hatred, and Anger,” 
Audre Lorde assesses the complicated relationships she has with other Black women. In the first 
few pages, she recounts as series of experiences that are, in her narration, examples of being 
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taught by the world, when she was just a child, to harbor rancor for her Black female body and 
self. I will cite the first story she tells: 
The AA subway train to Harlem. I clutch my mother’s sleeve, her arms full of 
shopping bags, christmas-heavy. The wet smell of winter clothes, the train’s 
lurching. My mother spots an almost seat, pushes my little snowsuited body 
down. On one side of me, a man reading a paper. On the other, a woman in a fur 
hat staring at me. Her mouth twitches as she stares and then her gaze drops down, 
pulling mine with it. Her leather-gloved hand plucks at the line where my new 
blue snowpants and her sleek fur coat meet. She jerks her coat closer to her. I 
look. I do not see whatever terrible thing she is seeing on the seat between us—
probably a roach. But she has communicated her horror to me. It must be 
something very bad from the way she’s looking, so I pull my snowsuit closer to 
me away from it, too. When I look up the woman is still staring at me, her nose 
holes and eyes huge. And suddenly, I realize there is nothing crawling up the seat 
between us; it is me she doesn’t want her coat to touch. The fur brushes past my 
face as she stands with a shudder and holds on to a strap in the speeding train. 
147. 
Lorde’s narration arrests my attention. And once again, I note the vivid presence of nonhuman 
material bodies and sensory perceptions that mold the contours of Lorde’s story. Lorde clutches 
her mother’s sleeve, the snowsuit that envelops Lorde’s body is plopped down on subway seat, 
the scent of damp clothes fills the rattling car, bodies of all kinds bump against each other in the 
enclosed space. A very specific material mood is put into play in Lorde’s narration of her 
encounter with a racist exchange. Moreover, it is striking that in this story, where all meaning is 
communicated via bodily movements, clothing brokers human touch. Lorde’s body is enclosed 
in a snowsuit. Meanwhile, the racist woman is draped head-to-toe in animal trappings: fur hat, 
fur coat, and leather gloves. These nonhuman material layers obstruct any possibility of skin-to-
skin contact. Nevertheless, a deeply intimate and traumatic interaction plays out on the clothes 
that two human bodies are wearing, suggesting that they are an extension of the human self.21  
                                                 
21 See Tanya Camela Logan’s dissertation, “Dressing Masculinity Among Black Men in Paris Since the Mid-1970s” 
for a longer discussion of clothing as a second skin in the construction and contestation of racialized being.  
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What does this attention to materiality do to Lorde’s narration, and how does this skin 
memory reappear in Lorde’s (telling of her) life later? Lorde’s snowsuit—a plush, new, blue 
covering that was mean to protect her from the winter wetness that plagued all the subway 
passengers—exposes the violence of the woman’s gesture. Rather than protecting Lorde, it 
becomes the vehicle through which Lorde is made to learn she does not belong. The woman’s 
racist repulsion is such that she would rather experience the discomfort of standing on a teetering 
subway, clutching a damp strap rather than risk touching a Black child’s clean clothing with her 
own coat. In the same movement that the woman stands up to get away from Lorde, the soft fur 
of the woman’s coat caresses Lorde’s face, a gesture that undermines the affective register of the 
interaction.  
Though Lorde’s narration places the interaction between herself and the woman at center 
stage, another story simmers on the sideline. Lorde’s sparse yet object-oriented narration made 
this sidelined story catch my eye upon re-reading with an attention to the objects that populate 
the narrative. Heavy shopping bags fill the arms of Lorde’s mother—a light-skinned Black 
woman from the West Indies—but since there is only one tight seat open in the subway car, her 
mother pushes Lorde down to sit while she remains standing. The fur-clad woman is on one side 
of Lorde, but on the other, sits a (white?) man, reading a newspaper. As I read this scene a 
second time, it occurred to me that in that dense space of a subway car, there are two gestures of 
racist and gendered violence emerging from the clutter of material objects in the narration. There 
is the woman’s overt gesture of pulling away and standing up to avoid tactile contact with 
Lorde’s body. This is the gesture that Lorde’s essay dwells on and makes explicit. But her 
narration also tells of the man who continues to read, unruffled, a newspaper of all things. 
 29 
 Reading a newspaper—instead of, say, a book—is an action that requires having one’s 
arm up and spread out; the man, in other words, takes with aplomb a substantial amount of space 
in what is a crowded public setting, where in the norms of civic life one would normally pay 
attention to sharing space. He neither moves to make more space for the child that is squeezed 
down next to him, nor moves to let a person with their arms full of packages sit down. The 
cultural norms of New York City in the early 1940s would dictate that a man would give up his 
seat on public transport to a woman, especially a mother, and especially if burdened with heavy 
objects. The complete disregard for Lorde and her mother’s presence is another type of racist 
interaction, one that demonstrates how a similar structure of feeling—disregard for the humanity 
of a different race—manifests itself differently in bodies as they are gendered. The white man 
refuses to move his body for a black woman and her child, while the white woman moves her 
body away from them. And in all this, there is Lorde’s mother, who “pushes [her] little 
snowsuited body down” (147). This meeting of two bodies, Lorde’s mother reaching out to her 
and pushing her down, is fraught with ambivalence. It seems to be both a rough and tender 
gesture. Hurried, because she is burdened; hurried, because the opening into a seat might soon be 
snatched by someone else, and she wants to give her daughter a small comfort in a rough ride. 
Yet the protective gesture of finding her daughter a seat ends up exposing her to an act of racist 
disgust.  
These experience infiltrates Lorde’s body, inhabiting how she moves in the material 
world around her, animating her sense of being in the spaces she moves in later in life, and 
inhabiting her narrative strategies. Later in the essay, Lorde recounts another incident, one that 
happened as an adult:  
I stand in the Public Library waiting to be recognized by the Black woman library 
clerk seated a few feet behind the desk. She seems engrossed in a book, beautiful 
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in her youth and self-assuredness. I straighten my glasses, giving a tiny shake to 
my bangles in the process just in case she has not seen me, but I somehow know 
she has. Otherwise motionless, she slowly turns her head and looks up. Her eyes 
cross mine with a look of such incidental hostility that I feel pilloried to the wall. 
To male patrons enter behind me. At that, she rises and moves toward me. 154 
The material setting in this scene stands in striking contrast with the subway scene. In the library, 
one can imagine silence, dry air, spaciousness. The bodies are not jostling against each other, on 
the contrary, they have the luxury of space and stillness. This time, Lorde is standing and the 
woman she faces is sitting down, and the act of hostility is not an eagerness to move away from 
Lorde, but a studied reluctance to approach her. The hostility of the librarian comes not from a 
difference in class and race, as in the scene with the fur-clad woman in the subway. Instead, it is 
a sameness that drives the interaction: both women, both Black, both presumably educated, both 
lovers of books it seems. Yet, instead of providing a point of solidarity, this shared experience of 
blackness and womanhood stokes hostility. Once again, Lorde’s narration uses material objects 
to spur moments of action. Lorde adjusts her glasses and lets her bracelets clink against each 
other, using this noise to force the woman’s attention to her, but it is not until two male (white?) 
bodies walk into the space that the librarian finally approaches Lorde.  
Through her narration, Lorde demonstrates how experiences of interracial and misogynist 
hatred weld themselves to her. She illustrates how her body brings these memories into the 
spaces she longs to share with black women, and sees the embodied memories seep into that 
space. Even though the librarian resembles other Black women that Lorde loves—“Why does 
she wear my sister’s face?”—her sidelong glance and hostile eyes call into space of the library 
the wide eyes of the white woman on the subway (154). Lorde consistently points to the material 
settings and sensory elements that mediated her social interactions, and points to how the 
material objects in different setting trigger and intervene in her embodied memories. Finally, she 
deploys material objects in her processes of remembering and narrating lived experiences to pull 
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a reader’s attention to processes of racialization and gendering that shape Lorde’s sense of 
subjectivity. Through all this, she forms a profoundly specific knowledge of being and belonging 
in a racialized world as a black, gendered, subject of the African diaspora.  
I wish to suggest, however, that she also points to ways of remaking affinities and 
solidarities—while acknowledging their limits—through her object-oriented narration. When I 
re-read the scene in the subway car, following the arms full of packages and the arms filled with 
a newspaper, I began to see how Lorde’s narration provides the materials for investing in Black 
female solidarity even as she demonstrates the multiple forces that work against it. Lorde and her 
mother experience a similar racism in the very same moment, even though the expression of the 
violence is gendered by their interlocutors. Lorde’s narration does not suggest that a mere 
recognition that her mother and her share an experience of racialized social violence leads to an 
easy affinity. Indeed, Lorde’s work remains powerful precisely because it layers these 
complexities onto each other. The answer she points to in the final pages “I have to learn to love 
myself before I can love you or accept your loving,” is a relearning of bodily memories (174). 
The path however, is one that opens out of the profoundly specific conditions of being a black 
woman in America. And what Lorde’s object-oriented narration tells us, I suggest, is that her 
experiences cannot be appropriated to produce a universal truth. But rather, that the work of 
being and belonging—even in experiences marked by the global phenomena of migration, 
diaspora, and racialization—must answer to the specific, material, sensory, and social conditions 
that traverse it.  
What I have tried to point out through the close reading of Mohanty and Lorde’s object-
oriented narration via Ahmed’s notion of skin memories, is how stories of migration and 
diaspora often point to unhomely feelings—the feeling of not belonging, being at odds—with the 
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world that one sees, smells, and touches on a daily basis. Even if one has lived in the same place 
for a close to a lifetime, or for generations. The state of being-at-home, then, is both a physical, 
sensory one, and an affective, social one. These three theorists invite us, as readers, to dwell on 
the role that the materialities of objects, environments, and bodies play in creating and narrating 
both unhomely feelings and the state of being-at-home. The ways of knowing the self that they 
outline, and the modes of action the point to, texture our understanding of migration and diaspora 
by noting and narrating the fractures of race and gender in practices of belonging. Finally, they 
suggest that the affinities, attachments, and ally-ships to collective identities must address the 
asymmetries within shared lived experiences, rather than assuming a facile solidarity can be born 
of them. 
Another Face: Objects in Site-Specific Mediums 
In the other “Faces” of this introduction, I address what material objects do in the world, 
and what they do in narration, and what I do with them. Yet another possible way of entering this 
project would be to set out the primary sites that nourish its work. Such a beginning, grounded in 
the specific examples discussed in Unsettled Belongings, could orient the reading of its chapters 
along questions of medium, genre and narrative strategy. This “Face” of the tetrahedron is the 
one I wish to turn to now.  
I have selected four site-specific mediums that will be analyzed as narrative assemblages. 
These are 1) museum exhibitions, specifically, the Galerie des dons (Gifts Gallery) at the Musée 
National de l’histoire de l’immigration (National Museum of Immigration History) in Paris, 
France; 2) memorial sites, specifically, the Cape Coast Castle Slave Memorial in Cape Coast, 
Ghana; 3) contemporary art installations, specifically Exhibit B by South African artist Brett 
Bailey and several works by Martinican artist Julien Creuzet; and 4) contemporary novels, 
specifically Senegalese author Fatou Diome’s Kétala (2005) and Nigerian author Chris Abani’s 
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Becoming Abigail (2005). Each of these four types of sites deploy material objects in the 
production of narratives, but the roles they assign to the objects, their engagement with the 
object’s materialities, and the narrative voice and subject positions they invite their publics to 
adopt, all differ.  
A narrative traces the unfolding of a set of actions over time. In this dissertation, using 
the term narrative assemblages helps me account for a multitude of human and nonhuman actors 
that participate in the creation, communication, and consequences of the narratives under 
analysis. In other words, I consider how each exhibition, memorial, installation, or novel is a 
multi-bodied congregation—an assemblage of words on a page; display apparatuses; named and 
unnamed material objects; temporal and geographic locations of production and reception; 
human bodies that create, write, view, read; and so much more. These are assemblages because 
they do not have a single point of origin nor linear movement, rather they produce a swarm of 
narratives through the push and pull of these many human and nonhuman bodies that enter and 
exit the assemblage. Jane Bennett speaks of texts as “a distributive network of bodies: words on 
the page, words in the reader’s imagination, sounds of words, sounds and smells in the reading 
room, etc., etc.—all these bodies coacting” (Bennett 2012; 232). This dissertation analyzes 
literary texts through this framework, but considers, in addition, narratives assemblage that are 
made up of words on a wall label, the sight of material objects, the sounds of a visitor’s steps as 
they walk through an installation, etc.   
While I focus specifically on the role—the narrative techniques and effects—of material 
bodies in these assemblages, Unsettled Belongings does not attempt to identify a universal 
poetics of objects. Instead, I tease out what is specific about the relationship between humans 
and objects in each of these types of narrative assemblages. I also seek to understand how these 
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narrative assemblages participate in larger discourses of being and belonging, through their 
representations of the lived experiences of migration, displacement, diaspora. While the 
specificities of each type of narrative assemblage will be discussed in their corresponding 
chapters, I will briefly sketch out a few preliminary considerations—concerns, questions, or 
points of interest—raised by each genre of narrative assemblage that will be helpful to keep in 
mind. 
Museum exhibitions: As narrative assemblages, museum exhibitions provide a fertile 
ground for analyzing how state institutions deploy material objects to construct a 
citizenry. I fall in line with Tony Bennett’s history of the museum in Western Europe and 
North America, The Birth of the Museum, in which he demonstrates how “museums 
formed a part of new strategies of governing aimed at producing a citizenry which, rather 
than needing to be externally and coercively directed, would increasingly monitor and 
regulate its own conduct” (1995; 8). The narrative assemblages operating through 
museum exhibitions, thus, are closely related to the production of national identity and 
practices of citizenship deemed proper by the ruling nation-state. As such, it makes sense 
to interrogate museum exhibitions in a project that asks what it means to be in and belong 
to a nation. Moreover, it is particularly important to bring museum exhibitions into 
consideration in a project on racialized being and belonging. The collection and 
exhibition of material culture—and persons—from Africa in Western Europe led to the 
development and dissemination of biological understandings of race as well as 
evolutionary approaches to cultural development.  
In France more particularly, the practices of collection and exhibition were 
closely tied with colonial conquest. Bennetta Jules-Rosette and Erica Fontana argue that 
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that the museums of colonial and postcolonial France had three narrative stages: “The 
first narrative stage is contact and conquest. […] The second phase is domination, 
acquisitions, and accumulation. […] The third cultural narrative […] is that of the 
implosion and saturation of culture” (86). In each of these stages, Jules-Rosette and 
Fontana argue, the techniques of display, classification practices, and relationships to the 
publics provides clues for analyzing France’s relationship to the inhabitants of the 
mainland and the colonies that were racialized as Africans. Given this history, museum 
exhibitions are a key site for addressing this dissertation’s exploration of how human and 
nonhuman bodies interact to express, impose, or remake notions of individual being and 
collective belonging in a postcolonial world. 
Memorial sites: Like museums, memorial sites are three-dimensional narrative 
assemblages, often managed by state or international actors. Like museums, they 
encourage visitors to accept a particular understanding of and relationship to the material 
content on display—and to each other. I examine memorial sites in addition to museums, 
however, because they pose slightly different questions. Namely, memorial sites, though 
tasked with remembering a past event, have significant consequences for the future. As 
Tony Bennett argues, “The shape of the thinkable future depends on how the past is 
portrayed and on how its relations to the present are depicted” (162). Often, and in the 
case of the sites discussed in this dissertation, what is at stake is making a more just 
future thinkable. The ethical and social imperatives of memorial sites allow me thus to 
investigate the kinds of futures that become thinkable, depending on the interactions 
between human visitors and the material space of the memorial site. Inviting the Cape 
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Coast Castle Slave Memorial site into the dissertation is a way to make a case for the 
ethical consequences of aesthetic choices in practices of commemoration. 
A second particularity of memorial sites is that, unlike museums, they tend to 
have relatively few things to see. Being often located in ruins, abandoned buildings, 
empty fields, memorial sites cannot rely on a visually-rich collection of material objects 
to tell their story. The narrative force of memorial sites, then, relies more heavily on 
senses beyond the visual, and requires an imaginative investment on the part of the 
visitor.22 The narrative assemblages of memorial sites, I thus suggest, function through 
mechanisms that are not quite the same as museums; they can teach us about how human 
and nonhuman bodies are co-constitutive in the formation of being and belonging through 
other kinds of interactions. 
Contemporary art installations: I have selected two contemporary art installations for 
discussion in this dissertation, because it is an aesthetic practice that often thinks 
critically about the predominant technologies of display and categories of objects used by 
museum exhibitions and memorial sites. There is, in fact, a trend of institutional critique, 
reinvigorated in the 1990s by artists such as Fred Wilson, Renée Cox, and Andrea Fraser, 
                                                 
22 Of course, there will almost always be a kinetic interaction in even conventional museums exhibitions, as the 
visitors move through the space to see the displays, and the material environment produces effects, intentionally or 
not. (See Constance Classen’s “Museum Manners: The Sensory Life of the Early Museum” for a historical inquiry 
into the multisensorial experience of visitors at a 17th century British museum.) Moreover, recent work in museology 
has trended toward imagining a multisensorial museum, and institutions are increasingly working on exhibitions that 
engage the visitor through multiple senses and form of interaction, not just looking (Black 2005; Classen and Howes 
2006; Pye 2007; Chatterjee 2008; Candlin 2010; Dudley 2010; Senses and Society 9.3 2014; Papastergiadis 2016). 
And certainly, some genres of museums (e.g. science museums, children’s museums) have a longer tradition of 
interactive displays that require a kinetic engagement. However, for most of the 19th and 20th centuries, museums 
invited visitors first and foremost to see and learn how to see—certainly not touch, listen, smell, or interact with the 
material objects on display through other senses. 
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that hones in on the interplay between race, colonialism, and globalization in museums.23 
This dissertation asks how exhibition technologies and categories—which, as mentioned, 
were often used in the fomentation of biological understanding of racial difference and 
racialized belonging—are repurposed by contemporary artists to tell alternative stories of 
race and belonging. The museum exhibitions and memorial sites that I analyze tend to 
represent a dominant, institutional, or governmental voice. Bringing in examples of 
creative expression produced by the people being spoken about (and sometime spoken 
for) in the exhibitions and memorial sites, allows me to consider how narratives shift 
when the subject positions and aesthetic purposes of the human actors in the assemblage 
change. In addition, though I argue in my chapters on museum exhibitions and memorial 
sites that there are creative curatorial and aesthetic choices that participate in the narrative 
outcomes of the assemblages, creative expression like arts and literatures allows for more 
ample room for maneuver. In terms of narrative, they are an exercise in fiction instead of 
fact, fiction which fosters imagination, or, “the ability to think oneself out of reality into 
an irreal but possible sphere” (Miller 1990; 297). The shape of the thinkable future, I 
argue, requires not just an examination of how the past is represented in the present, nor 
only a deconstruction of that present, though both of these are essential. It requires, in 
addition, a pressing against the limits of the thinkable future through creative practice. 
Novels: It might seem odd to label a literary text a site-specific medium, as one of the 
very hallmarks of literary narratives is the portability. A book can be tossed into a 
                                                 
23 The Institutional Critique movement, now recognized as a historical category, began in the late 1960s. A 
symposium held at the Los Angeles County Museum of Art energized a group of artists, including Michael Asher 
and Hans Haacke, to create performances, architectural interventions, and/or ephemera that make visible the inner 
workings and implicit logic of art institutions and markets. See Janet Marsine’s Critical Practice: Artists, Museums, 
Ethics (2017) and John C. Welchman’s edited volume Institutional Critique and After (2006). 
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backpack or downloaded onto a smartphone and pocketed. I insist, nevertheless, on 
including literary texts in a project that explore materiality as a narrative tactic for three 
reasons. The first is to emphasize that even if a literary text is not site-specific, the act of 
reading is site-specific. A person is located in a particular time and place at the moment 
the read the literary text through a material support, be that book pages or tactile screen. 
The location, time and support might change during the process of reading, but each 
instance of reading is enveloped in material trappings. 
The second reason is related: reading is an embodied experience. As Neville Hoad 
contends, “Fiction addresses the subject’s imagination, an imagination that is 
paradoxically but profoundly embodied; paradoxically because the act of reading (sitting 
still, being transposed to another world) is often a disembodied experience; profoundly 
because imaginative identification involves the entire sensorium” (Hoad 2007; xxx). In 
contrast to museum exhibitions, contemporary art installations, and (to a lesser degree) 
memorial sites, the narrative assemblages of literary texts must call into being the deeply 
physical presence of material objects not through direct bodily perception, but through 
the imagination and embodied memories.   
The third reason for including literary texts is that reading furthermore shapes the 
interaction humans have with other bodies before, after, and beyond the textual 
interaction. As Jane Bennett puts it, “Texts are bodies that can light up, by rendering 
human perceptions more acute, those bodies whose favored vehicle of affectivity is less 
wordy: plants, animals, blades of grass, household objects, trash” (Bennett 2012; 232). 
Reading can change human perception of, and affection for, the material bodies that we 
encounter in the “real” world.  
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I spend less time on this “Face” of the Introduction’s tetrahedral net because many of the site-
specific considerations of material objects will be more productive to discuss in their particular 
chapters. But, I hope that looking at this face has helped me (writer) and you (reader) orient 
ourselves to the questions raised by the primary material I have selected for the dissertation. 
A Final Face: What I do to Objects 
Another plane of the dissertation-as-tetrahedron that I wish to face is my own subject 
position, as reader and writer. This means reflecting on how my self, my skin memories, the 
material spaces I traversed and my own set of ever-changing affinities shaped the objects in 
Unsettled Belongings. How, in other words, does my lived experience and my writing body, and 
my set of intellectual and aesthetic affinities, contribute to the selections and omissions that 
constitute the critical approaches and corpus of the dissertation?  
The answers I propose in this “Face” will be partial, but I hope they serve to circumscribe 
my argumentative claims and work against any appearance this dissertation may have of simply 
throwing out old categories to erect new ones. It is a practice, I hope, of non-coercive writing. I 
pull this concept out of Françoise Lionnet’s articulation of non-coercive reading:  
To read non-coercively is to allow my self to be interwoven with the discursive 
strands of the text, to engage in a form of intercourse wherein I take my 
interpretives cues from the patterns that emerge as a result of this encounter—in 
other words, it is to enjoy an erotics of reading somewhat similar to Barthes’s in 
The Pleasures of the Text. 28 
For Lionnet, non-coercive practices of reading allow for what is unique to a particular reading 
experience to contribute to the production of meaning. Interpretation, in Lionnet’s framing, is 
mutually constitutive engagement between the specific text, its context of enunciation, and the 
reader’s embodied locality. Each of these parts is transformed in their encounter through the 
production of meaning.  It is thus an encounter in which the reading subject is empowered to 
listen to the resonances that the text makes across their lived experience and previous encounters 
 40 
with other human and nonhuman material bodies (e.g. texts read previously, but also, places, 
objects, physical exchanges).  
A non-coercive writing practice, I suggest, is a continuation of this interweaving of the 
self into the production of meaning. In following the interpretives cues of the narratives that I 
analyze and transmitting them to these pages, I allow the specific (and often chance) encounters 
that I had with material objects (including texts), people, and places to infiltrate the questions I 
pose, the conclusions I draw out, and the way in which I write them down. I recognize, for 
example, that laying side-by-side a slave memorial site in Anglophone Ghana for comparison 
with a contemporary art installation in France (even if it represents, in part, the history of 
transatlantic slavery) in the third chapter may seem like an odd choice. Not only because this is a 
dissertation in Francophone studies, but also because the two mediums—memorial sites and 
contemporary art installations—have different modes of production, creative licenses, and ethical 
imperatives. They come together in this dissertation because, by chance, I encountered both in 
the same year. That temporal proximity led me to notice other patterns, in the way the audiences 
of these sites spoke about belonging to collective histories, and what rights to remembering and 
representing those histories such belonging allows one to claim, or not claim. In writing that 
chapter, I attend to the limits and impropriety of the comparison I set up, while nevertheless 
demonstrating what knowledges are produced in the encounter between these two sites and my 
self, ways of knowing that would not have come about otherwise.   
This may seem to be an undisciplined practice, contrary to the disciplinary exigencies of 
scholarly production and communication. Ahmed speaks of “disciplinary homes” that dictate 
ways of ordering space, time, method, evidence, and ultimately, what is salient knowledge 
(2006; 22). Lisa Lowe describes it as this: “The modern division of knowledge into academic 
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disciplines, focused on discrete areas and objects of interest to the modern national university, 
has profoundly shaped the inquiry into [the connections of the four continents]. Even the 
questions we can ask about these histories are influenced by the unevenly inhabited and 
inconsistently understood aftermath of these obscured conditions” (1-2, emphasis mine). This 
dissertation inhabits several disciplinary homes, and sometimes straddles their thresholds. At 
times, its writing or methods may seem out of place. But given that my project makes a case for 
how strategies of belonging and homemaking are acted out through materially-oriented aesthetic 
and narrative practices, I have striven for this dissertation to make a home for itself between 
disciplines, through specific narrative and aesthetic choices in my writing. In other words, I have 
aimed to think about the form of this instance of scholarly communication, and sculpt that form 
into something that aligns with the content of the dissertation.  
One of those choices is the one I mentioned earlier, bringing into an unholy alliance 
material sites that would normally be relegated to separate spheres of study. Arguing that such 
sites belong together is a way of enacting one of the arguments of Unsettled Belongings, which is 
that who, what, and how something “belongs” has more to do with the narration after the 
instance of encounter, than a preexisting alliance. Another strategy for making the form of the 
dissertation enact some of the arguments of its content is allowing for multiple framings—
multiple disciplinary takes on the world—to coexist, as they do in this introduction through the 
deployment of a tetrahedral metaphor. Yet another is to provide some discontinuity even within 
the linear bounds of a dissertation that has a beginning and ending page. While one could start at 
the beginning and end at the end—and the individual chapters do have a tightly sequenced 
order—in the introduction I have attempted to construct the “Faces” as stand-alone sections that 
connect to each other but that could be read in different orders, or in isolation. In a similar vein, 
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the sequence of the chapters forms a kind of palindrome. The first and the last chapters, Arrive 
and Encounter, think through belonging to and making a home in France and are temporally 
oriented to the future. Meanwhile, the two middle chapters, Return and Remember, think through 
belonging and making a home in diaspora, and are temporally oriented to the past. The first and 
last chapters could be thus read as a pair, and the middle two as their own pair. The patterns and 
interpretive clues of such a pairing would be somewhat different, but equally valid I suggest, as 
reading the four chapters in their numeric sequence.  
As I make narrative and aesthetic choices such at these, I recognize, too, that I am acting 
out of ethical and political commitments born out of living in the body that I inhabit and the 
places that have inhabited my self. I am interested in what it means to belong to a community 
(singular or plural), to a place (singular or plural), and to draw a sense of being from such 
attachments, because my own experience of “home” does not fit into the measures offered by 
predominant home-making narratives. If home is “a mythic place of desire in the diasporic 
imagination,” I have had a “home” for thirty-some years in Mexico, the place my parents left 
before I was born (Ahmed 2000; 77). However, my attachment to and desire for that place waxes 
and wanes over the decades; it fills up in the years when I can travel there and link arms with my 
relatives and smell the dry polluted air of Monterrey, it fades away in the years where trips to 
France take the place of any time I could have spent in Mexico. There seems to be something, 
then, to the idea that I can make a home out of the “lived experience of locality, its sounds and 
smells” (Ahmed 2000; 89). I am drawn to this strategy of home-making, given that it is both 
portable—the skin memories I carry with me—and profoundly localized. Nevertheless, this 
measure, too, has its limits for me. I have never lived in the same city for more than six years 
consecutively; many of these places have surely left their mark on me, but in ways I cannot know 
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and the lack of being able to know these lived localities, identify their traces, means they are 
unfamiliar, undesired “homes” for me.  
I could try other measuring sticks to determine where I belong, such as home is where I 
am right now, in the present. But, my experience has shown me that even this claim has its 
limits. As a child, when I lived with my parents, no matter how much I loved and felt a part of 
the place my family was currently living in, “here” was rarely the correct answer when I was 
asked by other inhabitants of that place, “Where is your home?” If I answered “here,” my 
interrogator’s face would communicate incomprehension. I would venture, “I moved here from 
Texas [or California, or which ever state my family has recently left],” but that did not seem to 
resolve the issue, either. Trying yet another tactic, I might tell the inquisitor, “I was born in 
Canada,” as answer which I soon learned produced disastrous confusion and was to be avoided at 
all costs. After enough back and forth, I would eventually arrive at the answer that appeased 
everyone but me—“Mexico.” A place that I had tender feelings for but had never lived in, a fact 
that was palpable to me each time we visited. Despite the delight I took in playing with my 
cousins in Mexico, my time there would be full of clumsy encounters with this locality’s 
materialities, such as being given only bottled water to drink when all the other children drank 
from the tap, because my gringa stomach was not habituated to the local water.  
All of these measures of home failed me—or failed the person trying to determine my 
“home”—while I lived in the United States, because the brown-skinned body I inhabited, and the 
softly inflected English my mouth produced, fractured the expectation of what someone “from” 
the United States looked and sounded like. “Home” as one’s mother tongue was also fraught: my 
first words were in Spanish, but I felt and feel most at home in English, and sometime French 
seeps into my Spanish. Moreover, all three languages, when I employ them orally, are “marked” 
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by an accent, a sign of not-belonging. When I first lived in France in 2006, racialization and not-
belonging were just as present as they had been in the United States, but in another way. I 
learned that the North African men in Toulouse would hail me as “ma soeur” instead of 
“madame” or “mademoiselle” because they identified my hair and skin color as belonging with 
the North African women that lived in the neighborhood where I went to buy produce. Physical 
appearance and imperfect command of the language meant that, like in the U.S.A., I was often 
asked to account for my “home.” If I said I was American, a lengthy interrogation into my 
“origines” began. Unlike in the U.S.A., however, I tended to welcome this, perhaps even 
claiming Mexico as my home right off the bat, as this was during George W. Bush’s presidency: 
any distance I could put between myself and the country that I actually came from (and, to my 
surprise, missed) was welcome. 
In other words, Like Ahmed24 and like Chandra Mohanty,25 home as sensory experience, 
home as origin, home as birthplace, home as language, home as location of family, or home as 
location of those I have chosen to call family, is not condensed in a single place, or even two or 
three. It is a multitude of lived localities, affinities, and embodied memories that overlap, 
uneasily and asymmetrically. Home is a number of places where I have been, am going, or want 
to return to—and in all of these, home is never really in my hands. Like Ahmed, Mohanty, and 
also like Audre Lorde, my experience of what belonging to the places I felt I had some claim to 
call home collided with the ascription of race and gender to my self by those who also live in 
                                                 
24 “You might say I have multiple homes, each one a different kind of home: home is England, where I was born 
and now live, home is Australia, where I grew up, and home is Pakistan, where the rest of my family lives” (2000; 
86-87). 
25 “What is home? The place I was born? Where I grew up? Where my parents live? Where I live and work as an 
adult? Where I locate my community, my people? Who are “my people”? Is home a geographical space, a historical 
space, an emotional, sensory space? […] I am convinced that this question—how one understands and defines 
home—is a profoundly political one. […]” (126) 
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those places and have other claims of belonging. I recount these anecdotes to demonstrate how 
my particular material body and set of lived localities makes it so that “no clear or obvious fit 
between geography, race, and politics for someone like me” in the current ways we speak about 
collective and individual belonging to a home (Mohanty 135). However, if this lived experience 
of my body in different localities influences my intellectual affinity with Ahmed, Mohanty, and 
Lorde, and with the work of the Francophone African and Afro-Caribbean authors and artists 
that I analyze in dissertation, I recognize, at the same time, its asymmetries.  
My experiences of migration as a child were privileged by my parents’s education, 
cultural capital, and eventually, their financial prosperity. My experiences of migration as an 
adult have been “chosen,” and made less daunting by a US passport and access to a student 
visa.26 If at times uncomfortable, my experience in a brown body in the U.S.A. has nevertheless 
been protected from some of the more violent forms of racialization, because I move in elite 
spaces where I am less likely to be picked out as one of the Mexican immigrants stealing jobs (or 
other slanders, or physical violence). Furthermore, as a cisheterosexual woman, my gendered 
body lets me escape the formula Mexican + male = “bad hombre” that the current United States 
President propagates. In France, even if my “true” identity of Mexican is discovered, unlike in 
the U.S.A., it is treated as a novelty, and the beauties of my “homeland” and the generosity of its 
people will be touted—with racialized tinges, perhaps, but not of the kind that makes me fear for 
my physical safety. None of this protects me from the administrative violence that is routine in 
immigration proceedings in France—a violence that I did not have to confront directly in the 
U.S.A., as I became a citizen while still a minor—but it is, once again, tempered by my 
American passport, my fluidity in the French language, and my ambiguous ethnic origin that 
                                                 
26 The notion of a “chosen” migration is problematic, but not a digression I will take in these pages.  
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tends to be read as exotic rather than threatening or suspicious. And in no locality am I subject to 
the unique history that will, in Fanon’s words, subject African American and Afro-descendant 
persons not to “une conaissance de mon corps en troisième personne, mais en triple personne 
[…] à la fois responsable de mon corps, responsable de ma race, de mes ancêtres” (Fanon 110; 
[no longer a question of being away of my body in the third person but in triple person. […] I 
was responsible at the same time for my body, for my race, for my ancestors] Markmann 112).  
I have pointed to, then, the points that in my embodied experience of migration and 
racialization that converge with some of the persons and works that I encounter in this 
dissertation. I have also noted the separate directions that our experiences take after those points 
of convergence. I recognize that this configuration of racialization, gender, and migration 
influences not only my interest in such questions, but the kinds of texts and lenses I am drawn to. 
I could have constructed a corpus of literature written entirely by Francophone Senegalese 
women, and learned much about racialization, gender, and what it means to make a home in a 
postcolonial world. But I didn’t. I chose authors, artists, and institutions, producing work in 
English and French, whose possible “homes” are many, who speak of migration and diaspora, 
but often indirectly.  
This speaks to how I want to position my self against the persons that I bring into 
conversation in this dissertation. I place my self next to them, perhaps overlapping with their 
selves, but imperfectly and asymmetrically. I do not wish to speak for others who have 
experienced racialization and displacement, nor about others, but speak to them, next to them, 
indirectly with them. In other words, if I can speak to Julien Creuzet’s—a black, Afro-Caribbean 
male artist—aesthetic strategies for creating a sense of being and belonging, as I do in the fourth 
chapter, I can only do so through metaphor, analogy, and indexicality. If I can furthermore ask 
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Lorde’s text speak to Creuzet’s installations, I can do so through juxtaposition, uncomfortable 
alliances, uneasy intersections. For if I am drawn to both Lorde’s work and Creuzet’s work (to 
give just one example), it is not only because there are points of convergence in our embodied 
experiences of belonging through the fraught terrain of migration, race, diaspora, and gender. It 
is also because what they do with material objects in their creative practice is analogous to what I 
want to do with material objects in my critical practice: they form, inform, transform the 
metaphors and strategies for making meaning—and making meaningful homes.  
Closing a Tetrahedron 
In this introduction, I have walked the surface of the tetrahedron’s net to touch on each 
corner of its “Faces.” What I wish to do now, is fold it up to its three-dimensions and use it to 
look at and through the materials of Unsettled Belongings. My hope is that this dissertation will 
be of interest to scholars who are working on the topics of migration, diaspora, racialization, 
gender, and postcoloniality—especially those who explore their intersections. For Francophone 
studies in particular, I hope that this dissertation puts into dialogue some texts and theories that 
have not yet been put into conversation, pushing the field towards new disciplinary homes. 
Indeed, I would argue that one of this dissertation’s contributions is bringing in methods and 
sources from object-oriented analysis into the study of the African diaspora within a specifically 
Francophone context. A brief overview of the leading studies of blackness, diaspora, queerness, 
and the nonhuman turn would reveal few that are working with Francophone sources, territories, 
and context. In my analysis of Fanon in one of the “Faces” of this introduction, I have tried to 
press on the traces that would allow a reading of the contributions of Francophone postcolonial 
thought into such fields. In the chapters that follow, I will also attempt to demonstrate what 
French and Francophone studies has to gain from analyzing Frenchness through the methods, 
frameworks, and concerns that have animated black diaspora studies and the nonhuman turn. 
 48 
I also hope that this dissertation will be an invitation to scholars of race, gender, and 
diaspora outside of Francophone studies to take a second look at the nonhuman materialities at 
work in their primary and secondary texts, and ask themselves what turning to nonhuman 
material bodies in their practice of reading and writing can do for this field. For those scholars 
that have begun their own forays into how thinking through nonhuman materialities in the 
formulation of race, gender, and being—scholars like Mel Chen (Animacies: Biopolitics, Racial 
Mattering, and Queer Affect), Neel Ahuja (“Postcolonial Critique in a Multispecies World”), and 
Fred Moten (“The Case of Blackness”), Omise’eke Natasha Tinsley, Anneke Smelik and Nina 
Lykke (Bits of Life: Feminism at the Intersections of Media, Bioscience, and Technology), Kara 
Keeling (“Looking for M--: Queer Temporality, Black Political Possibility, and Poetry from the 
future”), Zoe Todd (“An Indigenous Feminist’s Take on the Ontological Debate: Ontology is 
Just another Word for Colonialism”), to add to those discussed previously—I hope this project 
enters their conversation in fruitful ways.  
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Chapter One: ARRIVE 
 
In 2007, one year after the Musée du Quai Branly’s splashy opening (see Introduction), 
another museum prepares to open in Paris. This museum located in the 12th arrondissement, far 
from the historic and cultural center of Paris. This museum is the National Museum of the 
History of Immigration (Musée national de l’histoire de l’immigration; MNHI). At the time of 
the MNHI’s opening, Jacques Chirac’s presidential term has just ended and his protégé, Nicholas 
Sarkozy, will succeed him. During Sarkozy’s presidential campaign, he promised a tough stance 
on immigration; he proposed to increase the number of annual deportations, and that DNA tests 
be administered to individuals applying for visas under the existing family-based admissions 
programs. As part of his immigration reform, Sarkozy will open a new state department called 
the Ministry of Immigration, Integration, and National Identity.  
It is this conflation of immigration and national identity that I want to interrogate in this 
chapter, since immigration can, paradoxically, be one of the veins through which the boundaries 
of national identity coagulate. Indeed, the MNHI states that its mission is to “gather, preserve, 
and promote the history of immigration, giving as many people access to it as possible, in order 
to raise awareness and give recognition to the role of immigration in France’s development” 
([rassembler, sauvegarder, mettre en valeur et rendre accessible au plus grand nombre l’histoire 
de l’immigration, pour faire connaître et reconnaître le rôle de l’immigration dans la construction 
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de la France]).27 This statement, like the name of Sarkozy’s Ministry of Immigration, Integration, 
and National Identity, suggests that the regulation of “outsiders” inside the nation goes hand in 
hand with the preservation of national identity. As feminist postcolonial scholar Sarah Ahmed 
notes, rather than assuming that cultural, racial, and linguistic diversity automatically changes a 
monocultural national identity, we can ask “How does multiculturalism reinvent ‘the nation’ 
over the bodies of strangers? How does the act of ‘welcoming the stranger’ serve to constitute 
the nation? How is the ‘we’ of the nation affirmed through the difference of the ‘stranger 
cultures’, rather than against it?” (Ahmed 2000, 95). If, as discussed in the Introduction, the 
Musée du Quai Branly served as a way for the French state to give full rights of citizenship to the 
material objects of its former colonies, while denying those very same rights to the people of its 
former colonies, this chapter asks, what conditions of welcome do the objects at the Musée 
National de l’Histoire de l’Immigration sketch out for the individuals that migrate to France from 
other countries, particularly the countries that were once part of France’s empire? If the MNHI 
purports to tell a national story of immigration, what kind of national social body does it foment, 
and what must those deemed to be coming from the outside do to belong to it?  
This chapter proposes answers to such questions, through an analysis of a few of the 
migration narratives circulated in, around, or by the MNHI. This analysis will touch on the story 
of immigration mobilized by State actors when they discuss this museum, as well as the story of 
immigration told through the curatorial choices in one section of the MNHI’s permanent 
collection in particular, the Gifts Gallery (la Galerie des dons). Closely looking at the 
organization, display, and interpretation of the objects in that gallery will show what this 
exhibition does to the story of belonging to the French nation. Finally, I will examine a few 
                                                 
27 All translations in this chapter, unless alternative bibliographic information is provided, are mine. 
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individual objects in the Gift Gallery, and investigate what role they play in the museum’s 
narrative of the nation. How do these material objects support, contradict, or denature the story 
that the MNHI tells? What stories of belonging are enabled by the material objects on display? 
How do the interactions of the human and nonhuman bodies in the Gifts Gallery shape the 
thinkable future for a multicultural, multiracial co-habitation of peoples in France? 
The Elephant in the Wall: History of Immigration as History of Nation  
Before turning attention to the curatorial choices and the objects in the museum, it will be 
helpful to understand what has defined the conditions of the Musée National de l’Histoire de 
l’Immigration existence. I will therefore trace how the MNHI defined its mission—and how its 
mission was mobilized in national political discourse—at a few key moments in its history. It 
was a project long in the making, as the proto-life of this museum extends back over fifteen years 
before its opening. In addition, during its first ten years, it has lived through a series of re-
openings and re-structurings. Part of this tumultuous existence is due to its fraught relationship 
with the state. As a national museum, it is under the tutelage of the Ministry of Culture and the 
Ministry of Education. These state departments undergo their own turnover and restructurings as 
presidents and ministers change, and the MNHI’s administrative council ultimately answers to 
these state actors—and depends on the state for its annual budget.  
I mention these tensions because they begin to point to the difficulty that both the state 
and the museum have experienced in articulating the relationship between immigration and the 
nation. The tensions also provide context for the at-times contradictory stories of immigration the 
MNHI portrays.28 In this chapter, I am limiting my discussion of France’s idealized immigration 
narrative to two speeches given by high-level government officials at significant moments in the 
                                                 
28 For more on this see Thomas 2010; Bancel and Blanchard; Aldrich 2005; Hommes et Migrations 1267; Blanchard 
et al. 
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MNHI’s history—even though one could make the case that the tensions palpable in the MNHI’s 
history echo a broader malaise expressed by the country, at all gradients of the political 
spectrum, in regards to the topic of race, cultural diversity, and national identity. I selected the 
speeches because the help identify the narrative framework that structures state-sponsored 
discourse on immigration. In other words, the speeches will shed light on the way the state tells 
(or wants the museum to tell) the story of immigration in France. I focus on this institutional, 
public output—official documents, publications, promotional materials—rather than, for 
example, individual interviews or visitor surveys, because I am interested precisely in what the 
MNHI, as a state institution, feels it is allowed to say.29 
As I mentioned earlier, the idea of having a space dedicated to the history and culture of 
immigration in Paris had existed since 1989, and was initially floated not by the government but 
by a small group of historians, human-rights advocates, and local politicians. In 2001, right as 
Chirac was campaigning for re-election, the immigration museum project piqued the interest of 
the national government. At that time, the Prime Minister serving during Chirac’s first term, 
Lionel Jospin, commissioned Driss El Yazmin, vice-president of the Human Rights League and 
representative at large of the immigration research group “Génériques,” and Rémy Schwartz, a 
history professor and adjunct member of the State Counsel,30 to conduct a study on the feasibility 
and interest of such a project. Their report concluded that addressing the history of immigration 
through a national project would indeed be worthwhile, but left the specifics of such a project up 
for debate. The report suggested that a national research center could be envisioned, along with a 
                                                 
29 As I discuss the goals and missions of the MNHI, whether they are explicitly stated or operating implicitly, I want 
to acknowledge that this, like all institutions, is made up of individuals. The staff, contributors, and leaders of the 
MNHI might each position themselves differently in terms of the stated missions of the institution, and their 
individual histories would likely nuance what the museum says, what it does, and its effects.  
30 Maître du requêtes au Conseil d’Etat. 
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public museum that might be distributed over a network of sites across the country, or attached 
to a university campus, or located in a single, independent site.  
After his 2002 reelection, Chirac proclaimed that developing a more coherent policy of 
immigration based on a new politics of integration (“une nouvelle politique d’intégration”) was 
one of his top priorities. Many saw this as a reaction to the rising political power of the Front 
National (FN). The 2002 presidential election was the first time that the FN—a party known for 
its anti-immigrant, anti-minority, and anti-European Union rhetoric and policies, and whose 
founder, Jean-Marie Le Pen, was a holocaust denier—had made it to this final round of a 
presidential election.31 In was in this context of a new politics of integration that the immigration 
museum project finally garnered government investment. Chirac’s politics of integration sought 
a paradoxical outcome: to cast immigration in a more positive light than the extreme right, but 
also to appease the anti-immigration sentiments of Le Pen’s supporters by reaffirming the 
importance of the nation’s core identity by making a meticulously calibrated diversity part of 
national identity. This move of including those designated as ‘others’ into the ‘we’ of the nation 
is why Ahmed insists on the need to “examine multicultural discourses to see how national 
identity can be established through welcoming (some) strangers” (Ahmed 2000, 16). It is not 
solely through expulsion and exclusion that nations may reaffirm their identity, but though 
selective, conditional inclusion.   
Chirac appointed former Minister of Culture Jacques Toubon32 to lead the project of 
developing a national museum of immigration. The Palais de la Porte Dorée, which sits at the 
                                                 
31 The French political system is a multi-party system that has a two-tiered presidential election. In the first round, 
each party can present one candidate to a popular vote. The two candidates that win the most votes move on to the 
final round.  
32 Toubon, popularly known a Mr. Allgood (“tout bon” translated into English), was known for his controversial 
1994 law mandating that not only all government publications be written in French, but that all advertisements, 
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East end of Paris’s city limits, was chosen as the site for the museum. The Palais is an Art Deco 
building that had been constructed for the 1931 Exposition Coloniale Universelle—a World’s 
Fair that strove to reproduce the diverse riches of France’s empire within the space of Paris.33  
 
Figure 3 Facase of the MNHI. Photo courtesy of author. 
A line of slim rectangular columns stretches across the façade of the building, with a 
single, massive doorway set in the center, flanked on either side by a series of narrow windows. 
This creates an imposing panorama and a formal aura to the building. The front courtyard of the 
Palais is gated, with a single entrance at the center. Visitors thus have no option but to approach 
                                                 
workplaces, commercial communications and contracts, and government-financed schools use French in all their 
exchanges and materials.  
33 The slogan of this World Fair was “Around the world in a single day” (Le tour du monde en un jour). It included 
pavilions representing various French colonies that usually displayed agricultural goods and crafts from those lands, 
large-scale reproductions of indigenous architecture, and, quite often, live performances by colonial subjects that 
demonstrated either a local ritual or labor practice such as weaving. There is an extensive literature on the colonial 
fairs, but see Aldrich (2009), Hodeir (2002), and Lindfors (1999) for particularly relevant studies.  
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the building from the dead center, and climb up a set of steps to reach the arcade and the 
entrance. The formality of the approach and the classical evocations of the colonnade, without 
any religious imagery, result in the building resembling a sacred yet secular space: a secular 
temple, if you will.  
The shaded arcade created by the colonnade provides a promenade that one can use to 
marvel at one of the most striking features of the building: the floor-to-ceiling low-relief 
sculptures that adorn the exterior walls of the building. Designed by Alfred Janniot, these low-
relief sculptures were commissioned by the 1931 Expo Coloniale’s director, Louis Hubert 
Gonzalve Lyautey, who was Marshall of France at the time. The purpose of the façade was to 
make the wealth of the French empire visible to the Expo’s visitors. The wildlife of these lands—
elephants, camels, zebras, lions—parade across the upper half of the walls, dominating the scene. 
The animals all face toward the imposing doorway that sits at the center of the building. The 
animals thus appear to be marching to the entrance of the building, led by ships crowned with 
many tiers of sails.  
Squeezed in between the wildlife and the windows, “native” people toil in canoes, in 
agricultural fields, and in mines, demonstrating the diversity of goods and labor that the 
colonized territories provided for France. The “types” of animals and peoples indigenous to each 
territory are clustered together, with the name of that territory (e.g. “Maroc”) engraved near the 
cluster. The effect is both order and abundance; the native flora and fauna, exploited by the 
indigenous laborers, are classified by region and function as productive groups, but every inch of 
the sizeable wall is carved, suggesting there was not enough space to represent all of the riches of 
these lands. Many of the people portrayed carry or fill baskets and other containers with the 
fruits of their labor, and one can easily imagine that those baskets will fill the ships depicted on 
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the façade that with swelling sails enter the Palais. Since the low-relief murals sit behind the 
colonnade, the murals have a curious effect of display and containment. The people and animals 
are visible from afar, in between the columns. But the columns also appear to be holding in this 
teeming landscape of natural riches, like the bars of a prison cell.   
The Palais de la Porte Dorée was intended to stay open after the fair closed, as the 
Museum of the Colonies (le Musée permanent du colonies). The Museum of the Colonies’ 
mandate was to exhibit artisanal goods crafted in France’s overseas territories and provide 
geographic and historical information about these lands. In 1932, it changed its name to Museum 
of the Colonies and Outer France (Musée des colonies et de la France extérieure), and then in 
1935 it became The Museum of Overseas France (Musée de la France oute-mer). In 1960, under 
the influence of André Malraux, a surrealist artist34 who had been appointed Minister of Culture, 
it changed its collection focus to art objects, becoming the Museum of African and Oceanic Art 
(Musée des arts africains et oceaniens; MAAO). The natural history, scientific, and ethnographic 
displays were taken down, though the aquarium, located in the basement, remained. In 1990 it 
changed names yet again to become the National Museum of Art of Africa and Oceania (Musée 
national de l’art d’Afrique et d’Océanie), but closed 13 years after that, in 2003, when its 
collection migrated to the Musée du Quai Branly.  
                                                 
34 The surrealist in movement in France became, early on, one of the primary advocates for the independence 
movements of the colonial territories. The leaders of the surrealist movement had close working ties with the 
founders of the negritude movement, and often used their cultural capital to promote, disseminate, and advocate for 
contemporary African poets, writers, and artists. During the 1931 Expo Coloniale, two anti-imperialists groups with 
communist ties, the Comité de la defense de la race nègre (CDRN; previously the Ligue de la Défense de la race 
nègre founded by Lamine Senghor) and the Vietnamese Comité de la lutte published tracts denouncing the the 
exhibitions. Many of the members of these groups were arrested to prevent disruptions to the fair. The CDRN, in 
conjunction with the French section of the international Anti-Imperialist League, and covert help from the Parti 
communiste français, organized a counter-exhibition called “The Truth About the Colonies” (La vérité sur les 
colonies). Several Surrealist artists participated by curating the part of the exhibitions that featured arts from Africa, 
Oceania, and the Americas. See Blake 1999 (pp. 133-35) and 2002; Morton (pp. 98-110); Spector (pp. 177-79); 
Hodeir and Pierre (pp. 125-34); Hodeir, Pierre, and Leprun. 
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The endless modifications to its name signal the French state’s changing relationship to 
these territories over the 20th century: first colonies, then overseas departments, then independent 
nations. The struggle to name these lands, as well as to categorize the objects on display inside 
the museum, as art or as artifacts, mirrors the movement in the relationship between France and 
the people living in these lands as well: colonial subjects, indigenat with partial rights, 
‘nationals,’ assimilated citizens, or, eventually, autonomous citizens of independent nations.35 
The site is hence intimately entwined not only with France’s broad colonial history, but with its 
specific history of appropriation of material objects—agricultural, industrial, and artistic goods—
for commerce as well as for exhibition and study.  It is also tied with the history of the World 
Fairs, where the practice of putting humans on display to demonstrate cultural—and in some 
cases, purportedly biological—differences was prevalent. One would thus hope that a museum, 
particularly one focused on the movement of people across geographies, would reflect on these 
earlier practices of circulating, articulating, and displaying cultures and cultural difference 
through human and nonhuman bodies. The two speeches that inaugurated the MNHI, however, 
did not employ these histories as a framework for understanding the project. Furthermore, as I 
will argue in the section on the Gifts Gallery, some of the curatorial practices employed in the 
MNHI actually reproduce the colonial aesthetics of displaying the people and goods of France’s 
overseas empire. 
* * * 
The first speech to inaugurate the MNHI was given by Prime Minister Jean-Pierre 
Raffarin on June 8, 2004. This speech announced to the public the state-sponsored project of 
                                                 
35 France developed a complex system of law across its colonies that differentiated between types of subjects, 
creating inferior legal statuses for the indigenous inhabitants of the territories it had seized. As I will discuss later on, 
this legal status was, in some cases like in Algeria, directly determined by religion and phenotype.  
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building the museum of immigration, and revealed that the selected site for the future MNHI was 
the Palais de la Porte Dorée. To tell the story of the relationship between France as a nation and 
the history of immigration, Raffarin chose not colonialism as a narrative device, but, instead, the 
1790 French Revolution. He describes the revolution as the moment when the then-subjects of 
the king engaged in a communal project of universal human rights, claiming the status of citizens 
as that which allowed them to exercise these rights. Raffarin’s language propagates the 
Republican idea that nationality and citizenship are universal vocations, and eliminate local 
specificities (2004 [La Révolution a consacré la nation en rompant avec les particularismes 
locaux]).36 The 1790 Revolution, then, in narrative that Raffarin mobilizes, is what makes 
immigration possible: it allows any individual, regardless of origin, to claim universal human 
rights and exercise them through citizenship. 
Raffarin, however, conveniently forgets that though in 1794, the National Assembly had 
indeed decreed that all men (excluding slaves, and women) residing in the colonies were French 
citizens with full rights, regardless of race, that universal legal status was soon particularized. 
Napoleon Bonaparte created a separate set of laws to govern the indigenous inhabitants of 
colonial territories in the early 19th century, stripping these subjects of citizenship and the rights 
it entailed. Later, the Indigénat Code—implemented first in Algeria in 1865 and then across the 
empire in the late 1880s, lasting until 1944—created an inferior legal status for the indigenous 
inhabitants of the colonies, particularly those of the Muslim faith.37 Only the inhabitants of the 
                                                 
36 Here, Raffarin draws from the idea of Republicanism, a form of governance and national ideology developed by 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau (among others) that animated the 1790 revolution and drew the outlines of the modern 
French Republic. A key tenet of Republicanism is that what unifies the subjects is not a common identity, but that 
each individual is engaged in a direct relationship with the State. 
37 The earliest version of Indigénat code, created 1965 under Napoleon III, was first applied to the territory of 
Algeria. These laws made the indigenous inhabitants of the colonies French nationals but not French citizens, they 
were thus subject to French law (with some recourse to “customary” or religious courts) but without access to the 
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four oldest townships in French West Africa (located in what today is Senegal) had full 
citizenship rights, and not until 1915.38 To put it more explicitly, cultural and geographic origin, 
gender, religion, and physical appearance were all used to determine whether the inhabitants of 
France’s colonized territories had citizen’s rights. Overlooking this history of discriminatory 
citizenship, Raffarin proclaims nationality and citizenship as universal values on which French 
identity is founded—and thus, he claims, inclusive of all immigrants.  
Raffarin, in other words, declares that because of the French nation’s strong belief in 
these values—which, again, he considers as universal and unifying forces—the immigration 
museum project will be one that “chooses integration into the nation rather than differentiation 
between populations” as its guiding editorial line (2004 [Notre exigence de vérité repose sur des 
convictions fortes: nous avons fait le choix de l’intégration à la nation plutôt que la 
différenciation des populations]). The nation, therefore, and national identity, operate at the 
center of Raffarin’s vision for the museum of immigration—and immigration at large. Raffarin 
furthermore defines a French person as “a citizen that takes part in these values, that believes in 
universality, and who thinks and reasons in our language—our language as it is the very vector 
of our civilization and that is why we cling to it dearly” (2004 [Un Français aujourd’hui, c’est un 
citoyen qui a en partage ces valuers, qui croit en l’universal et qui pense et raisonne dans notre 
langue, notre langue qui est le vecteur meme de notre civilization et c’est pour cela que nous y 
                                                 
same rights as French citizens. The Indigénat code also affected land rights, imposed special taxes and duties, and 
made forced labor possible. Though some modifications were made, the Indigénat code was not abolished until 
1946. From Joan Wallach Scott’s The Politics of the Veil: “In 1870, citizenship was extended to Algerian Jews, 
though Jews were already considered French nationals in the metropole. In the hierarchy of social distinction, Jew 
ranked below Christian Europeans and native French, but above the Muslims (both Arab and Berber), who were the 
real subject people, those with no vote and no right of representation. Berbers, however, were considered superior to 
Arab because it was said that their belief in private property, their commerce and family law, as well as their 
European looks (red or blonde hair, blue eyes), made them more likely to assimilate to European ways” (48) 
38 One of the rights gained by this citizenship status in the four communes was the right to serve in the French 
Army. In some iterations of the code, in other territories, it was possible to apply for French citizenship, though in 
Algeria it required giving up their Muslim status and right to be tried in religious court.  
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tenons tant]). So though Raffarin claims French national identity is based on the ideal of 
citizenship as universal a mode of being, which everyone thus has access to, he describes a 
curiously culturally particular way of being a citizen.  
In the end, Raffarin’s vision, the ‘universal’ story of immigration is the story of arriving 
at a local identity—in other words, immigration is tantamount to becoming French. However, 
becoming French requires certain conditions of thinking, reasoning, and being in the world, 
given that, according to Raffarin, being French means adhering to a particular humanist 
ideology, believing that that ideology is universally applicable, and structuring one thinking and 
reasoning through the French language. In short, he espouses a narrative of modern liberalism, 
which can be understood as “the branches of European political philosophy that include the 
narration of political emancipation through citizenship in the state, the promise of economic 
freedom in the development of wage labor and exchange markets, and the conferring of 
civilization to human persons educated in aesthetic and national culture—in each case unifying 
particularity, difference, or locality through universal concepts of reason and community” (Lowe 
3-4). As Lowe suggests in The Intimacies of Four Continents, such narratives hide the practices 
of enslavement, displacement, and exploitation that were made possible through that very 
promise of freedom and consciousness. We see this in the remainder of Raffarin’s speech. 
After his opening statements which set up French citizenship—and the modes of being it 
entails—as the destination point of immigration, Raffarin then given a brief overview of 
immigration with the intent of showing how successfully such an integration into Frenchness has 
worked in the past. He names the major waves of European immigrants according to their origin 
(the Polish, the Belgians, the Spanish, the Italians). He then briefly mentions the soldiers from 
the colonial territories that fought and died in the World Wars, saying he pays his respects to 
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them. He then cites the North and West African immigrants that came—because they were 
actively recruited by factories that needed manual laborers, he neglects to say—to France after 
World War II, and notes that they were largely responsible for rebuilding the infrastructure of the 
nation. He mentions their difficult living conditions, and thanks them for their labor. He 
concludes his historical overview by saying that all of these immigrants have greatly contributed 
to France’s national project. 
Raffarin says little else in reference to colonial history. He alludes briefly to the elephant 
in the room—the history of the Palais de la Porte Dorée as a colonial museum—and says, 
simply, that “Colonization and immigration are evidently tied, even if immigration started long 
before colonization and accelerated its pace after decolonization” (2004; [La colonisation et 
l’immigration ont des liens évidents, meme si l’immigration avait commence bien avant la 
colonization et qu’elle s’est accélérée après la decolonization]). Raffarin does not bother to 
expound on these evident ties, nor does he acknowledge that the immigration that took place was 
not only from other lands to France, but from France to the colonial territories, with French 
citizens sent to the territories to occupy and govern the land, to manage local labor forces, and to 
decide and enforce who had access to, and to what degree, those “universal” rights of citizenship.  
Moreover, Raffarin does not mention that in this inverse movement of French people 
going to territories in Africa, the Caribbean, and the Pacific, they did not find it necessary to 
contribute to the social and cultural projects of the people they invaded, but rather imposed the 
social structures and cultural norms of the metropole. In a startling show of near-sightedness, 
Raffarin fails to realize that his discourse on immigration reproduces the imperial logic of 
assimilation the guided the French colonial project. The mission civilisatrice, as it was called 
during and after the French Empire, claimed that its goal was to “civilize,” through labor, 
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education in the French curriculum, and language acquisition, the indigenous inhabitants of their 
colonies in order to eventually produce African (or Asian, or Arab) Frenchmen, identical to the 
inhabitants of metropolitan France (even though not necessarily holding equal rights). The goal, 
apparently, has not changed, only the location: now the subjects of the former colonies come to 
France and the mission civilisatrice takes place there. 
Raffarin’s speech was the only one by a major state actor to inaugurate or acknowledge 
the Musée national de l’histoire de l’immigration until its rededication by President François 
Hollande in 2014.39 I will highlight just a few elements from Hollande’s speech in 2014 to show 
what stayed the same and what changed in the national discourse and attitude toward 
immigration during those ten years. While Hollande—who was the Socialist Party (Parti 
Socialist, PS) candidate—addresses much more explicitly and critically the history of 
colonization and its violence, and does describe and condemn present-day racism and 
Islamophobia, the idea and ideals of the nation remain at the heart of his speech.  
Hollande opens, much like Raffarin did, by saying that the history of immigration is the 
history of the nation: “To address the history of immigration, is to address France’s history: it is 
history, our history” (2014 [Evoquer l’histoire d’immigration, c’est évoque l’histoire de France, 
c’est l’histoire, c’est notre histoire]). In that sense, he uses a similar reasoning as Raffarin: we 
care about immigration’s history because it teaches “us”—those who are already French—about 
“our” nation. Like Raffarin, Hollande also speaks of being French as “not tied to one’s origins, 
                                                 
39 When the MNHI opened in October 2007, President Sarkozy did not attend, nor did he attend the inauguration of 
its media library and new exhibition spaces in 2009. His absence was taken by the press to signal a dismissal of the 
project as unnecessary—this is the president that, in 2005, as minister of the Interior, defended the law that pressed 
school curriculum to emphasize the positive outcomes of colonialism. It was likewise taken to signal his disapproval 
of the leadership of the project, since most of the scientific committee resigned before the museum opened, as a 
protest of Sarkozy’s impending new laws on immigration. A common phrase in the media was that the MNHI was 
the museum “snubbed by Sarkozy” (boudé par Sarkozy).  
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but to one’s adhesion to a common project” (2014 [depuis 150 ans, la République n’est pas liée 
aux origines, c’est l’adhésion à un projet commun]). However, Hollande alludes not the 
Declaration of the Rights of Man, but a speech by philosopher Ernest Renan in 1882 in which 
Renan spoke against an essentialist national identity tied to race and religion, advocating instead 
national identity as a conscious, collective choice, with individual rights and responsibilities.  
In the vision of the nation and national identity that Hollande outlines, though still 
coming out of a French tradition of thought, we can see a conscious effort to make space for a 
diversity of traditions, ideologies, and experiences. The space of possibility for these other 
traditions, ideologies, and experiences, however, are shaped by unavowed conditions.40 Hollande 
stresses that the nation must “answer the question of immigration in a Republican way” (2014 
[traiter d’une façon républicaine la question de l’immigration]). Integration remains the desired 
outcome, and Republicanism is once again treated as a universal vocation. The vector for 
integration, in Hollande’s speech, is not the French language or a religious or cultural tradition, 
but secularism (laïcité).41  
In fact, Hollande posits that it is the very belief in the ideal of the Republic and the ideal 
of secularism that makes immigration possible in France. Republicanism because, according to 
Hollande, it unifies by providing a common project that does depend on a particularized identity, 
and laïcité because it is “the freedom to believe or not. […] [laïcité] is what allows us know, in 
                                                 
40 Furthermore, as Aimé Césaire notes in his Discourse on Colonialism (Discours sur le colonialisme), while 
advocating for a national unity forged through the recognition of individual rights and their engagement towards a 
collective good, Renan nevertheless claimed that not all races were made equal. In La reforme intellectuelle et 
morale, Renan argues that some races were destined for subservience—that, in fact, part of Europe’s great collective 
project ought to be the mastery of these lesser races (the Chinese and the “Negroes”). See pages 37-38.    
41 As J. Scott notes, there are differences between (American) secularism and French laïcité. laïcité refers not simply 
to a separation between church and state but to the role of the state in protecting individuals from the claims of 
religion. It further rests on the notion that the secular and the sacred can be divided in the lives of individuals” (97-
8). I am translating laïcité as secularism in this chapter and will use the two interchangeable as I will not be making 
extensive comparisons between the two nor discuss secularism in other countries in any detail. 
 64 
our actions of everyday life, what we can do and what we are not allowed to show or do” (2014 
[la liberté de croire ou de ne pas croire.  […] ce qui permet dans les actes de la vie quotidienne 
de savoir ce qu'il est possible de faire et ce qu'il n'est pas possible de montrer ou de faire]). Lacïté 
is celebrated as a practice of freedom: there is no state religion and everyone is free to claim a 
faith or not. In essence, Hollande suggests laïcité functions as the traffic rules on a public street: 
anyone can enter the space and use it to circulate through the city, as long as they follow the 
rules of the road. These rules, because they apply to all and do not make exception for any 
religion, are considered to be culturally neutral.  
However, typically, laïcité requires that no visible signs of religious affiliation or practice 
be brought into public space. One has the freedom to practice one’s religion in the privacy of 
one’s home or in the space of a religious institution, but not in public; it assumes, then, a way of 
being that divides public and private selves. Thus, the problem is that in proposing 
Republicanism and laïcité as a way out of particularized identities in theory, Hollande assumes 
that these two principles are divorced of identity politics in practice. The theory and practice of 
laïcité gets played out in public spaces, and as the rules are established they reveal themselves to 
be culturally conditioned, as the burkini ban examples from the summer of 2016 illustrate. 
Following a rise of Daesh-related terrorist attacks in France, twenty-six towns instated an explicit 
ban, enforced with fines, for women who wore “burkinis,” the full body swimsuits associated 
with Islamic clothing practices, to the public beach.42 In addition to imposing fines, the bans led 
to some police officers escorting women off the beach or, on a few occasions, forcing them to 
remove some of their clothing, even women that were not wearing a burkini but rather leggings, 
a tunic, and head-scarf. The burkini and the modest clothing paired with a head scarf were 
                                                 
42 The incident that inspired this flurry of legislation was the Bastille Day attack in Nice, in which a man claiming 
ties to ISIS drove a cargo truck into the beach front crowds killing 84 people and injuring several hundred.  
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banned, according to the municipalities, because they were “ostentatious signs of religious 
affiliation” and thus violated the secular mandate to keep religious signs and practices in private 
spaces and not incite public disorder.  
Laïcité is seen as universal and non-discriminatory because in theory, no one is allowed 
to wear signs of religious affiliation. However, in determining what is customary clothing and 
what is religious clothing, laïcité becomes particularized. Wearing a swimsuit is decreed as the 
proper, secular clothing for enjoying the beach. But that clothing practice, in general, 
corresponds with or at the very least does not compromise the religious or philosophical values 
of, for example, a mainstream Catholic or an atheist. It does, however, compromise for some 
people of the Muslim faith, their religious practice. Following this rule for one religious group 
does not interfere with the exercise of their faith, but it might for another one.43 As Joan Wallach 
Scott demonstrates in The Politics of the Veil, the flurry of legislation determining proper use of 
the headscarf in exemplifies the way “French norms of sexual conduct [were] taken to be both 
natural and universal. […]  It was also a way of insisting on the superiority of French gender 
relations, indeed, of associating them with higher forms of civilization” (8, 16). Perhaps more 
troubling is that it is not just the theory of laïcité that is entwined with particularized cultural 
practices, but its enforcement. What made the modest clothing that the women wore on the beach 
religious clothing, and not just the clothing of someone shielding themselves from the sun, or 
uncomfortable with the full exposure that a bikini offers—or, moreover, a non-religious cultural 
                                                 
43 My argument is most certainly not that a professing a faith should give one person or group rights over another 
person or over society at large, nor that faith-based arguments should be used for granting exceptions to the rules 
and responsibilities that apply to the social body at large. What I want to highlight is the way the language of rights 
is shaped by cultural biases. These biases must not be ignored. We must examine how they intersect with the power 
dynamics of social relations if we want to ensure that particular social groups, especially those that have been 
historically marginalized, are not systematically excluded from operating with the same kinds of freedoms in social 
space. Pages 93-97 in Scott’s Politics of the Veil provide an insightful discussion of the nuances in accommodating 
religious claims within a secularist framework. 
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expression? How do the police offices decide who to fine? Would a nun in her habit, or a Tibetan 
monk in robes, be also asked to strip down to a swimsuit and briefs? And if laïcité is universal, 
why is it that only women’s bodies required policing through the burkini ban? Just as Raffarin’s 
claim that citizenship is a universally-accessible mode of belonging becomes dubious when 
France’s history of discriminatory citizenship is traced, so too does Hollande’s claim that laïcité 
can equitably unify people of all cultural and religious backgrounds start to crumble when 
pressed. 
In essence, the parallel that I want to make between the two speeches is that, in addition 
to their continuation of the imperial logic of the mission civilisatrice, they both assume that in 
the process of immigration, the nation acts as a stable and neutral common ground that each 
individual is equally able to enter. Immigration brings new people into the nation who are then 
shaped by the nation, and these newcomers do not make the rules, they abide by them. 
Immigration, in this vision, is also a universal process: all immigrants are seen as equally able to 
be shaped by and fit into the nation, and this process is seen as entailing no violence. Certainly, 
Hollande points to version of the nation in which newcomers might be able to “keep” their 
language or religion—but only as long as it does not interfere with the “common project” of the 
nation. Like the indigenous laborer depicted on the walls of the building that houses the museum, 
immigrants can “enrich” the national body, but they do not get to decide what the contours and 
boundaries of that common project could be.  
Hollande and Raffarin’s vision of the nation may contain some differences, but overall, 
their speeches cast the story of immigration as a plotline whose final destination is identification 
with pre-existing national values. They justify this plot structure with an implicit “host” vs. 
“guest” logic, which I will argue is likewise operating in the Gifts Gallery. I will give more 
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examples of this host vs. guest logic in the gallery space and in Hollande’s speech later on, and 
discuss the limitations that this logic imposes on the creation of a common ground—a common 
project—that could lead to equitable and peaceful collective living. In order to get to that, we 
need to look at the MNHI, its space, its curation, and its human and nonhuman material bodies. 
Immigration as Arrival Plot in the Gifts Gallery 
The Musée national de l’histoire de l’immigration has three exhibition spaces: the 
permanent exhibit, Waypoints (Repères); a temporary space that hosts roughly two new 
exhibitions per year; and the permanent Gifts Gallery (Galerie des dons). It also has a media 
library and a screening room, and a robust website that makes accessible much of the materials 
from the permanent exhibitions. Waypoints uses archival materials, didactic documents, and art 
objects clustered around ten themes—such as “Facing the State,” “At Work,” “Religion”—to 
outline two centuries of immigration to France. The overall approach leans towards the historic, 
both in its development of immigration as a longstanding phenomenon, the kinds of materials it 
uses in its exhibitions, its chronological organization, and its emphasis on the importance of 
commemoration and memory. I mention this exhibition to give a sense of the museum’s overall 
approach to immigration and its museological methods. However, this chapter will be focusing 
on the smaller Gifts Gallery, which was opened in 2008, one year after the original opening of 
the museum.  
The objects on display in the Gifts Gallery, as its name suggests, have been donated to 
the museum. The donors are immigrants and descendants of immigrants, and the objects tend to 
be humble objects, the kinds of things that would live in the intimacy of the home, or be used on 
a daily basis for work. I have chosen this particular exhibition space for two reasons. First, 
because the intimate relationship between people and objects is one of the vectors through which 
the poetics of migration is explored in this dissertation. The material objects in the Gifts Gallery 
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speak to such relations, given that they were invited into the museum precisely because they 
once were an intimate part of individual immigrants’ lives. Secondly, it is one of the spaces 
where individual ways of telling the story of migration cohabit with the curatorial voice of the 
museum, since the objects are accompanied by lengthy text labels that tell their donors’ stories, 
often through direct quotations from the donors’ first-person narrative. Of course, curation is still 
part of the process, as the museum workers select and edit the stories, and arrange the display of 
the objects in the gallery. Nevertheless, it is a space in the museum where the divergences and 
convergences of an individual immigrant story and a national story of immigration might be 
more visible. I will begin with the curatorial aspects before delving into the ways in which these 
intimate material objects might tell a their own story of immigration. 
* * * 
Luc Gruson, the director of the ensemble of the MNHI, states in the catalogue that the 
goal for this gallery was to tell the story of integration “not from the perspective of the host 
society, as it is too often happens in public policies, but from the view “on the ground,” from the 
point of view of those who were taken in and became integrated” (Gruson 7 [non pas du point de 
vue de la société d’accueil comme le font trop souvent les politique publiques, mais plutôt par 
« le bas », du point du vue de ceux qui ont été accueillis est se sont intégrés]). The head of 
collections, Hélène du Mazaubrun, describes the creation of the gallery as a participative process. 
Both of these museum staff members speak of the objects in the Gifts Gallery as bearing witness 
to intimate stories, related to the family and the private home space. Gruson speaks of this 
section as the “repères intimes” (intimate references) to flesh out the “repères de l’histoire” 
(historic references) of the main exhibit.  
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The design of the display cases, however, flattens the three-dimensional dynamic objects 
into a pictorial surface. The objects are sheltered behind floor-to-ceiling glass vitrines that are 
partially painted over with text or abstract forms.  
 
Figure 4 Gifts Gallery. Photo courtesy of author. 
 
This non-transparent decoration outlines the spaces through which one can see the objects, 
creating a kind of frame a mural collage. Though the decorative motifs clearly had organizational 
purposes (creating thematic clusters of objects and hiding the empty space), their aqueous color 
scheme with rippling lines recalls the aquarium on the basement floor of the MNHI’s building.44 
                                                 
44 There are relatively few objects in proportion to display space, and I suspect that hiding the empty space was 
another motivating factor for this peculiar museography. The objects are clustered into the viewable portion, making 
the display cases seem full. The window-like effect remains, even if not the primary or sole intention, but I note the 
emptiness as it speaks to the difficulty the museum had in assembling exhibits without a starter collection—and the 
only moderately-successful recruitment of immigrant donors. 
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It is difficult not to think of these cases as fishbowls rather than windows, and in that case the 
effect is more of confinement—and brings to mind the low-relief sculptures on the façade 
outside, in that they express both a dimensionality and a flatness at the same time, and are set up 
into a kind of wall mural that the visitor experiences by walking alongside it. 
Furthermore, the material objects are accompanied by labels that speak not just to the 
individual donor’s story of immigration, but to the principal waves of immigration from the 
donor’s place of origin. The chef’s uniform donated by Rougi Dia thus has a label that tells of 
her journey to France and success in the culinary world, but a second label in the display case 
tells of Senegalese immigration to France. The macro-histories do at times point to the 
entanglements of migration, colonialism, and state-sponsored displacements that Raffarin and 
Hollande’s speeches elided. Nevertheless, the arranging of the material objects by place of origin 
reproduces, once again, the arrangement of the colonies depicted on the façade of the Palais. This 
is all the more jarring given that the names of the colonial territories and the names of the 
independent nation states have often remained the same. Thus, most of the places named on the 
façade also appear on the walls Gallery—though the Gallery names some that are not on the 
façade (e.g. Italy, Argentina)—creating an uncanny double of the low-relief mural. 
In essence, what I am suggesting is both the inauguration speeches and the Gifts Gallery 
inside the MNHI appear to operate through the narrative logic of the colonial mission that was 
etched on the façade of the Palais: the (economic and cultural) contributions of peoples outside 
of France is rewarded by status as a French subject and access to the freedoms that it promises. 
Indeed, the curatorial framing in the catalogue and website suggest that what is meaningful about 
these individual donations to the Gifts Gallery is that they, collectively, contribute to a national 
history. The presentation on the website claims that “Incorporated into the Museum, the objects 
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[in the Gifts Gallery] which previously were mere family mementos—identity papers, expired 
work contracts, personal archives—join the ranks of “testimonial” objects that bear witness to 
immigration in France” (MNHI [Intégrés au Musée, les objets qui n’étaient jusque-là que des 
souvenirs de famille, des papiers d’identité, des contrats de travail périmés, des archives 
personnelles viennent grossir le rang des objets "témoins" de l’immigration en France] 
translation and italics mine). What has earned these objects a place in the museum is not the 
singularity of their previous owners, not their “mere” family histories, but their collective 
participation in France’s history. Once again, the notion of contributing to the nation appears at 
the heart of the immigration story the museum has set out to tell.  
The Gifts Gallery, I contend, spatializes this narrative of contribution, outlining the steps 
one must take to be able to belong to the French nation and exercise the rights of citizenship. The 
exhibition space is a balcony gallery, on the third story of the museum, overlooking the open 
auditorium on the ground floor. The displays are set along the four narrow balcony corridors, 
forming a square around the open auditorium below. 
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Figure 5 Installation shot, Gifts Gallery corridor. Photo courtesy of author. 
At each corner, the title theme is painted onto the wall. These four themes are: Inherit, Share, 
Contribute, Accept (Hériter, Partager, Contribuer, Accepter).45  
                                                 
45 In my many visits to the exhibition space, it was never clear to me whether the objects in proximity to each theme 
were supposed to demonstrate that action in particular. Upon reading the catalogue, it was revealed that for the 
curator, the thematic actions did serve as organizational categories. The area by To Inherit displays objects that were 
given by the child or grandchild of the original donor; To Share displays objects that speak to a cultural or ethnic 
tradition; To Contribute shows objects that demonstrate how the donors participated in the evolution of France, 
through labor, military service, or civic engagement; To Accept displays the objects that speak to a multicultural 
identity in the construction of the donor’s life story. These categories, by not means clear-cut, also overlap, as there 
are inherited objects, for example, that appear in other sections.  
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Figure 6 Exhibition themes at the MNHI. Photo courtesy of author. 
It is striking that the museum chose to set the themes as verbs, rather than nouns—why not 
“Heritage” rather than “Inherit”? Also striking is the use of infinitive; the unconjugated verb 
seems to lend an undetermined quality to the themes. Who has, or will, or is, sharing? Or is it a 
command, since in French the infinitive can function as imperative when writing step-by-step 
instructions, such as in a recipe? If so, who is it that must inherit, and what?  
Short descriptions accompany the four themes, completing the sentence fragments, and a 
close reading will provide some clues as to who is the imagined subject of the actions. By 
Inherit, the description reads: “a family history and understand one’s roots through the past” 
[Hériter d’une histoire familiale et comprendre ses racines à travers le passé]. This implies that 
whoever is inheriting cannot understand their roots through the present. Furthermore, it suggests 
that this understanding will come through the exploration of not just any history, but a family 
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history. Similarly, Share is completed by “one’s traditions and culture in the midst of a family, a 
community, or with society” [Partager ses traditions et sa culture au sein d’une famille, d’une 
communauté ou avec la société]. Here, there seems to be an assumed division between “family” 
and “community,” both which are particularized (une famille, une communauté) and “society” 
(la société), which seems to be universal and does not have the same culture as the “family” or 
“community” (otherwise, they wouldn’t need the culture shared with them). The other themes, 
which I will explore later, have a similar construction, in which it appears that the individual that 
is—or should be—performing these actions is not the imagined average national subject, but the 
idealized immigrant.  
Once we have established that the subject of the actions in the gifts gallery is the 
imagined immigrant, we can interpret the thematic actions in the gallery as the steps the MNHI 
believes the immigrant must take to integrate, in order to create a perfect multicultural soufflé. 
The choice of the infinitive as the verb tense compounds this effect, given that in French, the 
infinitive is the administrative imperative—it is precisely the verb tense that immigrants confront 
as they go through the visa processing and all their other interactions with state institutions. 
Moreover, because the displays are set in a balcony space rather than an open room, visitors 
cannot wander from one theme to another at will; there is a discrete order to follow. Visitors 
must encounter the themes in sequence starting with Inherit and ending at Accept (though they 
can, of course, choose to skip over, stop, or turn back).46 Though each of the fifty-plus donors of 
                                                 
46 When one enters the balcony gallery, one can turn right, towards Inherit or left towards Accept. It is thus possible 
to follow the sequence backwards, starting with “to Accept” and ending with “to Inherit,” as I did in my first several 
visits. The catalogue, however, clearly states the intended order of the themes, and spatially, it encourages visitors to 
follow it by placing the “proper” beginning (Inherit) on the right, the direction most visitors turn to when entering 
exhibition spaces. 
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the objects in the Gifts Gallery collection had a unique migration trajectory, the curatorial 
organization suggests that upon arrival, all immigrants will (should) follow the same path.  
Each of the four thematic actions  then, function as moments in the MNHI’s idealized 
journey of migration, with integration as the endpoint. The first two, Inherit and Share, center on 
the family, while the next two shift the focus to “society”—to the host nation, in this case, 
France. It appears that for the MNHI, the narrative of migration is a journey of shifting 
allegiance from the family to the nation. Furthermore, the first two steps suggest that while the 
immigrant inherits—it its their inalienable property with a mandate to pass it down 
genealogically—a particularized past, traditions, and cultures, these elements ought to be shared 
with—not given to—the larger social body. An odd tension simmers underneath the mandate to 
share. The museum wishes to display the cultural heritage of the immigrant donors, but the 
sharing rhetoric hints at a fear that this cultural heritage might become cultural baggage that will 
clutter up the house if the imagined immigrants make themselves too much at home.    
If cultural heritage, in the implicit migration narrative at the MNHI, is more of a 
temporary loan to the nation than a permanent offering, what are the gifts hinted at in the name 
of the Gifts Gallery? The answer lies in the final two thematic actions, which shed some light on 
the gifts the imagined immigrant is expected to offer. The third thematic action in the gallery is 
to Contribute “to the History of a nation and participate through labor, through military service, 
or through collective civic engagement” [à l’Histoire d’une nation et intervenir par le travail, les 
armes, ou les luttes collectives]. In other words, the proper way to contribute is to participate in 
existing civic engagements. Finally, the last step is Accept “the complexity of individual histories 
and to envision one’s future in a collective lifestyle” [la complexité des histoires singulières et 
envisager son avenir dans un vivre ensemble]. If the past belonged to the family or a particular 
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community, it appears that the act of sharing is the first step to engagement in the present, and 
this sharing will lead to investing in the future of the nation. Intimacy and singularity, by the end 
of the journey, are replaced by a civic-minded collective engagement performed in the public 
space. 
As a result of this narrative structure, a peculiar temporal and spatial plot organize this 
imagined immigrant journey. The temporal sequence (first you accept, then you share, etc) also 
implies a temporal reorientation, from looking back, towards the past, to looking around, at the 
present, to looking forward, towards the future. A spatial reorientation matches the temporal 
reorientation. This reorientations refers not only to the geographic journey that brought the 
immigrant to the French soil. Rather, the immigrant journey proposed by the Gifts Gallery also 
involves a shift from the intimate space of the private home, to the public space of civic 
engagement and society. The logical endpoint, for the MNHI, of the temporal and spatial plots of 
the immigration narrative is thus participation in French society—more precisely, inhabiting 
public space in a way that exemplifies French national values.  
When describing the final section of the Gifts Gallery, Accept, du Mazaubrun describes it 
as the section with objects that embody the moment the immigrant donors accepted that “there 
would be no return. This is the realization that allows him or her to settle into the present and the 
future of the host nation” ([il n’y aura pas de retour, ce qui lui permet de s’ancrer dans le present 
et l’avenir de son pays d’acceuil]). Du Mazaubrun uses the term pays d’acceuil, which means 
host nation, but “acceuil” also translates as “welcome.” The happy ending the Gifts Gallery 
imagines is one in which the “home culture” of the immigrants is relegated to the past and to the 
private space of the home, only welcomed into the public when it can be put into service for a 
greater national good of their host nation.  
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The Gifts Gallery, in fact, not only describes this as the proper immigration process, it 
enacts it. When the immigrant donors give their personal objects to the museum, they allow 
France “to endow itself with a national collection, part of the “common goods” (du Mazaubrun 
8; [de se doter d’une collection nationale, incorporée au “bien commun”]). In France, the 
collections held in national museums (with the designation “musée de France”) do not belong to 
the institution that exhibits them, but rather to the state itself. All acquisitions, deaccessions, and 
changes to the collection must undergo an approval process through the National Office of 
Patrimony that is part of the Ministry of Culture. The objects given to the Gifts Gallery 
collection thus literally become State property. Interestingly, when the Gifts Gallery first opened, 
the objects were taken in as loans. A few years later, the museum decided to change their status 
to donations. Though the curators celebrate this decision as a gesture of honor, giving the objects 
due respect in consecrating them as national patrimony, I wonder how keeping them as loans 
might have emphasized the agency of the givers and the individual, fragmented nature of their 
migration stories. Instead, what was part of a family heritage becomes part of the national 
patrimony, serving the social body of France by allowing the museum to fulfill its mission of 
incorporating the history of immigration into national history, turning multiculturalism into one 
of the republican values of France. This process of giving to the nation is ongoing, as an empty 
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([Cette vitrine peut recevoir vos prochains dons et récits]). 
             
Figure 7 Empty Display case, Left, and Close-up of Label. Photos courtesy of author. 
The Logic of Hospitality in Migration Narratives  
I propose that the logic operating in this migration narrative is the logic of host and guest. 
The nation, its society, are the protagonists, that play the role of the gracious hosts that welcome 
the immigrant guest into a home. The immigrant, like any good guest, comes bearing gifts. 
Indeed, the speech given by President Hollande at the MNHI’s re-inauguration in 2014 that I 
analyzed earlier in this chapter also operates under a hospitality logic. Hollande, when speaking 
about the museum’s collection, declares: “I thank the donors, who, through a musical instrument, 
a machine, a piece of fabric, have made it possible to illustrate their attachment to France as well 
as to their home country. It is as if the home countries came here to offer themselves up to the 
host country, that is to say, to France” (Hollande 2014 [Je remercie les donateurs qui ont fait en 
sorte de pouvoir par un instrument de musique, une machine, une étoffe, démontrer le lien qu’ils 
avaient avec la France et aussi leur pays d’origine. Comme si le pays d’origine venait ici s’offrir 
au pays d’accueil, c’est-à-dire la France]). This rhetoric casts as laudable—normal, even—that 
the immigrant guests offer themselves up to the host country. And Hollande, as head of State, 
can be seen here as modeling the proper behavior of the host citizens: they should accept, with 
gratitude, the gifts of their immigrant guests.  
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Why does pointing out the hospitality rhetoric of the immigration narrative in the Gifts 
Gallery (and in popular discourse on immigration) matter? In fact, wouldn’t it be a good thing if 
France welcomes in immigrants, gives them a home, and is grateful for what they bring to the 
nation? The problem is that the language and metaphors of hospitality imply particular relations 
between parties (the hosts and guests). While these relations at first glance may appear to favor 
inclusion, generosity, and acceptance, they also set in motion certain expectations, 
responsibilities, and hierarchies. When they logic of hospitality is mapped onto immigration 
policy and practice, the outcome is subtly pernicious. Mireille Rosello’s Postcolonial 
Hospitality: The Immigrant as Guest draws a comprehensive study of the language and logic of 
hospitality in the discourse on immigration in France through the 1990s. I will not summarize her 
extensive findings here, but do agree with her conclusion that problem with the hospitality 
narrative in immigration discourse is that it provides an illusion of welcome while legitimizing 
and codifying persistent inequalities.  
In essence, hospitality logic gives the host a reason to believe the home is inviting, while 
enabling those pesky relations of power to remain operational, they have merely been swept 
under the rug. For example, a host may welcome a guest, but the home, its rules, remain in the 
hands of the host. The guest, meanwhile, inhabits an inherently precarious role, for even though 
a “good” host will tell their guests to settle in, a guest always risks outstaying a welcome, or 
making themselves too much at home. Of course, the host, as Jacques Derrida elaborates in his 
study of the politics of hospitality, runs the risk of the duties and obligations of hospitality taking 
him or her host-age.47  The host is expected to provide certain comforts for the guest, and in the 
ideal of unconditional hospitality, a host gives up their place for the guest. This possible 
                                                 
47 See Derrida (2000), especially pages 123-127. 
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substitution of roles between guest and host is suggested in the very language, as in French 
“hôte” refers both to a host or a guest. What is important to note is that in all of these possible 
scenarios of hospitality, the host and the guest inhabit the same space, but their experience of the 
space is not conditioned by the same expectations. The veneer of hospitality can normalize these 
expectations, as the guest can be decried as ungrateful if they refuse or criticize the expectations 
or point out the discomforts of the situation. Likewise, the inconveniences the host experiences 
can be praised as examples of self-sacrifice, while the privileges the hosts enjoy can be 
normalized and rendered invisible.  
The point, then, is not that being a host and being a guest is risky business, but rather that 
the logic of hospitality as the structural force of a state-sponsored narrative of migration masks 
the conditions of welcome. Hospitality distracts, in other words, from the renegotiation of rights 
that takes place under the veneer of hospitality. Indeed, we can parse out the conditions of 
welcome in migration narrative in the Gifts Gallery, which ends with “Accept the complexity of 
individual histories and to envision one’s future in a collective lifestyle.” The acceptance step of 
the immigrant plot endorses a celebration of the multicultural diversity, and even appears to also 
apply to the host citizens. The host citizens, like the immigrants, need to imagining themselves in 
a collective national lifestyle that includes diverse individual stories. However, as I suggested 
before, “multiculturalism can involve a double and contradictory process of incorporation and 
expulsion: it may seek to differentiate between those strangers whose appearance of difference 
can be claimed by the nation, and those stranger strangers who may yet be expelled, whose 
difference may be dangerous to even the most heterogeneous of nations” (Ahmed 2000, 97). 
When we think back to the plot in the Gifts Gallery that moves through the four distinct steps of 
Inherit, Share, Contribute and Accept, it appears that a welcome into the public sphere is given 
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once the diversity of cultural heritage is relegated to the private sphere of the family, and the 
imagined immigrant enters the public space as an inconspicuous member of the common project 
of the Republic.  
Thus, the migrant narrative plotted out by the Gifts Gallery suggest a process of 
differentiation, wherein the cultural diversity of the imagined immigrants is accepted when it 
contributes the pre-existing civic project—when it enables, that is to say, a particularly French 
way being a citizen. In other words, when we take Hollande’s and Raffarin’s speeches alongside 
the curatorial choices of the Gifts Gallery, the conditions of acceptance—of welcome, really—in 
France appear to correlate with how smoothly the non-French cultural practices of the immigrant 
guests can be folded into the principles of Republicanism in general and laïcité in particular. 
These, as I demonstrated earlier, are principles that are culturally particular, not universal—or, as 
Joan Wallach Scott puts it, “it is a universalism that is particularly French” (11-12). Moreover, 
this French way of being universal is shaped out of the historical context of imperialism. In 
Lowe’s words, “The social inequalities of our time are a legacy of these processes through which 
‘the human’ is ‘freed’ by liberal forms, while other subjects, practices, and geographies are 
placed at a distance from ‘the human’” (2). If the gifts the immigrant guests give brush against 
these principles or question their universality, their right to claim belonging is met with hostility 
rather than hospitality, as we saw in the case of the burkini ban on public beaches. 
In positioning the nation of France as a home whose doors are open to all, the narrative 
overlooks how the threshold of the home is monitored, preventing some from even reaching the 
open door. For those that do step through, the “making themselves at home” by adopting the 
customary laws of the nation requires a modification of their previous modes of being, a process 
which may entail varying amounts of adaptation and may be experienced as—or enforced with—
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varying levels of physical, semantic, or affective violence. However, if the language of 
hospitality masks the conditions of welcome and normalize the hosts’ privilege, it can also be 
recruited to reveal and interrogate those conditions. It can be used to pose questions creatively, 
that shift the ethical frame of immigration. For example, we can ask who are the guests of honor 
in the context of immigration, and who is asked to leave? Can the “guest” become a “host,” and 
how so? What would that look like? What happens to the host and the home? Can a guest invite 
other guests? What if the guest wants to leave? What rights can the children of the guests 
exercise? In the following section, I will analyze some of the objects in the Gifts Gallery to see 
how these material bodies contribute to how process of making oneself at home. My goal is to 
trace how the semantic and material properties of objects, and their relationship with their 
immigrant donors, intervene in the narrative of migration proposed by the MNHI. I suspect that 
the objects will deviate from the temporal and spatial plots laid out by the MNHI’s narrative, and 
challenge some of the hospitable assumptions that undergird it. 
Objects as Narrative Agents in the Gifts Gallery Migration Plot  
So far, in this chapter, I have parsed out some the curatorial choices in the Gifts Gallery 
to identify the rhetorical elements and narrative effects of the story of migration that the MNHI 
tells. I have informed my reading of the museum’s story of migration with the speeches of 
President Hollande and Prime Minister Raffarin, as they enable us to identify the overarching 
narrative frameworks that currently structure discourse on migration in France. I have argued 
that these frameworks, and the narrative effects of the curatorial choices in the Gifts Gallery, 
propose a story of migration that make the host nation the protagonist and casts the immigrants 
in the role of guests, who must integrate into the host nation by exercising the national values of 
the Republic. This story poses problems. One of them being that the plotline of migration 
narrative enables a differentiation of cultural differences, wherein only the differences that can 
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be recruited to serve the common project of the nation are welcomed as truly belonging. Due to 
this, I have suggested that this plotline perpetuates—even exacerbates—historically unequal 
relations of power between France and its immigrant “guests,” perhaps in particular those 
“guests” coming from the territories France exploited through colonization. 
However, to suggest that the curatorial choices produce a monolithic narrative would 
overlook the unruly power of material narration. And to presume that the narrative frameworks 
on immigration that dominate political and popular discourse irreparably disable imaginative 
story telling would be likewise shortsighted. In this final section of the chapter, I will discuss 
some moments in the Gifts Gallery where the logic of hospitality does not structure the plot. In 
other words, I will ask point to the moments where the guest or the host step out of the bounds of 
their roles, demonstrating how the human and nonhuman material bodies and the individual 
migrant narratives act on and against the immigration plot set out by the museum that whose 
happy ending remains an exclusionary integration?  
I will look at three gifts, and the narrative labels written by their immigrant donors, that 
stray out of the prescribed narrative and change the spatial and temporal emplotment of the 
storyline. I will suggest that these objects and their stories narrate against the grain of the 
dominant migration plotline proposed by the museum. This acting on the dominant narrative was 
not necessarily a curatorial intention—the museum may not even be aware of the ways these 
elements deviate from the overall storyline—but the choice to include direct quotations from the 
immigrant donors does open up this space of nuancing. I would even imagine that this nuance 
was a desired outcome.48  The donors that give their objects and share the story likewise may or 
                                                 
48 Though I maintain that the overall framing of the collected stories reproduces problematic relations of power, 
there was a genuine desire o the part of the MNHI curators and scientific council, I believe, the tell the story of 
immigration through a diversity of individual voices. I also acknowledge that certain curatorial choices, such as 
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may not be aware of the ways in which their gift could intervene in the dominant narrative. I am 
not seeking in this section to identify subversive intent as much as subversive effect. Moreover, I 
am seeking to establish that the narrative effects (be they subversive or not) of the interplay 
between the human actors and the material actors are produced precisely on the margins (perhaps 
even outside) of human agency, will, or intent. In other words, in this section I want to turn 
attention to how the material objects act out and act on the journey of migration and the retelling 
of this journey in the Gifts Gallery. 
* * * 
“Look, here is my mother,” says Sarah Doraghi’s label, “50% cotton, 50% polyester” 
next to a vitrine holding a neatly folded pillow case and a bottle of Quartz perfume ([Voici donc 
ma mère 50% coton 50% polyester]). Doraghi immigrated from Tehran to Paris in 1983 as a 
child. She and her siblings were left in the care of their grandmother and aunt while her mother 
stayed in Tehran until 1989.  
       
Figure 8 Perfume and pillowcase, Left, Doraghi's narrative label, Right. Photos courtesy of author. 
Doraghi describes how, between her mother’s intermittent visits, “my absent mother 
appeared as a pillow case. My mother, a tall, magnificent brunette, could take on any shape or 
                                                 
creating a way for immigrants to participate in the museum, and the rich text labels that transmit the donors words 
with minimal mediation, actively provide ways to complicate and nuance the national immigration story that would 
otherwise appear to be set in stone.  
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form as long as it wore the same perfume” ([ma mère absente avait donc l’allure d’une taie d’un 
oreiller. Ma grande maman brune et sublime pouvait prendre n’importe quelle forme, n’importe 
quel aspect pourvu qu’elle porte le même parfum]). As a child, Doraghi would regularly spritz 
this cream-colored pillow case with the perfume her mother wore, taking comfort in the olfactory 
presence of her mother, despite her physical absence. In the label, Doraghi calls this pillow “a bit 
of umbilical fabric that I was never able to let go of” ([un bout de tissu ombilical auquel j’ai 
jamais su renoncer]).  
This object and the story the donor tells denature the plotline of the migrant narrative 
proposed by the MNHI temporally, affectively, and spatially. For one, though this object appears 
in the Accept section—the section meant to display objects that embody the moment of 
integrating oneself into the collective future of France—the pillow case and its lingering scent 
enable and embody the opposite. They are, above all, about not letting go. Though her mother 
eventually comes to stay permanently in Paris, the years of absence are not recuperated. 
Temporally, the pillowcase remains oriented toward the past, and, more specifically, to an 
individual (not collective) future that did not happen. Doraghi once imagined a childhood by her 
tall, brown-haired mother’s side, but instead her childhood is spent in search of her mother’s 
olfactory presence. Doraghi experienced her present as out-of-step with how she and her mother 
expected her childhood to take shape. Thus, affectively, the pillowcase holds on to that which 
was lost, not gained, during the journey of migration. This “former future”49—an outcome that 
was once imagined as possible, but that is no longer fathomable in the present—and its effects on 
                                                 
49 Koselleck’s Futures Past: On the Semantics of Historical Time, explores how “how expectations, hopes, or 
prognoses projected into the future are articulated into language” (1985; xxiii). He argues that historical experience 
of time is articulated either implicitly or explicitly in their relationship of a given past to a given future. Our 
understanding and experience of the present moment is shaped by “the perspective we posses from the onetime 
future of past generations, or more pithily, from a former future” (1985; 5). 
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the experience of the present, is a temporal plane that is not addressed in the MNHI’s migration 
narrative that moves smoothly from past, to present, to future. 
 Furthermore, Doraghi refers to the pillow itself as first as her mother, and then as a 
remaining bit of the umbilical cord that tied her to her mother. The use of metaphor here is key. 
Doraghi is not saying that the perfumed pillow reminders her of her mother, nor even that it was 
like her mother. Instead, she insists on saying that it was, and is even today, her mother (“Here is 
my mother, 50% cotton…”). Or, more precisely, the umbilical cord: a piece of her mother’s 
material body that it also her own material body. Spatially, then, the pillowcase brings the 
country left behind into the hearth of the new home. Doraghi arrived in Paris in 1983, her mother 
did not arrive permanently until 1989, but during those six intermediary years, the perfumed 
pillow took her place. Her mother thus arrives multiple times, every time she visits but also 
every time Doraghi breathes in the scent of the perfumed pillow.   
As I discussed previously, the curation of the Gifts Gallery suggest that the plot of 
migrant narrative begins upon arrival, and that this arrival effaces all differences. The diverse 
trajectories coalesce into a discrete, sequenced plot that leads everyone to the same endpoint: 
integration into the pre-existing French identity. Doraghi’s pillow, amplified by the perfume, 
denatures this plot by multiplying this moment of arrival. In a way, Doraghi’s mother had 
already arrived by the time she makes the permanent move in 1989. In addition, the perfumed 
pillowcase modified Doraghi’s lived experience in the host country to make it more hospitable to 
her. In this sense, the objects are not so much testifying, telling a story of migration, as acting in 
and on a narrative to change its plot. They participated in the lived experience of migration, and 
they also contribute to how the experience is remembers and cast into a narrative. Because of 
these, I consider these material objects not only as co-narrators but as narrative agents: they 
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condition the temporal planes of the plot and its spatial orientations—I will expand on this 
designation at the end of this chapter.  
In addition, the pillowcase and perfume turn attention to migration as a sensory 
experience. The sensory experience highlights the intimate, intensely personal, and embodied 
moments of migration that cannot be swallowed up in a collective story of nation or of 
immigration. Though Doraghi shares a personal memory with the museum and its public, the 
sensory experience of her migration journey that she shares remains stubbornly intimate, 
inaccessible despite being put on display. Anyone else might be able to stop in a high-end 
boutique and ask for a sniff of Molyneux’s Quartz perfume, but that scent will only conjure up 
Doraghi’s mother for her. It is thus the singular, the private, and the intimate consequences of 
migration that the pillow and its perfume embody, rather than a contribution to a national story.   
Finally, the perfumed pillow not only multiplies the moments of arrival and makes each 
of them equally “real” moments of arrival, it also inhabits, through the sensory experience, this 
space of arrival rather than moving on to the next marker in the plot. When Doraghi speaks of 
the pillowcase as a piece of umbilical fabric, she clings to what ties her flesh to her mother’s 
flesh. Though one could say that this is a gendering of origin as female, and read Doraghi’s 
language as a gesture of choosing the “motherland” over the “host country”—refusing to cut the 
umbilical cord, so to speak—I would argue the gesture suggests a more nuanced relationship. 
Doraghi speaks only of holding on to a fragment, a bit and end (“un bout”) of umbilical fabric, 
suggesting that the cord has been cut, from both bodies. Migration as an embodied and inter-
bodied experience will be explored in the fourth chapter of this dissertation, in which I will 
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analyze the role of bodily fragments and textured bodies as metaphors in migration narratives.50 
For now, I only proposed that Doraghi’s deployment of the perfumed pillow case as umbilical 
fabric is not a matter of choosing one body or land over the other. Rather, it signals a persistent 
attention to that which cannot even be differentiated as belonging to one body or another, as 
being origin or destination. This rearranges the spatial plot of the MNHI’s migration narrative, as 
the immigrant does not depart from an origin point and arrive at a destination point (physically or 
affectively) but rather the journey enfleshes both of these places into the bodily space of the 
migrating person.   
* * * 
Another kind of denaturing of the plot line of the migrant narrative proposed by the 
MNHI can be heard through Louis Bissack’s gift. Bissack’s gift is an entire horizontal cut of a 
tree trunk brought from Cameroon. Before being gifted to the museum, this slab of wood had 
lived in Bissack’s apartment, serving as a tabletop. Through the narrative label we learned that 
Bissack was born in Cameroon in 1955, in his early adolescence Bissack washed cars to help 
support his younger sibling and mothers. During this time, he met a French priest who had been 
sent to work in Cameroon. Soon after the priest was called back to France, he got in touch with 
Bissack’s family. He needed to hire someone for a job in France and had thought of Bissack. 
Bissack had long dreamed of trying to work in France, but had always imagined he would get 
there by attempting a clandestine boat crossing and look for odd jobs that could pay him under 
                                                 
50 I will be drawing from Ahmed who investigates the sensory experience of migration as 
something that happens not just to a person but between bodies: “Such an understanding of 
embodiment can be theorized in terms of inter-embodiment, whereby the lived experience of 
embodiment is always already the social experience of dwelling with other bodies. Or, as Gail 
Weiss puts it, ‘To be embodied is to be capable of being affected by other bodies” (1992:162)” 
(47) 
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the table. Instead, he finds himself traveling by plane, landing at the Paris-Orly airport in 1972 
“with a work contract in his suitcase” [avec un contrat de travail dans ses valises].  
 
Figure 9 Table-top donated by Bissack. Photo courtesy of author. 
In many ways, Bissack’s story seems to fulfill the migrant narrative the MNHI imagines, 
and even to exemplify the kind of hospitality logic that underpins France’s discourse on 
immigration. Bissack migrates legally and into good working conditions, having been taken, as 
he says, “under the wing” [sous l’aile] of his generous French host. He demonstrates his 
gratitude by sacrificing an object brought from his home country—an object, moreover, that had 
a personal and utilitarian function in his home—to the museum. However, in his narrative, he 
also mentions that despite having now lived and worked in France for several decades, and being 
eligible for citizenship, he has not taken that step: “As he likes to say, he is ‘France’s guest’” 
[Comme il se plait à le dire, il est ‘l’hôte de la France’].  
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I was struck by this phrase, not only because Bissack, an immigrant, consciously places 
himself in the role of “guest of the nation,” but because of the pleasure with which he appears to 
name himself as guest. Though he has followed all of the proper steps in the plotline that the 
MNHI suggests will lead to a seamless integration, Bissack prefers and pleasures in maintaining 
an in-but-not-of status. And yet, though he retains and relishes in his guest status, he also 
expands the prerogatives of the guest role. The gift he gives to the museum is the wood that was 
once a table in his home.51 With this gesture, he turns the tables in the host-guest relationship. He 
is not only the grateful guest sitting at the host’s table, but has his own table to offer. As a guest, 
he thus claims the right to be hospitable. He also exercises his hospitality not only in the host 
nation, but by continuing to support his family in Cameroon with the wages he makes in France. 
His labor thus gives not only to the host nation, but the nation he left behind. Bissack’s gift 
therefore changes the endpoint of the plot laid out by the MNHI’s migration narrative: he does 
not become French, even though he assumes some of the rights of the host.  
Furthermore, the material objects featured in the story he tells subtly challenge the 
assumption that differences are erased upon arrival. Bissack’s story retraces not only the 
migration journey he took, but also the one he could have taken. The possibility of this other 
route, the clandestine one, suggests that the plot could have gone quite differently after arrival. 
He may have been an unwelcome guest, sent back to Cameroon, or he might still be in France, 
but less easily able to offer hospitality. His sponsor could have abandoned or exploited him. 
These other plotlines begin to point out that there are gradations in the kinds of guests and the 
                                                 
51 Interestingly, though the catalogue contains a picture of the full table with its legs, in the Gifts Gallery, the table is 
displayed vertically so that one can only see the wood slab. In appearance, it looks simply like a beautiful slab of 
wood; one would not know it was a table unless one read the description. I suspect this choice was determined 
primarily by the size of the display cases, though it also has the effect of turning the table into an aesthetic object, 
effacing its utilitarian function. This recalls the practice of displaying in art museums only the wooden face masks of 
the elaborate headdresses used in dances and important ceremonies in West Africa. 
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kind of welcome that France offers. It also reminds us that hospitality is not necessarily 
generosity without self-interest; Bissack was welcomed into France for his ability to fulfill the 
labor needed by his host. Bissack may have found “good” host—a relationship of hospitality that 
was mutually beneficial—but all the other twists and turns that this plot could have taken linger 
in the story Bissack shares.  
Ultimately, one of the major actors in the plot are the papers he carried in his suitcase: 
with a work contract, he had access to rights and protections that are supposed to be universal 
“human rights,” but that those who lack the proper immigration papers and thus live and work 
clandestinely are less easily able to access and demand. If Doraghi’s pillow made her lived 
experience of France more hospitable in the affective realm, Bissack’s papers makes his lived 
experience more hospitable economically as well.  
* * * 
The possibility of other routes not only to arrive in France, but once in France, begins to 
undo the MNHI’s assumption that France is the logical endpoint to the migration narrative. In 
this third example, Maria Alejandra Lilliès Lacroix Valbuena Lagarde’s story continues to undo 
the inevitability of the ending the MNHI imagines. Lilliès Lacroix gave the museum religious 
mementos from Venezuela, where she was born and raised. She gave these gifts to the museum 
despite the fact that, in her own words, “Whenever someone uses the term immigrant, I don’t 
have the impression that they are talking about me” [Lorsqu’on emploie le terme d’immigré, j’ai 
l’impression qu’il n’est pas question de moi]. She came to France as a university student, curious 
to know the country where her grandfather was born. She fell in love, and stayed, getting married 
quickly to have the proper papers. Though she initially thought the MNHI “had nothing to do 
with her” [je ne me sentais pas concernée par le Musée national de l’histoire de l’immigration], 
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she eventually decides to participate in the Gifts Gallery because “Ultimately/In the end, to 
immigrate is to end up staying” [Finalement, immigrer, c’est finir par rester].  
Lilliès Lacroix’s story highlights the haphazard endings of immigration narratives; until 
one stays, one has not immigrated. And in that sense, when does one know when one has stayed? 
The ending is not a logical outcome as much as it is an arbitrary stopping point that recasts all 
the twists and turns that preceded it as leading up to that particular end. Thus, Lilliès Lacroix’s 
story turns attention to the category of immigrant not only as a legal status, but a structure of 
feeling,52 and one that emerges in between the lines of legal discourse, the host country’s 
perceptions, community of origin perceptions, and self-narration. She notes that she did not feel 
like an immigrant; in some ways, she belonged to the country even before she moved there to 
study, since her grandfather was French. But, clearly, someone thought she was an immigrant, 
otherwise her gift would not have ended up in the museum. Her gift is a ceramic medallion from 
Venezuela painted with the face of Jesus. We can read the gift metaphorically, the religious 
symbol sacrificed at the altar of the secular state. However, it is important to note that Lilliès 
Lacroix already felt French, not like an immigrant; and, her integration did not require a giving 
up of conspicuous religious symbols, unlike the girls who had to give up their head scarves to 
continue attending school (see J. Scott). Once again, the object suggests, contra the official 
narrative of the Gifts Gallery, that cultural, religious, sexual differences are not effaced upon 
arrival, but that the process of “becoming French”—integrating into the republic and practicing 
laïcité—differentiates between these differences, excluding some. 
                                                 
52 I am referring to Raymond Williams´s later use of this term, which is defined in Oxford Reference as “the 
different ways of thinking vying to emerge at any one time in history. It appears in the gap between the official 
discourse of policy and regulations, the popular response to official discourse and its appropriation in literary and 
other cultural texts. Williams uses the term feeling rather than thought to signal that what is at stake may not yet be 
articulated in a fully worked-out form, but has rather to be inferred by reading between the lines.”  
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Interestingly, this feeling or lack of feeling like an immigrant is noted—and dismissed— 
in du Mazaubrun’s summary of findings from the Gifts Gallery collection. Du Mazaubrun 
observes that relatively few of the material objects in the gallery donated by “first-generation” 
immigrants. She says, “In fact, many immigrants say they ‘don’t feel like immigrants,’ because 
they consider their exile a temporary one, with the hope of returning some day, despite having 
spent a number of years in France and having begun the naturalization process” (Mazaubrun 12; 
[D’ailleurs beaucoup [d’immigrés] se disent « ne pas se sentir immigrés », puisqu’ils perçoivent 
souvent leur exil comme temporaire, dans l’espoir d’un retour, en dépit du nombre d’années 
passées en France et de démarches de naturalisation entamées]). Though these individuals 
emphasize that they do not feel like immigrants, for du Mazaubrun, this feeling is an invalid 
indicator of their immigrant status: they arrived from another country and show no signs of 
leaving, thus they are immigrants.  
The affective dimension of the migration journey—the feeling like an immigrant—brings 
up the question of who needs to remember their migration narrative, and who is not allowed to 
forget? In what ways does a hospitality logic in migration narratives create a burden of memory 
that perpetuates the unequal statuses of host and guest? The discussion of the feeling of 
immigration comes up again when du Mazaubrun compares by origin the communities 
participated in the gallery. She notes that the majority of the donors came from other European 
countries, while other communities equally if not more significant in number, like the Asian 
immigrant community, barely participated. She also observes that the Italian community in 
particular was very active, postulating that “This community is perfectly integrated in French 
society today, which could explain the motivation of the descendants of Italians to bring 
attention to their ancestors’ journeys” (du Mazaubrun 12; [Cette communauté est aujourd’hui 
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parfaitement intégrée dans la société française, ce qui pourrait expliquer la volonté des 
descendants d’italiens de valoriser le parcours de leurs ancêtres]). Du Mazaubrun’s observations 
suggest that the affective experience of immigration varies between communities, and does not 
necessarily correspond with the legal status of residency nor with the time of arrival. What 
remains unsaid in Du Mazaubrun’s comments is that a shared skin color, religion, and cultural 
norms could have played a role the “perfect integration” of the Italian community. The 
purportedly color-blind and secular Republic appears to nevertheless accommodate more easily 
the communities that resemble the imagined francais de souche in phenotype, religious 
background, and culture. 
At another point, Du Mazaubrun notes that most of the donors and participants in the 
gallery were the children or grand-children of immigrants, commonly referred to as second and 
third generation immigrants. These individuals “feel, on the contrary, very interested with the 
museum’s process, to the extent that certain ones express the ‘feeling of being immigrants 
themselves’ even though they were born on French soil” (du Mazaubrun 12; [se sentent au 
contraire très intéressés par la démarche vis-à-vis du musée, au point que certains formulent le 
« sentiment d’être eux-mêmes des immigrés » bien que nés sur le sol français]). Though she does 
not identify from which community or country these immigrants come form, the language she 
reports them using to describe their status in France does not correspond with what she noted in 
the Italian community. These participants do not identify themselves not as descendants of 
immigrants wanting remember their ancestors, but as immigrants themselves.  
What might this décalage between how they feel and their immigration status tell us? On 
the one hand, it points to how upon arrival, differences are not erased but rather redifferentiated. 
If (some of) the descendants of (some) immigrants feel like immigrants rather than like citizens, 
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this suggests that in their lived experience creates a distance between themselves and the national 
identity.53 Ahmed points out that “Feminist, queer, and critical race philosophers have shown us 
how social differences are the effects of how bodies inhabit spaces with others,” explaining also 
that, “Difference is not simply found in the body, but is established as a relations between 
bodies” (2005, 5; 2000, 44). Difference is articulated as bodies inhabit the same space and are 
determined as familiar or strange, proximate or distant, and all the gradations in between. 
Because of this, Ahmed argues that “the lived experience of embodiment is always already the 
social experience of dwelling with other bodies” (47). It is not the process of arrival that creates 
an immigrant feeling, but what comes after. In the context of immigration to France, while the 
differences in question fall all over a spectrum, the ones that France insists are not part of its 
national identity—race, religion, and gender—do appear to function as markers of integration.54 
These differences are turned into irreconcilable differences with the “universal” values of France 
and become vectors of exclusion from French ways of being.55 
Conclusion 
In the following chapters of the dissertation I will discuss how material objects 
participate in the affective experience of migration. How belonging, in other words, whether that 
                                                 
53 Rosello points out that the popular and scholarly practice of tracking “generations” of immigrants can enable this 
kind of differentiated inclusion: “the ‘difference’ from an imagined native identity might become so imperceptible 
that they will not even be identified as part of a “second generation” that they are supposed to embody. Yet, even if 
it is fuzzy, invisible, and inconsistent, the idea of a “second generation” does not lose its relevance and power; it 
allows us to continue to think of “immigrants” as guests and of “us” as hosts. If we think of immigrants’ children as 
“mediators” between “us” and “them” (rather than, for example, as part of “us”), the parents will continue to be seen 
as newcomers (even if they have been in the country for thirty years)“ (2001; 91) 
54 “Indeed we need to factor in what Edward Soja calls “the geopolitics of the body,” meaning that race, gender, and 
ethnicity often firmly attach some bodies to certain narratives” (Coly 16) 
55 As Joan Wallach Scott argues, “Abstraction allows individuals to be conceived of as the same (as universal), but 
sameness is measure in terms of concrete ways of being (as Frenchness). And, ascriptions of difference, conceived 
as irreducible difference, whether based on culture or sex or sexuality, are taken to preclude any aspiration to 
sameness. If one has already been labeled different on any of these grounds, it becomes difficult to find a way of 
arguing that one is or can become the same” (13).  
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is a belonging oriented towards the idea of a nation, a culture, a race, or to a particular shared 
history, is produced with and by not only the stories we tell ourselves, but the material bodies 
that act in and on these stories. When I speak of the agency of material bodies in migration 
narratives, I want to distinguish between two faces of this agency . One is a narrative agency, 
and the other an inter-bodily/assemblagic agency.  
Though these two kinds of agency will be explored in the subsequent chapters, I will say 
a few words to begin to sketch out the contours of my reading of material agency. To provide a 
contrast to an agency-oriented understanding of nonhuman material bodies, I would describe the 
curatorial deployment of the material objects donated to the Gifts Gallery as being the opposite 
of an agency-oriented understanding. The MNHI treats these objects as inert, testimonial objects. 
The objects are valued for their role as witnesses: they provide evidence that a migration journey 
took place, and any effects they produce come from this evidentiary power. Certainly, the objects 
do testify in that they provide material traces of France’s long history with immigration. 
However, I propose calling these objects not witnesses of the migration experience, but narrative 
agents. I do this to emphasize less that they narrate the story themselves, but that they enable the 
conditions for storytelling. We can see this clearly in the Gifts Gallery, where the act of giving 
the objects created the occasion to tell, record, and exhibit the stories of the immigrant donors.  
That being said, I would also emphasize that narrative agency is not the only kind of 
agency that the objects demonstrate. In their previous owners’ lives, the objects enabled 
particular actions, occasions, and structures of feeling. We can catch glimpses of this inter-
bodied agency in the three examples I pulled from the Gifts Gallery. In the first example, 
Doraghi’s perfumed pillowcase participated in the affective experience of her arrival to France. 
The ability of fabric to hold on to a scent, its pliability and portability, all permitted Doraghi to 
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smell even if she couldn’t see her mother during the years apart. Jane Bennett, in her theory of 
vibrant materiality, might read this assemblage of perfume, pillowcase, and child as “an animal-
vegetable-mineral-sonority cluster with a particular degree and duration of power” (23). In 
Chapters Two and Four, I will discuss Bennett’s theory more extensively. For this chapter, I use 
this understanding of agency as located between human and nonhuman to highlight how a 
material object (the perfumed pillowcase) thus shaped the migratory experience of Doraghi as 
she lived it, not just the narration of the experience after the fact; this is an inter-bodily agency, 
the two material bodies affecting each other and shaping the conditions of possibility for affect 
and action.  
In the second example from the Gifts Gallery, Bissack’s story, two major objects, as 
discussed play a role. The table top, as a narrative agent, opens up a space for him to tell the 
story of his migration experience, and its form and semantic function enable his narration to turn 
the tables on the expected host-guest roles. Meanwhile, the papers he had carried in his suitcase 
display an inter-bodily agency in that they enable a materially advantageous experience for 
Bissack in the host country. Bissack alone would have been equally able to perform the labor his 
host wanted him to perform, but without the papers, his experience would have likely been 
financially, physically, and affectively precarious. The abstract process of immigration, in all its 
economic, affective, and bodily precarity is materialized through these papers. 
I employ the terms of material narrative agency and inter-bodily agency because they 
allow for critical readings that are more attentive to the distinct ways that nonhuman material 
bodies act on human experiences, particularly migratory experiences. Migration experiences are 
intensely physical and sensorial ones. They involve the movement of one’s body from one 
location’s particular sounds, smells, sights, and textures to another location’s set of sensory 
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experiences. Migrations are also experiences that splinter the dominant locations—homes—that 
shelter identity (family, culture, birthplace, living place). These affective “homes” are split from 
the sensory experiences that accompanied them: “The journeys of migration involve a splitting 
of home as place of origin and home as the sensory world of everyday experience” (Ahmed 
2000; 90). Those of us that seek to grasp the myriad of re-orientations to time, place, and self 
that migration experiences unleash need to be equipped with the language and tools that allow 
for critical readings of these experiences in all their sensorial and affective nuance. I argue that 
the framework of a narrative and interbodily agency that operates between the human and 
nonhuman can contribute to such readings.  
  Of course, the categories of narrative agency and inter-bodily agency are not meant to 
operate exclusively of each other. In the final example I discussed from Gifts Gallery, Lilliès 
Lacroix’s mementos from Venezuela provide an occasion not only to tell the story of her 
journey, but to recalibrate the affective relationship to her host country and to the status of 
immigrant. Before designating her mementos as gifts to the MNHI, Lilliès Lacroix didn’t feel 
that she belonged to the immigrant community. Using them to map out her journey not only 
provided the occasion to tell her journey, but shifted her attachment. She begins to feel that there 
may yet be a common ground between herself and others who have lived migrant experiences. 
This re-tilling of a common ground through a retelling of migration experiences can, I argue, 
transform the terrain of belonging.  
As Ahmed’s phrases it, “Migrant bodies, selves, and communities cannot simply be 
understood as simply one side of identity or the other, or on one side of the community or the 
other: rather, it is the uncommon estrangement of migration itself that allows migrants to remake 
what it is they might have yet in common” (94). Rather than understanding the migration 
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narrative as a journey from a home identity to a host identity (or a refusal of host identity by 
clinging on to home identity), we can map out plotlines that create the conditions of empathy and 
imagination that irrigate an underexplored common ground. The remaining three chapters will 
analyze migration narratives that attempt to ground a feeling of belonging in different types of 
“homes,” and use the framework of material agency to understand what goes into the kinds of 
groundings, and their sensorial and affective effects.  
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Chapter Two: RETURN 
 
 
“There is no subject, there is no object…. But there are events” 
Bruno Latour, Pandora’s Box, 281 
 
The Event  
Winter 2015, shuffling between Paris and a Midwest college town, was an uncanny time 
to be writing about mourning.  The writing of this chapter began in France, shortly before two 
young men, claiming to act in the name of Islam, walked into the offices of the French satirical 
newspaper Charlie Hebdo and gunned down the entire editorial team, the police officer that was 
there to prevent such a thing from happening, and a few other people who worked for the 
newspaper or in the building. Charlie Hebdo, though not as widely read as it once had been, was 
still a touchstone of French culture. The newspaper—mainly caricatures and satirical articles—
was known for its irreverent writing and penchant for taking on the most powerful figures and 
institutions in the French state, even the figures that were normally sacred. 
 Throughout its existence, the newspaper routinely suffered from boycotts, hate mail, 
and—less often, but occasionally—state sanctions for going “too far” in its representations of 
established political powers, particularly the Catholic Church as well as the far right wing’s 
party, the Front National. Nevertheless, the newspaper’s portraits of the prophet Mohammed 
sparked the most-high-profile controversies, and Charlie Hebdo’s stance against what they called 
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Islamic extremism blended easily into a rising anti-Islamic sentiment in France.56 These satirical 
drawings earned the newspaper death threats, a lawsuit (which they won) in 2007, and a 
firebombing of their offices in 2011. The debate on the secular left rested on whether Charlie 
Hebdo’s cartoons racialized Islam through its portrayals of Islamic extremists—and were thus 
inappropriate—or if, as the editors claimed, the caricatures “merely” attacked religious 
fundamentalism of any color. 
 By late 2014, however, the French authorities had decided that the threats of violence 
against Charlie Hebdo had attenuated. They reduced the security detail that trailed editor-in-
chief and founder Stéphane Charbonnier and other members of the team. On January 7, 2015, 
Chérif and Saïd Kouachi showed up with their rifles at the newspaper’s office during the weekly 
editorial meeting and ended the lives of twelve people.  
Unmournable Citizens 
Because I was in France researching the material that is now on these pages, I was present 
not only for the event but for the aftershocks. I was present as solidarity marches were organized 
and a national minute of silence observed; even the metros held their wheels for that minute on 
January 8, 2015. A few days later, I watched as 1.6 million people marched in solidarity to the 
Place de la République in Paris; President François Hollande and the leaders of many nations 
participated, and simultaneous demonstrations were organized around the world.  
In his address to the nation the evening of the assassinations, President François Hollande 
sought to give meaning to what had just happened, declaring, “Ces hommes, cette femme, sont 
morts pour l’idée qu’ils se faisaient de la France, c'est-à-dire la liberté. […] Aujourd’hui, c’est la 
                                                 
56 Charlie Hebdo began to focus its satirical energies on Islamic fundamentalists in the early 2000s. When accused 
of xenophobia, its contributors and editors insisted that they were equal-opportunity jesters: “L’attaque contre toutes 
les religions, c’est ce qui constitue notre identité” [Attacking all religions is the definition of our identity] affirmed 
editor-in-chief Gérard Biard (Ternisien 2012).   
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République toute entière qui a été agressée. La République, c’est la liberté d’expression” (Elysée, 
January 7, 2015; [These men, this woman, died for what they believed France stands for: 
freedom. […] Today, what was attacked is the Republic itself. The Republic is freedom of 
expression]. If these individuals had died because they incarnated the national value of freedom 
of expression—the core identity of the nation according to Hollande—then mourning their death 
took on a particular valence: mourning was a civic obligation. Mourning was not to be a solitary 
process but a collective manifestation performed in a public space.  
In addition, the purpose of mourning would not be merely to commemorate the lives of 
individuals but to commemorate and insist on the collective values of a nation. This sentiment 
threaded its way throughout the official statements of the French government, and the reports by 
journalists on national and international media. Prime Minister Manuel Valls encouraged people 
to attend the solidarity demonstrations that were scheduled for the Sunday after the attack, “J’en 
appelle à l’unité, tous ceux qui aiment la France doivent venir à la marche de dimanche, c’est 
une manisfestation citoyenne, ça c’est la France” (TF1, January 9 2015; emphasis mine [I am 
calling for unity. All who hold France dear must come to the Sunday march. It is a citizens’ 
assembly, and this is what makes us France]). The civic turn that mourning took called upon the 
citizens of the nation to collectively mourn two things at the same time: the bloody death of 12 
humans, and an assault on the freedom of speech. By mourning both, we would claim our 
belonging to a kind of enlightened citizenship through a valiant insistence on the freedom of 
expression as a universal human right.   
The problem with presenting the Charlie Hebdo attacks as a violation of universal human 
rights worth collective mourning, is that human rights are not universal. The lived experience of 
exercising these rights is not universally homogenous but inflected with experiences of gender, 
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race, and language among other factors.57 In addition, as many were quick to point out, the fairly 
frequent deaths of journalists from non-Western nations killed in their own countries for 
“speaking freely” receive little global media attention and no international political 
commemoration. However, what I want to highlight is that the very language of universal human 
rights enacts particular modes of belonging that render some people as mournable—salient 
members of a community—and others not. To mourn the attack on Charlie Hebdo specifically as 
an attack on the freedom of expression is to stake a claim in a world where freedom of 
expression looks a particular way. That world is one in which Charlie Hebdo can become a 
secular martyr in a struggle to uphold the freedoms a nation holds dear, while other struggles to 
exercise freedom, such as wearing a headscarf, are perceived as threats to that same nation.58  
Teju Cole brings the first glimmers of this idea to germination in his wonderfully 
insightful response to the Charlie Hebdo attacks. In an essay titled “Unmournable Bodies,” Cole 
argues that along with sitting in just sorrow over the violent deaths of twelve humans, we—a 
“we” Cole positions as citizens of the Western world—also ought to examine the way our 
nations use force and violence to police “our” beliefs about what democracy, personal liberty, 
and freedom of speech look like. Cole writes, and I quote at length because his words are worth 
their weight, that although he was encouraged by the generous acts of worldwide solidarity in the 
aftermath, the reaction to the Charlie Hebdo attacks nevertheless:  
indicates how easy it is in Western societies to focus on radical Islamism as the 
real, or the only, enemy. This focus is part of the consensus about mournable 
bodies, and it often keeps us from paying proper attention to other, ongoing 
                                                 
57 See Chapter One, particularly the discussion on secularism and republicanism for more on this.  
58 It should go without saying, but it does not, that no vision of any world should be policed and enforced with 
violence; I am not saying it was right for two men to take guns into their hands and empty their cartridges into the 
living, soft membrane of the bodies of the people who ran Charlie Hebdo, or any other newspaper, or any other 
thing. What I am saying is that a version of this same violence is already being used to police a culturally specific 
(not universal) understanding of liberty. 
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instances of horrific carnage around the world […] violence from “our” side 
continues unabated. By this time next month, in all likelihood, many more “young 
men of military age” and many others, neither young nor male, will have been 
killed by U.S. drone strikes in Pakistan and elsewhere. Their deaths will be 
considered as natural and incontestable as deaths like Menocchio’s, under the 
Inquisition. Those of us who are writers will not consider our pencils broken by 
such killings. But that incontestability, that unmournability, just as much as that 
massacre in Paris, is the clear and present danger to our collective liberté. 
Cole is not sanctioning the actions of Chérif and Saïd Kouachi. Rather, he is asking if perhaps 
there is a continuum that links the innocent blood the Kouachi brothers spilled with the innocent 
blood spilled as collateral in American bombings in Pakistan, for example. If so, why is one kind 
of blood mourned as an affront on all human values, and the other kind of blood spillage deemed 
as necessary damage? What does consensus around which bodies are mournable, and which ones 
are unmournable, tell us about the way we outline “correct” practices of being and belonging to a 
national and international modern citizenry?  
The questions seemed particularly poignant and pointed, given two other “events” that 
were—more slowly, less surely, but still stubbornly—entering the newscape of North American 
and Western Europe: the migrant crises in the Mediterranean, and the Black Lives Matter 
movement in the U.S.A. following the uprisings in Ferguson and Baltimore. Both of these crises 
highlighted the systematic loss of human lives through state-sanctioned practices of enforcement, 
and yet these deaths were not decried as assaults on universal principles of humanity. To the 
contrary, it seemed that these deaths were seen as unfortunate but necessary to the proper 
functioning of state order. Collateral damage of controlling the streets, controlling the border.  
Cole’s phrasing of “unmournable” bodies clung to me as I dug into the two narrative 
spaces that I was preparing to center this chapter around. The first is French-Senegalese author 
Fatou Diome’s novel Kétala (2006), in which the belongings of a young Senegalese women take 
it upon themselves to tell the tale of her migration to France, estrangement from her family, and 
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tragically early death. The second text is Nigerian author Chris Abani’s novella Becoming 
Abigail (2009), in which a teenage girl from Lagos is sexually abused by her uncle when she 
arrives in London, becomes romantically and sexually involved with her social caseworker, and 
commits suicide without anyone to notice her disappearance. Both are texts that practice the 
mourning of bodies whose deaths were treated as normal, necessary, and thus, unmournable.  
What this chapter takes as a given is that mourning is an inherently narrative practice, a 
telling and retelling of lives loved and lost. The texts that I’ve chosen operate through mise-en-
abimes: they tell the story of the telling of a mourning story. To put it another way, they 
themselves practice the very processes of mourning that they represent. The mourning practices 
enacted by the texts, I will argue, are oppositional readings of the tragedies they tell. In this 
chapter, I draw on Ross Chambers—who is himself building on Michel de Certeau’s deployment 
of oppositional strategies—by delving into the room for maneuver that is made possible through 
the relationships between human and nonhuman material bodies in mourning narratives. In other 
words, I explore how an oppositional reading of the tragedies is made possible because the texts 
make space for the power of materiality to act in places where narrative power stutters. This 
chapter furthermore asks what these relationships do to our own (critical) reading practices: what 
does the material agencement59 of narrative elements open up in the space between reader and 
text? In inviting and formulating readerly positions, what kinds of subjectivities—relationships 
between self, state, and other—are likewise formulated?  
Throughout the chapter, I will trace the interactions between humans and material 
objects—particularly personal belongings—that appear in Kétala and Becoming Abigail. I will 
                                                 
59 Here, I am thinking of Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of agencement in Towards a Minor Literature. The specific 
material environment with its contingencies that make not only the enunciation and the delivery of a message 
possible, but constitute the very desire to speak it or hear it. This is particularly necessary, Ross Chambers (2004) 
argues, in discourses of extremity, where the undesireability of the message being delivered must be overcome.  
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propose a few ways in which these interactions invite oppositional readings and a 
disidentifactory structure of feeling (a structure that I will define along the way). Material 
mourning in the two novels, I will argue, tends to reterritorialize bodies as mournable through 
three narrative moves. First, unlike the civic mourning I described earlier, which reinforced 
existing hierarchies of being and belonging along previously established frontiers of collective 
national identity, material mourning opens avenues of attachment that are not circumscribed by 
the familiar territories of familial, linguistic, social, racial, sexual, or geographic identification. It 
furthermore proposes a model of belonging that flattens those hierarchies of belonging and the 
freedoms they entail. Secondly, material mourning diffuses a usually anthropocentric sense of 
agency into an energy that is distributed across a field of animate and inanimate objects. Like the 
material belongings in Kétala which, as I briefly mentioned, take it upon themselves to tell the 
story of their owner’s life, I see material mourning as a rhetorical move that broadens the sources 
and senses of empathy available to minoritarian subjects. Finally, material mourning insists on 
the frailty of the human body, and emphasizes the way this vulnerability is both invited and 
shared. This is a means of universalizing human suffering in a way that does not efface 
differences and injustices yet does open territory that can be claimed as common ground. The 
three things together enable the reterritorialization of bodies that deviated from the normative 
practices of being and belonging as mournable ones, but they also begin to model and to provide 
those structures of feeling necessary to imagine a new mode of belonging, one that can shift the 
questions we pose to our postcolonial present and reshape the thinkable future. 
Disidentificatory Mourning 
Mourning, as I described in the opening anecdote, may be mobilized by the state to bring 
a collective of people together to reaffirm the values and practices around which it articulates a 
national identity. However, mourning can also be a subversive practice, reterritorializing as 
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mournable the bodies that deviate from the norms of being without—and this is important—
erasing, eliding, effacing the ways they butted against the attachments that are practiced by the 
majority of subjects in a modern nation state. This is the kind of mourning that José Esteban 
Muñoz theorizes in Disidentifications: Queers of Color and the Performance of Politics. Muñoz 
proposes the concept of disidentification as “descriptive of the survival strategies the minority 
subject practices in order to negotiate a phobic majoritarian public sphere that consciously elides 
and punishes the existence of subjects who do not conform to the phantasm of normative 
citizenship” (3). In other words, this is a relationship wherein a subject that exists at the edges of 
a public sphere neither fully assimilates nor fully rejects a potentially repressive ideological 
apparatus but rather finds ways to use it towards her own ends.60 
For Muñoz, the act of mourning can be co-opted as a survival strategy that enables a 
disidentificatory structure. Exploring the disidentificatory potential of mourning, I will argue, 
becomes a useful lens for analyzing the relationships between the protagonists and their material 
belongings in Kétala and Becoming Abigail. But it will also help parse out the readerly positions 
that the texts invite. Like oppositionality, which I will discuss further on, key to this strategy is a 
reliance on ambivalent energies to enact affective change. In my analysis of Kétala and 
Becoming Abigail, material mourning is one of the avenues through which disidentificatory 
strategies can be deployed; it puts in place between reader and text “an ambivalent structure of 
feeling that works to retain the problematic object and tap into the energies that are produced by 
                                                 
60 Muñoz carefully traces the genealogy of disidentification, which he locates in Louis Althusser’s theory of 
subjection formation through ideological interpellation, in which a subject is “called” into formation by the 
ideological apparatus of a dominant structure such as the nation-state, religion, etc. Interpellation is at some level a 
process of recognition, as the subject must identify himself at that which is being hailed. Muñoz positions his 
deployment of disidentification in relation to Judith Butler’s earlier work, who sees the ambivalent recognition—“to 
read onself and one’s own life narrative in a moment, object, or subject that is not culturally coded to “connect” with 
the disidentifying subject”—as a point of departure for potentially reworking cultural constructs and their 
accompanying empathies (Muñoz 12).  
 108 
contradictions and ambivalences” (Muñoz 71). Muñoz’s work provides a language for the kind 
of mourning that pauses on overlooked lives without forgetting the conditions that rendered them 
unmournable to the majority in the first place. This is a kind of mourning that give us tools, in 
other words, to retain the disruptive qualities of those lives that existed at the margins of 
normativity, while creating a network of sympathies through which a reader can see the fate of 
those previously unmournable bodies as tied into the fate of a larger collectivity. It opens, one 
might say, wider avenues to collective living precisely because it offers modes of attachments 
that work around current borders of belonging drawn by both a nationalistic identification and a 
diasporic formation.  
Materials for Mournability 
One text in which we can trace mourning’s subversive edges is Kétala, published by 
Fatou Diome in 2006. “Lorsqu’une personne meurt, nul ne se soucie de la tristesse de ses 
meubles !” [When a person dies,” the opening line of Kétala’s prologue laments, “no one feels 
for the furniture’s loss!] (7). Strange it may seem, to react to a death by worrying about the 
emotional well-being of the deceased person’s material possessions! Nevertheless, Kétala, a 
novel about the interiors of mourning, continually enacts this move of directing attention to the 
intimacy of a relationship between human being and nonhuman material entity. The novel begins 
in Senegal at the death of a young woman, Mémoria, and takes place in the week that leads up to 
her funeral. In that week, the story of Mémoria’s life from birth to death, from girlhood to 
arranged marriage to separation, from natal village to Dakar, to France, and back, is retold to the 
reader. The telling, however, is voiced not by her beloved ones nor by the abstract third person 
narrator, but by her belongings. It is Mémoria’s material inheritance—her couch, her silverware, 
a pearl necklace, the clock that hangs on the wall, to name just a few—that gather to piece 
together her life’s trajectory. While a third person narrative voice floats over the entire scene, 
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opening and closing sections of the novel, describing the present activities of the objects which 
are locked inside Mémoria’s apartment, it is the objects that narrate everything that happened to 
Mémoria leading up to the narrative present.  
Even though the objects names are not personalized, each object does have a distinct 
personality—Mouchoir (Tissue) is fragile and emotional while Montre (Watch) is an even-
tempered know-it-all; Masque (Mask) and Chasseur (Hunter) vie for the attentions of another 
wooden carving, Coumba Djiguène; Collier (Necklace) puts on the airs of a fine lady. The 
belongings all bicker and interrupt each other over petty matters. Similarly, the description of 
their physical features is markedly anthropomorphic; eager to listen to what Porte (Door) has 
overheard, “Les chaises se penchèrent sur la pointe de leurs pieds, les fauteuils se penchèrent, le 
grille-pain ouvrit sa bouche édentée, la table se rapprocha à quatre pattes, l’ordinateur ne fut plus 
qu’un œil figé, à l’écoute” [The chairs leaned forward to the tips of their toes, the armchairs 
leaned forward, the toaster oven opened its toothless mouth, the table crawled closer, the 
computer became a motionless eye: they were all ears] (14). These are mobile objects, leggy and 
eager, with expressive facial features and human senses. The rhetorical move of placing the 
narrative voice in the material belongings has more at stake, however, than mere 
anthropomorphic amusement. The material mourning in Kétala comes out of an initial absence 
of mourning: the objects speak—and speak to each other—because no one else is doing the work 
of telling and listening to Mémoria’s life story. 
The belongings’ intimate relationship with Mémoria puts in sharp relief Mémoria’s 
alienation from her own biological family. Her parents, siblings, and extended family never enter 
the apartment in which the objects are narrating Mémoria’s life. In fact, the only part of the 
mourning process they care about is the kétala: the distribution of Mémoria’s material goods at 
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the end of the eight-day mourning period. As the objects will eventually piece together, 
Mémoria’s familial estrangement was caused by her failure to live up to the standards of 
“womanhood.” Coming from a respectable family in Dakar, Mémoria’s parents had arranged for 
her marriage to a family friend, Mahkou. Though initially concerned when, several months into 
the marriage, Mémoria still wasn’t pregnant, her extended family rejoiced when the young 
couple moved to France and began sending financial support back home. This illusion of a 
happy, dutiful couple is shattered when Mémoria returns to Dakar a few years later, still 
childless, now husbandless, and dying of AIDS after having supported herself (and her family in 
Senegal) through prostitution. Her deviant sexual behavior and broken marriage status render her 
body an unmournable one; her death is “normal” because she did not abide by “proper” sexual 
standards and her death is “necessary” because as an HIV carrier, she posed a threat to the health 
of a collectivity. Both in her hometown and abroad, it seems, her death was more worthy of 
being forgotten than of being remembered. 
However, Coumba Djiguène—the statue that belonged to Mémoria—reveals to the rest of 
the objects something that not even Mémoria’s family knows: the reason that Mémoria and 
Mahkou moved to France in the first place was that Mémoria found out that her husband was in a 
longstanding romantic and sexual relationship with her closest friend, Tamara. Late one night, 
Mémoria, frustrated that Mahkou is wholly uninterested in sexually consummating their 
marriage, goes unannounced to Tamara’s house to confide in her—only to discover that Mahkou 
is already there. The nature of Mahkou and Tamara’s relationship is evident. That night, 
Mémoria also finds out that Tamara not biologically female, but has been living as a woman ever 
since she arrived in Dakar. Tamara (previously named Tamsir) and Mahkou had met and become 
lovers in Gambia, long before Mahkou’s marriage to Mémoria. When Tamsir’s father discovers 
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this same-sex intimacy, Tamsir flees Gambia and follows Mahkou to Senegal. Tamsir becomes 
Tamara and the love affair continues despite Mahkou’s marriage to Mémoria. Upon the 
discovery of the affair and of Mahkou’s same-sex desire, Mémoria decides she must flee as well, 
and take Mahkou to France. She believes that “Là-bas, loin de tout, ils apprendraient à mener 
une vrai vie matrimoniale” [Over there, away from it all, they would learn to have a real married 
life] (128). Mahkou is reluctant, but since Mémoria threatens to reveal his secret if refuses, they 
pack up their belongings and move to France.    
It may seem odd that Mémoria leaves her homeland rather than leaving her husband 
when she discovers that Mahkou is sexually interested in men. Kétala, however, shows that 
“home” is not merely a geographic space, but a set of gender relationships and behaviors. The 
novel frequently mentions how Mémoria is touted by her family and peers as the ideal 
Senegalese woman: beautiful, brilliant, a talented dancer, obedient daughter, loyal friend, and 
desired by many men. And yet, without consummating her marriage and having children, her 
womanhood is unstable grounds, as is, it seems, her claim to belong to a Senegalese nation-
building project. Mémoria’s wedding pagne tells the rest of the objects how Mémoria and 
Mahkou’s mothers have the couple’s bed sheets checked every morning to find signs of first 
intercourse. After a week goes by without proof of intercourse, the mothers arrange to use 
chicken’s blood to fake the penetration of the hymen. The blood-stained sheet, a vicarious and 
fraudulent witness, is triumphantly displayed to the family and paraded through the streets. After 
months of a still-chaste marriage, Mémoria reveals her sexual frustration to her mother, who puts 
the burden back on Mémoria. The mother gives her a string of beads infused with sexual powers. 
These beads overhear Mémoria’s mother telling her daughter: “le bois mouillé n’empeche jamais 
la bonne ménagère de tisonner son feu et servir un bon plat chaud” [damp wood won’t keep a 
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good house wife from kindling a fire and serving up a hot meal] (80). The message her mother 
sends is that if Mémoria fails to seduce her husband, then she’s failed her family. In short, 
arousing desire, consummating it, and producing a child is the measure of her womanhood. 
Finding herself married to a man who has no interest in having sexual relations, Mémoria no 
longer fits in to any of the sexual and social roles that are available to women in her country; she 
may be in the geographic location of “home,” but she no longer belongs, and thus she must 
leave. 
Sexualities of Citizenship 
What we must pause on here is that gender relations and collective identity are forms of 
attachment that are closely—and problematically—related to each other in a postcolonial African 
context. Since the African independence movements in the late 1950s and early 1960s, collective 
identity has been a fraught question. No longer the subjects of an imperial power, the question to 
grapple with what political-cultural formation could hold together people of differing linguistic 
and ethnic backgrounds, whose cohabitation was, in part, the result of the violent and disruptive 
process of colonization and the slave trade. When the colonized territories gained independence, 
they organized themselves politically and culturally as nation-states. Independence from the 
colonial powers did not, however, guarantee freedom from all forms of oppression; in fact, they 
reinforced a narrow definition of sexual identity and expression.  As Neville Hoad elucidates in 
African Intimacies: Race, Homosexuality, and Globalization (2007), “[i]n certain crucial ways, 
nationalism, as a hybrid product of European enlightenment and romantic discourses, carries its 
own set of implied gender relations, even when appropriated, or used from below by anticolonial 
nationalisms in the struggle for decolonization” (57). The imposition of heterosexual monogamy 
as the “properly modern” practice of intimacy during colonization effaced earlier practices of 
homosexual and heterosexual intimacy and gender relations that had previously existed in 
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African cultures. These practices, in fact, had been used as evidence by European colonial 
projects of the African populations’ need for civilization.61 Paradoxically, this homophobic 
discourse has been internalized in some African nationalistic discourses that now claim that 
homosexuality is a “white disease” that was introduced to the African continent and people 
through colonialism or slavery.62 This fusion of national identity and sexual identity makes it 
discursively impossible to identify as “gay” and “African” or “Senegalese” at the same time.63 
Of course, the nation-state is not the only framework of identity that holds sway in 
postcolonial Africa. Given the long history of multiple dispersions and ongoing migrations, the 
diasporic experience resonates as a shared experience that may organize collective ties and 
facilitate a sense of belonging for peoples who identify as black. In The Black Atlantic: 
Modernity and Double Consciousness (1994), which outlines one of the most enduring 
theorizations of black diaspora, Paul Gilroy famously rerouted black identity not through African 
roots (origin) but through the routes that crisscross the Atlantic. He argued that diaspora is the 
key cultural unit that defines a black or pan-African identity, one that could replace 
geographically or historically bounded units of analysis. This move of putting diaspora at the 
center of a black identity was supposed to exemplify a more capacious and mobile form of 
                                                 
61 Hoad notes that the colonial administration was deeply interested in observing and defining sexual behaviors. He 
states that “bodily practices signified as sexual or acts signifying bodily practices as sexual may have been 
instrumental in the instigation of colonial rule and were certainly and important part of its implementation” (7) 
62 For a full discussion, see Hoad (2007), particularly Chapters 4, and 5; see also Hayes Queer Roots of the 
Diaspora: Ghosts in the Family Tree (2016), particularly Chapters 1 and 2; see also Babar M’Baye’s “The Origins 
of Senegalese Homophobia: Discourses on Homosexuals and Transgender People in Colonial and Postcolonial 
Senegal” which includes some discussion of homophobia and nationalism in Uganda as well. All three of these texts 
draw from anthropologic sources, literature, popular discourse, and historical documents to address queer sexualities 
and gender noncomforming practices and their representations from outside and inside the African continent. See 
also the African Studies Review Forum on “Homophobic Africa?” (56.2 September 2013).  
63 This impossibility and invisibility is compounded for queer women, as the documentaries The Vibrancy of Silence 
(Djilo Kamga and Ekotto 2017) and Ouvrir la Voix (Gay 2017) also profile queer and lesbian women who testify to 
the difficulty of identifying as black African and gay, both on the continent and abroad. The South African 
photographer Zanele Muholi has been creatively documenting the queer lives of women in her country, and 
contributing to the rethinking of gender through a local lens (see Gabeba Baderoon’s “ ‘Gender Within Gender’: 
Zanele Muholi’s Images of Trans Being and Becoming”). 
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belonging, one that could accommodate ties to multiple territories and move away from a 
conflation of race and place and nation.  
However, if nationalism espouses a heteronormative and patriarchal model of belonging, 
diaspora as the nation’s “other” often reifies as much as it contests the same masculinist, 
Eurocentric, and heteronormative vision of belonging. By focusing on experiences from which 
women have historically been excluded in order to define diaspora and by framing culture as a 
shared inheritance, Gilroy’s theorization of the diasporic experience implicitly reproduced the 
latent androcentric and genealogic structure of nationality.64 In fact, as Stefan Helmreich noted, 
“diaspora” is a word with biblical origins, whose etymology alludes to the scattering of seeds, 
which in the Judeo-Christian cosmology stand in for sperm. Diaspora’s origins thus “refer us to a 
system of kinship reckoned through men” (Helmreich 245). In both its etymological root and its 
scholarly routes, diaspora has not been as hospitable a formation as it initially appeared.65   
Before returning to the novel to see how the definition of home is tied up in questions of 
sexual longing and belonging, we must take into account how it is not only that nationalism and 
diaspora presuppose heterosexual gender relations, but that sexual practices and affective 
intimacies themselves are primarily understood through the lens of a Euro-American definition 
of sexuality. Moreover, the modern Euro-American definition of sexuality is itself fairly recent 
scientific construct oriented around the an understanding of monogamous heterosexuality as the 
norm, as Michel Foucault argues in The History of Sexuality. It is necessary, as Gopinath so 
succinctly puts it, to interrogate “the globalization of ‘gay’ identity that replicates a colonial 
                                                 
64 See Clifford (1994), Ganguly (1992), and Mohanty (1992) for examples of early studies that noted this trend or 
attempted to account for the gendered experience of diaspora.  
65 Though it must be noted that Jarrod Hayes’ Queer Roots of the Diaspora: Ghosts in the Family Tree compellingly 
argues that if one goes back to Kobena Mercer’s “earliest redefinitions of diaspora in black British Cultural studies, 
it starts to look like diaspora may very well have been queer all along” (2016, 16). See also Jafari Allen’s edited 
special issue of GLQ: Gay And Lesbian Studies Quarterly titled “Black/Queer/Diaspora.” 
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narrative of development and progress that judges all ‘other’ sexual cultures, communities, and 
practices against a model of Euro-American sexual identity” (11). Hoad similarly argues that the 
plurality of “homosexualities” and the particularities of “African” sexualities have been effaced 
not only through political practice and discourse in Africa, but in scholarly studies of Africa as 
well.66 Whether the practices of intimacy—sexual and affective—that existed alongside 
heterosexual practices in Africa at the time of colonization were presented as deviations or as 
cultural norms, they were used to justify the colonial mission and brutal practices of imposing 
heterosexual, monogamous sexual “normalcy.”67  
Because of this, a history of non-heterosexual intimacy on the African continent has been 
lost. As Babacar M’Baye argues in the case of Senegal specifically, “it is not homosexuality but 
rather homophobia that was a colonial imposition. Such colonial homophobia produced the 
denial of the Africanness of homosexuality that we see in contemporary Senegal, which erases 
and silences the important contributions that homosexual and transgender subcultures have made 
to the nation’s history” (123-24).”68 Paradoxically, today, African nations are criticized 
internationally for their homophobic intolerance, in the same language of progress and properly 
civilized behavior that once laced the colonial discourse that banished previous “non-normative” 
                                                 
66 Hoad points to a few studies that depart from this tendency: Male Daughters, Female Husbands: Gender and Sex 
in African Societies (Amadiume 1987), Rethinking Sexualities in Africa (Arnfred 2004), and two essays in Murray 
and Roscoe’s Boy-Wives and Female Husbands: Studies of African Homosexualities (1998); Deborah Amory’s 
“Mashoga, Mabasha, and Magai: ‘Homosexuality’ On the East African Coast” and Kendall “ ‘When A Woman 
Loves A Woman’ in Lesotho: Love, Sex, and the (Western) Construction of Homophobia”). Sylvie Tamale’s 
African Sexualities: A Reader also offers a multidimensional survey of diverse practices of intimacy on the African 
continent. 
67 For more on how sexual mores and gender norms were both imposed and contested in the imperial space—and 
how these debates were linked to anxieties in mainland France--see Conklin; Conklin et al; Chaperon; Gaudio; and 
Martin.   
68 Other examples are Kaoma and Cheney, who each argue that upsurge in homophobia and its political 
mobilization is imported from the United States, primarily by evangelical groups. They state that homophobia on the 
African continent is fueled by the belief that homosexuality is an import from the West and augmented by a concern 
about fertility rates. Other scholars demonstrate how homophobia is stoked by associating with external (i.e. 
Western, non-African) ways of life are Ahlberg and Kulane (2011, p. 36), and Teunis (2001; pp. 174-75). 
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sexual practices. Recuperating this history—a move which requires expanding the imagination to 
understand sexual and affective intimacy as practices and relationships that do not necessarily 
follow a heterosexual template—changes the temporal understanding of sexuality. It changes the 
narrative where European and North American countries are the paradigms of progress and 
progressive human rights, while the global south is relegated to the role of playing catch-up.69  
Queer Territories of Longing 
Kétala renders palpable the inhospitability of both diaspora and nation as territories of 
attachment for anyone who cannot fit into the dominant, heteronormative gender relations. 
Mémoria is adrift, unable to fit into any of the sexual and relational structures that are embedded 
within a national or diasporic affinity. Mahkou loves and admires her, but does not desire her 
sexually; she burns with unfulfilled sexual desire, but finds herself emotionally and physically 
drained when she turns sex into her trade. She is neither wife nor lover nor mother, and when her 
family discovers what she has been doing in Europe, she is no longer a daughter, either: all the 
social and sexual roles available to Mémoria lead, literally, to a dead end. And yet, she 
stubbornly refuses to give up on any of them, refusing to formally divorce Mahkou or even tell 
her family the state of their relationship, and rejecting his advice to find a (heterosexual) partner 
that can love her the way she wants to be loved.  
It would be easy to dismiss her obstinate insistence that Mahkou is the only man she can 
love and start a family with as childish, self-destructive, homophobic or some combination of the 
three. However, I argue that the narrative labor of the material belongings in Kétala invites, 
instead, a radical reconfiguration of the modes of belonging proposed by both nation and 
diaspora. This radical reconfiguration is what I will call an act of queering. Queering, in this 
                                                 
69 See Hoad (2007), notably the Introduction 
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chapter, will express a modification of both the object of desire as well as the direction of desire 
away from the subject’s expected Other, in such a way that heteronormative and patriarchal 
norms, structures, and relationships are excavated and undermined. This is loose definition 
perhaps, but intentionally so, as I will argue that it is this very mobility that opens space for 
disidentificatory attachments.  
As the material belongings map out Mémoria’s wanderings through her affective 
relations in different geographic spaces, they queer the sexual and romantic territories that 
Mémoria traverses. Part of this queering is a formal one: the material objects tell the story on 
Mémoria’s life through the form of a roots narrative, but in so doing, they change the direction of 
the narrative desire and expectation. When the storytelling begins, Masque tells the other objects 
that they will “tous ensemble, reconstituer le puzzle de [la] vie [de Mémoria]” [put together the 
puzzle of Mémoria’s life] (22), of which each of them hold a piece, so that they can carry it with 
it to their new homes. In other words, they seek to understand the past in order to be able to 
transmit it to a future generation. This mimics the form of roots narratives, which, whether 
seeking to establish a temporal or geographic origin, are often one of the key cultural products of 
the diasporic experience.  
Roots narratives provide ways of claiming affinity to a place or time that is elsewhere; 
they provide an answer to the question “Where is home?” and “Where are you from” at the same 
time. However, as Hayes notes, “whereas roots narratives claim merely to discover an origin that 
preexists the search for and so-called discovery of roots, the telling of the story is actually what 
creates the origins and, indeed, identity is rooted in them. […] roots narratives narrate a ‘return’ 
to a ‘prior’ origin that is actually not prior since it is an effect of the narration, not its cause” (3, 
19). Kétala exemplifies precisely this type of narrative, that traces the journey of Mémoria’s life 
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in order to understand where she belongs. I argue, the roots produces by the material belongings 
narration are queer roots: “Queer roots, in other words, are origins that are not original; queer 
diasporas exist through ‘returns’ to these origins-that-are-not-origins” (Hayes 19). The material 
belongings’ storytelling of Mémoria’s migrations queer the notion of return by displacing the 
signifiers of home and abroad because, as I will demonstrate, Mémoria’s “return” home is a 
heterosexual exile yet a queer homecoming.   
One sign of these queer roots is revealed when the objects put together is why Mémoria 
left Senegal in the first place: to, as I mentioned, have a “real” (i.e. heteronormative) married 
life. This is reversal of narrative expectations, as the “progressive” West tends to be painted as 
the asylum for homosexual bodies under fire, if not the very source of homosexuality. Gopinath 
speaks of a recurring “developmental, progress narrative of ‘gay’ identity formation that posits 
the diaspora as a space of sexual freedom over and against the (home) nation as a space for 
sexual oppression” (14). It thus not insignificant that threat of homosexuality in Kétala is not 
located in West but in the neighborhood, through the queer body of Mémoria’s closest friend and 
Mahkou’s lover, the Gambian Tamara/Tamsir. Queer (sexual) desire in Kétala is thus not 
produced by moving from Africa to the West, but through an internal crossing of borders.70 
Since homosexuality comes from home, Mémoria’s move abroad is an attempt to re-route desire, 
a part of her plan of to “débusqué le mâle à l’état de nature” [flush out the male to his natural 
state] (Diome 126).  
Leaving the home nation is thus, for Mémoria, paradoxically, not a space of sexual 
freedom, but a search to re-establish heteronormative sexual origins: a ‘return’ to 
                                                 
70 Interestingly, Gambia’s borders lie within Senegal and are one of the most blatant examples of borders that were 
established according to an economic rather than linguistic, cultural, or topographic logic. It was the division of land 
between Britain and France in the 18th century that formed a separate but embedded nation.  
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heteromasculinity. The problem is that, as Mémoria’s statue Coumba Djiguène testifies, this 
‘original’ heteromasculinity cannot be ‘returned’ to since it has not yet existed: Mahkou’s only 
sexual experiences have been queer ones. Meanwhile, for the character Mahkou, longing for the 
“home nation” is a queer longing for the transvestite lover he left behind. This is similarly a re-
routing of narrative expectations: going home would be returning to a queer lifestyle. Thus, 
queer desire and heterosexual desire are displaced from the territories that they normally signify. 
Queering diaspora, according to Gopinath, may begin “unmasking and undercutting [diaspora’s] 
dependence of a genealogical, implicitly heteronormative reproductive logic” (10). I argue that 
by displacing those desires, the novel makes this move of undercutting diaspora’s dependence on 
implicitly heteronormative reproductive logic. It turns both the nation and diaspora away from 
their implicitly acceptable objects of desire. 
The changing of the direction of desire is, in fact, what happens in Europe, but not the 
way Mémoria expects it. In Europe, there is not a return but a re-orientation of the language of 
home and (be)longing. Mahkou does not settle into a “real married life” with Mémoria; he meets 
a Frenchman named Max and ends up starting a relationship with him. However, before Mahkou 
runs away with Max, he and Mémoria take a striking journey through affective territories. In 
their apartment in Strasbourg, Mémoria begins inviting Mahkou to read and role-play the erotic 
novels she discovers in France. One evening, swept up by the game, they have sex, for the first 
and only time. It is worth noting the language used to describe the effects their heterosexual 
genital-on-genital intimacy has on Mahkou. In the morning, before leaving for work, he leaves a 
note on the pillow for Mémoria that reads, “Merci, chérie, pour cette merveilleuse nuit. Tu m’as 
fait découvrir une contrée que j’ai toujours crue hors de portée” [Thank you, darling, for this 
wonderful night. You made me discover a land that I always thought was out of reach] (195). I 
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was struck by Makhou’s evocation of a territory, a land that is out of reach. His heterosexual 
desire and intimacy is not formulated as a return to a pure, natural state of heteromasculinity but 
as a discovery. Even more importantly, it is not a destination but a detour. Though he temporarily 
inhabits the space of Mémoria’s desires, letting his affective and erotic territories be shaped by 
hers, this is not the homecoming that Mémoria hoped it would be. Mahkou never again desires 
Mémoria, and soon after leaves her for Max. 
The image of homecoming resurfaces at the end of the novel, after Mahkou does return to 
Senegal to take care of Mémoria on her deathbed. This homecoming is nevertheless a profoundly 
queer one, as the coming home is also a coming out. Mahkou finally tells his family about his 
male lovers and moves in with Tamara. The text states, “Tamara était le fleuve qui continuait 
d’irriguer et de fleurir l’existence de Mahkou, une terre où se récoltait un amour pur, renforcé 
par le souvenir de Mémoria” [Tamara was a river that continued to irrigate and make Mahkou’s 
existence blossom, a land whose harvest was true love, reinforced by the memory of Mémoria] 
(286). It is important to note that both Mémoria’s cis-female (but childless) body and Mahkou’s 
bisexual male body are associated with a nourishing land, an image that is usually associated 
with heteronormative motherhood as well as nationhood (the motherland), and that Tamara’s 
transgendered body is imagined as irrigating this land. Each of these territories are, at different 
moments, homes and foreign lands; they are at times out of reach and at times softly entered. 
They embody, following Muñoz, disidentificatory desires in all their ambivalent energy. 
The novel, in other words, makes a radical case for homegrown homosexuality—of queer 
kinship, more precisely—in Senegal, not only through Mémoria, Mahkou, and Tamara’s 
relationships, but through the object that belonged, at one point, to each of them: the wooden 
carving of a female bust, Coumba Djiguène. “Djiguène” means “woman” in Wolof. One of the 
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common names for men who have sex with men in Senegal is “gor-djiguène” meaning 
manwoman. Accounts of gor-djiguène appear in European and African ethnographies of Senegal 
starting in the late nineteenth century, and descriptions of menwomen also appear in Senegalese 
literature.71 Though Kétala does not name her as such, Tamara displays many of the traits 
associated with gor-djiguène: a brilliant dancer, highly sought-out conversationalist, providing 
entertainment and advice for Dakar’s high society, the best-dressed and best-coiffed among the 
women--but also the subject of envy and ambivalence.72  
The statue Coumba Djiguène narrates to the other material objects belonging to Mémoria 
the story that Tamara tells Mémoria when she “comes out” to her. Tamara’s coming-out 
narrative functions much like the roots narrative that the material objects are putting together. 
Coumba Djiguène tells the other objects how Tamara traces for Mémoria the physical, sexual, 
and affective violence that Tamara-as-Tamsir was exposed to by her father in his efforts to 
“correct” her sexual and gender nonconforming practices in Gambia. This hostility leads Tamara 
to flee Gambia for Senegal with Mahkou; they are able to pass by unnoticed by the border guards 
because Tamara dresses as a woman and wraps up Coumba Djiguène as a baby. For Tamara, like 
for Mémoria, home is not found through a genealogical narration that traces back through 
                                                 
71 Reports on homosexual and non-gender conforming practices in Senegal have tended to be contradictory in their 
definitions of gor-djiguènes and their role in Senegalese society—likely because the authors were themselves 
ambivalent if not outright homophobic. Gorer (36) describes the gor-djiguène (gor-digen in his spelling) as being 
generally well-regarded in society, though excluded from Muslim burials, and Crowder (68) makes similar 
observations. Cheik Niang (p. 505) reports that ibis and yoos are the terms self-chosen by men who have sex with 
men, and that gor-dgiguène tends to be how outsiders (non-MSM) label them; when heard in present-day Senegal, 
Niang’s interviewees reported, it usually means insults will follow. Teunis (160) reports very similar definitions. 
Menwomen in Senegal are mentioned in, for example, Ken Bugul’s Le Baobab fou, Mariam Bâ’s Un chant écarlate, 
and Ama Ata Aidoo’s Our Sister Killjoy. See Hayes (pp. 87-97) for a comprehensive bibliography and analysis of 
several key sources that discuss menwomen in Senegal and West Africa. 
72 From Gorer: “They are called in Wolof men-women, gor-digen, and do their best to deserve the epithet by their 
mannerisms, their dress and their make-up; some even dress their hair like women. They do not suffer in any way 
socially, through the Mohammedans refuse them religious burial; on the contrary, they are sought after as the best 
conversationalists and the best dancers” (36). 
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generations of blood kinship. Instead, her sense of being and belonging are made possible 
through practices of coming-home and home-making that are intimately tied to telling stories of 
coming-out and the material objects that provide the conditions for such journey and their 
retellings.73 Though Mémoria initially rejects the Tamara’s friendship after she comes out to her, 
jealous of Tamara’s relationship with Mahkou, in the end, Mémoria comes “home” to Dakar 
where her final days are spent not under the care of her biological family, but of Mahkou and 
Tamara. 
Queer Matters of Belonging(s) 
I take the time to discuss Mémoria and Mahkou’s sexual intimacy for two reasons. First, 
because through this episode, Kétala intertwines a longing for home with sexual longing. As 
discussed above, the mobile and queer orientation of sexual desire in Kétala reconfigures the 
meaning of a diasporic longing for home, where “home” is both found and lost abroad, and the 
longing for home manifests itself as both a homosexual and heterosexual orientation of desire. 
The longing for home and the sexual longing form and inform each other, transforming their 
orientation and their territories of attachment. This profoundly queer articulation of diaspora, as 
Gopinath puts it, “recuperates those desires, practices, and subjectivities that are rendered 
impossible and unimaginable within conventional diasporic and nationalist imaginaries” (11). 
Queering the longing for home—and the considering the queerness of home—“becomes a way 
to challenge nationalist ideologies by restoring the impure, inauthentic, and nonreproductive 
potential of the notion of diaspora” (11).  
This in of itself is radical and radically important given my argument that Kétala can be 
                                                 
73 For a fascinating discussion of the parallels between a diasporic coming-home and coming-out, see Bénédict 
Boisseron’s Creole Renegades (2014) particularly the chapter “Maryse Condé’s Histoire de la femme cannibale: 
Coming Out in the French Antilles.” 
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read as opening avenues of attachment that work around current borders of identification drawn 
by both a nationalistic identification and a diasporic formation in our postcolonial present. 
However, what I want to emphasize is that it is the specifically material mourning that the text 
performs that allows this disidentificatory reading of diaspora and desire, in a way that not only 
queers the templates of heterosexual and homosexual relationships, but the relationship between 
human and nonhuman. 
By the essential role of material mourning, I mean in part that Mémoria’s belongings are 
the only ones that have the power to tell the story of her intimate attachments, since they have a 
privileged proximity to her body: for example, it is Oreiller, the pillow that graces Mémoria’s 
bed, that tells the story of her night with Mahkou. However, beyond filling a void, this material 
mourning allows the text to open up a different way of thinking about personhood—much like 
Sarah Doraghi’s pillow does at the National Museum of the History of immigration (see Chapter 
One). As the text moves on, what emerges through the transposition of the narrative voice onto 
nonhuman material bodies is not a mere objects-substituting-for-humans, but rather an unbinding 
of the ontological distinctions between human and nonhuman material bodies, through an 
elucidation of a relationship of belonging. For what binds together these immensely disparate 
objects—a handkerchief, a TV, a dining set, a pagne, a couch; some factory made, some family 
heirlooms, some purchased in France—is that they belonged to Mémoria. There is no category 
that would give salience to the collection of objects other than their common owner; without her, 
they are a meaningless jumble. Collections, then, are also the effects of roots narratives: who 
they belonged to and how they belonged to someone is the story that gets told after the fact. 
What is also interesting, though, is the horizontality of the relationship between these 
human and nonhuman bodies: the objects belong to Mémoria, but she belongs to the objects as 
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well. The couch upholstery contains the dried tears she once shed; her pillow is pressed to the 
shape of her arms and chest as she slept with it held tight; the heels of her boots are bent to the 
pressure of her feet when she walked the cobblestone streets of Strasbourg, Paris, and Marseille. 
She left her trace in them, on them, and likewise, the objects realize, “Ce tas d’affaires, c’était 
tout ce qui restait de Mémoria, les seules marques tangibles de son passage sur terre” [This pile 
of belonging was all the remained of Mémoria, the only tangible traces of her time on earth] 
(Diome 281). The objects, in their physicality, do more than bear witness; the bear (carry in 
them) and lay bare (expose through their matter) the marks of her life in a way that no other 
being, human or nonhuman, is able to. As a collective body, they are Mémoria’s remains; but if 
they are separated, no trace will remain of her. Her being, in other words, is constituted via the 
physical impressions she has left on them just as they are shaped by her.  
Thus, the practice of mourning that Kétala illustrates is one in which those markers of 
mutual constitution between human being and nonhuman material object are noted and narrated. 
This practice allows the reader to “begin to experience the relationship between persons and 
other materialities more horizontally” (Bennett 10). Moving toward a horizontal relationship, in 
which agency is distributed across an assemblage of human and nonhuman bodies suggests a co-
dependent, interactive model of belonging. We can think here of Bill Brown, who speaks of “a 
social relationship neither between men nor between things, but something like a social relation 
between human subject and inanimate object, wherein modernity’s ontological distinction 
between human beings and nonhumans makes no sense” (451). What Kétala presents is Mémoria 
and her belongings functioning as a heterogeneous assemblage of human and nonhuman material 
bodies.  
Here, Spinoza’s ontological vision of the world, in which things—people, material 
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objects, organic and inorganic substances—are associative bodies that exist and “act” not alone 
but via their effects on other bodies, is clarifying. Jane Bennett draws on this vision to suggest 
that “agency” or the will to act is not a human-centered force but a vibrant materiality. Bodies, 
human and non human, Bennett proposes, are modes: “to be a ‘mode,’ then, is to form alliances 
and make assemblages: it is to mod(e)ify and be modified by others” (22). This vision resonates 
with the relationship that Mémoria and her belongings have in Kétala, since it appears that it is 
not only Mémoria’s life story but her very being that is a cause and effect of her belongings.  
However, what is important to note is that this is not a relationship of domination; while 
we may be able to identify and observe the effects of Mémoria’s actions and emotions, we also 
see how these were formed, influenced, made possible by her belongings—like the erotic books 
and sexy clothes that Mémoria calls into action to momentarily alter the course of Mahkou’s 
desire. Indeed, Bennett contends that the properties that distinguish human beings and nonhuman 
material things—particularly their ability to act, to produce effects, to be actants if not agents—
flow back and forth between the two categories of human and non-human, rather than being 
located primarily in the human.74  
Furthermore, is not so much that the objects are privy to Mémoria’s inner thoughts but 
that they can get close to her thoughts, approach them, feel them rather than observe them. The 
material objects, despite embodying the authority of narrative voice, are neither all-knowing nor 
definitive, and the knowledge they do have does not come from a unidirectional observation. To 
give an example, the light robe that Mémoria wears as she packs up her Dakarois home to move 
to France on an impossibly hot day, remembers: “Comme elle me portait, j’étais imbibée d’une 
                                                 
74 Of course, as Bennett points out, different materialities express power differently: “Humans, for example, can 
experience themselves as forming intentions and as standing apart from their actions to reflect on the latter” (31). 
But Bennett emphasizes that even processes of reflection is inseparable from the material environment that shapes 
them. See Bernard Stiegler The Technics and Time (1998). 
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sueur aussi abondante que l’espérance qui l’habitait”  [Since she wore me, I was drenched in the 
sweat that was as profuse as the hope that lived in her] (129; italics mine). Soaking up Mémoria’s 
sweat and clinging to her body, the robe is able to experience the intensity of Mémoria’s hopes 
and desires for the future. The hope that inhabits Mémoria is felt and lived (not observed) by the 
robe via the effects it has on its tissue. What the robe and the other belongings share with 
Mémoria is best understood as intense, intimate flashes of feeling that participate in that mutual 
constitution that Peter Stallybrass so eloquently describes when he notes that in the industry-
speak of tailors in 19th century England, “the wrinkles in the elbow of a jacket or sleeve were 
called ‘memories.’ Those wrinkles recorded the body that had inhabited the garment. They 
memorized the interaction, the mutual constitution, of person and thing” (196). This 
multisensory and tactile engagement speaks to a mode of meaning-making that resists a sense of 
being based on what is visible. . 
This mutual constitution of subjectivity particularly salient in a postcolonial, racialized 
context of personhood. For as Frantz Fanon famously theorized, it is the gaze of the colonizer—a 
gaze that regards the colonized subject as indelibly Other—that calls into being the personhood 
of the (post)colonial subject, structuring how the subject sees their self. In Fanon’s articulation of 
the colonial gaze, this gaze penetrates: it dismembers the subject and entirely destabilizes his 
relationship to the material world. Kétala articulates another way of being with an Other. The 
objects’ practice of mourning is the opposite of penetrating, as it is based not on “a tradition of 
representation that conceives of identity as the satisfaction of a totalizing, plenitudinous object of 
vision” (Bhabha 66) but on an intimate co-dwelling. The belongings re-member rather than dis-
member Mémoria by recounting not what they saw, but how their materialities acted upon each 
other. This suggests a mode of being that is not founded on (self) recognition but on collective 
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dwelling; not a splitting of resemblance and difference, but a tugging, bending, shaping of 
material bodies over time.  
What is emphasized is both the materiality of humanity—that in the end, humans are 
material bodies like their inanimate belongings—and the humanity of materiality. Thus, the 
objects function not solely as witnesses but as embodiments of Mémoria’s personhood: “Chacun 
de nous est une trace de l’histoire de Mémoria; si on nous sépare les uns des autres, il ne restera 
plus rien de notre maîtresse” [Each one of us is a trace of Mémoria’s story; if they separate us 
form each other, nothing will remain of our mistress] (17). The material objects’ co-dwelling 
makes the narrative voice possible. The objects must stay together, continue working in an 
assemblage, to practice the work of mourning, which is to build bridges across “Un vide créé par 
la mort et la désormais impossible interactivité du je avec un tu sans intention” [A vacuum 
brought by death, in which I can longer interact with you” (9). In the end, this is the home and 
the lineage that Mémoria finds: not a marriage and family with Mahkou, but a chorus of objects 
that compose and re-compose her life story. Existing as a collection, the objects in Kétala 
continually claim and reclaim the relationship of belonging even in Mémoria’s absence, insisting 
on the mournability of her body.  
Wounds of Belonging(s)  
So far in this chapter, I have argued that the relationship between the human characters in 
Kétala and the nonhuman material objects in the novel queer the heteronormative principles of 
“nation” and “diaspora” as collective identities that can be called upon to organizes affinities, 
attachments, and claims of being and belonging for postcolonial African subjects. In the 
following sections, I will suggest that in Chris Abani’s Becoming Abigail, the relationships 
between the human characters and their material belongings invites a practice of solidarity that 
does not depend on a shared experience of culture, racialization, geography, gender, or sexuality 
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that national and diasporic identities assume—even though the novel traces how such 
experiences are each at certain points vectors for exploitation. Of particular importance will be 
the narrative power of materiality in eliciting sympathies, desires, and affinities through the 
embodied process of reading. 
Abani’s novella interrogates the interaction of humans and belongings in a process of a 
material mourning that is at once belated and preemptive. The novella is set in contemporary 
Lagos and London, following the coming of age of another young woman, Abigail. The narrative 
oscillates between chapters labeled “Then” and “Now.” The “Then” is set in Nigeria, where 
Abigail lived for the first thirteen years of her life, while those that are “Now” take place in 
England. Yet even the “Now” is told belatedly, catching up to the narrative present only at the 
final pages of the novella. The narrative folding over of time and place is mirrored by a material 
folding over of time and place through Abigail’s very body, as she is named for her mother, 
Abigail, who died giving birth to her. In the same breath that Abigail the daughter came to life, 
Abigail the mother died, but did not disappear. For the longer that Abigail the daughter lives, the 
more her body, movements, and facial features come to resemble the previous Abigail, a fact she 
is acutely aware of thanks to her widowed father’s gaze: “[Her father] turned and looked at her 
and she saw it and recognized what it was. She looked so much like her mother that when he saw 
her suddenly, she knew he wanted her to be Abigail” (22). Through the “Then” chapters, we 
learn that Abigail’s father, unable to stand her resemblance to her mother, sends her to London to 
live with her mother’s cousin, hanging himself shortly before she departs.  
In London, Abigail’s life takes a turn for the worse. Instead of sending her to school as 
promised, Peter, her mother’s cousin’s husband, pimps her out. When she fights back, he 
punishes her by stripping her naked and tying her in the doghouse in the yard in the middle of 
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winter. He visits daily—twice daily—to feed her rotten food, rancid water, to pee on her and 
rape her. On the fifteenth day of this torture, she bites off his penis and makes a run for it. She is 
found fainted on the streets and taken to social services where she is assigned a caseworker, 
Derek, a mild-mannered middle-aged and married man. Abigail and Derek have an affair, 
Derek’s wife catches them in the act of passion, and Derek ends up in jail since Abigail is a 
minor, just fourteen years old. Despite Abigail’s protests that she willingly participated in their 
romantic and sexual relation, the jury condemns Derek as guilty. In the final pages, Abigail flicks 
the ash of her cigarette into the Thames and follows down after it to the dark waters. 
Abani’s gift as a writer is his ability to evoke the stark brutality of slow-burning abuses 
layered on a single human body, while leaving space open for flashes of hope, desire, and 
intimacy. Part of Abani’s writerly power is to subsume the intensity of the reading experience 
through restraint: in fragments, and repeated bits of phrases. Often, simile or metaphor anchor 
the fragment, such as in the third phrase of the novella, “This memory like all others was a lie. 
Like the sound of someone ascending wooden stairs” (19). Comparing feelings and facts to 
sounds, and sounds to tactile sensations, the reading experience in Becoming Abigail is one that 
calls upon a deep investment in the sensorial imagination. This repetition and cross-modal 
sensorial attention creates a haunting effect—perhaps heightened, in my own reading experience, 
by the curious effect of reading one’s own name in the printed words of a novel.  
Nevertheless, the unruly metamorphosis of the material and the intangible point to a 
practice of material mourning that creates its own language of belonging. The Abigail in Abani’s 
novella is alienated from her own body, and her mourning practices serve to negotiate this 
detachment as well as the attachment to her mother’s ghost. Given the doubling of Abigail and 
her mother, in mourning her mother Abigail seems to be mourning her own future death—or 
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perhaps it is that the young Abigail’s life is stillborn, a lingering echo of her mother’s. Chambers 
suggests that haunting is the narrative effect of an inability to mourn. If so, Abani’s text is 
doubly haunted. Mourning is normally a belated process; here, it is preemptive as well, 
anticipating Abigail’s death while making up for the loss of her mother as well. The question that 
Becoming Abigail thus poses is what language is there for laying your own body to rest, when 
one is barely acknowledged as being alive? When one, in other words, recognizes the 
unmournability of one’s body? Such an unmournable narrative would have to somehow “get 
[itself] read, but without comprising [its] wrongness, the means by which they signify, which is 
what would occur if they made themselves too readily readable. Thus even their readability, in 
the end, must be somehow wrong” (Chambers 289).   
Abigail seeks to make mourning meaningful by practicing tracing gestures that bring her 
mother’s material shape into her present material surrounding while also making room in those 
present surrounding for a life of her own.  attempts to imagine her mother as a mappable 
territory. Maps, for the young Abigail, were “[h]er favorite thing. The only thing she read” (31). 
Initially, we know that Abigail loves maps without knowing why. The explanation comes later in 
the novella: “This drew Abigail to maps. […] the black lines of science, pretending that here, at 
least, on the flat spread of the map, it was possible to have any kind of dominion over a 
landscape. Over things” (73). Maps render land visible, even the distant and ghostly territories. 
There is an element of pretense, of course—“black lines of science, pretending”—but like good 
fiction, maps create a world that can be held in one’s hands. In the same way, Abigail seeks to 
make the shape of her mother emerge through maps. When Abigail looks at the map, “sometimes 
the alchemy of her stare transmuted the parchment into her mother’s skin” (73). Following the 
lines of the map with her eyes, Abigail traces the shape of her mother’s body through the forms 
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of the map, assigning each body part a territory, and “Everything else became the imagined 
contours of her inner life” (74). The spectral presence of her mother metamorphoses into a 
material object that can be seen, traced with her fingers, and measured—without relying on a 
mimetic visual representation, something that will be essential in the discussion of collective 
mourning in the next chapter. 
The relationship that Abigail builds between her (present) body and her mother’s (absent) 
body oscillates between tracing gestures that exteriorize her mother’s self onto material objects, 
and shaping gestures that embed her mother’s self onto her own body. Both the tracing and 
shaping gestures are deeply tactile ones, in which Abigail’s body carves into, wrinkles, cuts, and 
smoothes out other material bodies. This tugging and pulling and shaping is a reaction to absence 
of the previous Abigail, and absence that initially overwhelms her: “The shape of that Abigail 
was so clearly marked, the limits traced out in the stories that filled the world around this 
Abigail, that it was hard to do anything but try to fill the hollowed-out shape” (47). When she is 
still young and living with her father, Abigail collected anecdotes about her mother, gathering 
these stories from everyone who knew her by trading her labor for a story. She writes the stories 
that she collects on scraps of paper and hides them under clothes, letting them scrape off her 
skin, leaving scars: “Chaffing. Becoming. Becoming and chaffing, as though the friction from 
the paper would abrade any difference, smooth over any signs of joining, until she became her 
mother and her mother her” (36). This doubling—and the décalage in the doubling—that Abigail 
longs for is engraved in the structure of the sentences, which form near-anagrams. “Chaffing-
becoming-becoming-[and]-chaffing,” or “her-mother-and-[her]-mother-her.” In trying to occupy 
the same space, to be a perfect mirror image, there’s a stutter, a tick, a wrinkle that betrays. 
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And so, Abigail changes her tactic, using material objects now to widen rather than efface 
the décalage between her mother and her, and eventually make room for a story that is her own. 
In Kétala, there are vivid passages that describe how Mémoria’s body shaped her belongings, left 
her trace on them. In Becoming Abigail, it is the opposite that takes the spotlight—objects leave 
their mark on the human body. The scrapes and ink from the scraps of inky paper that told her 
mother’s story fade too quickly from Abigail’s body, “That was when she discovered the 
permanence of fire” (36). She begins burning words on her skin, or sometimes simply letting a 
cigarette burn a mark. However, in discovering the malleability of her flesh, Abigail begins 
inscribing her own story rather than her mother’s onto her body. Immediately after having sex 
with her caseworker, Derek, Abigail takes a needle to the fire and uses it to burn a series of tiny 
dots all over her body, creating lines. When Derek discovers the freshly-burnt dots, she explains: 
‘This one,’ she said, touching the ones on each breast, first one, then the other. 
‘This one is you, this, me. In the middle in Greenwich. Here,’ and she was down 
on her stomach, ‘is my hunger, my need, mine, not my mother’s.’ […] And he 
traced her in that moment, the map of her, the skin of her world, as she emerged 
in pointillism. Emerging in parts of a whole. Each. Every. 55 
The gesture Abigail performs here is one of both tracing and shaping—tracing because it is a 
gesture that outlines and renders legible her body, and shaping because it changes the materiality 
of her flesh (live tissue to scar tissue, smooth to bumps) and makes Abigail emerge. Deleuze and 
Guattari speak of agencement, the material envelope, so to speak, that makes the passing of a 
message possible.75 There is a message that Abigail passes through the marking of her own body. 
The message of being alive, of being a living body that hungers and yearns and attempts to find a 
way to belong in this world. The traces she embeds into her body are both visible and intimate, 
on the surface of her skin yet on the most intimate parts that few can see. They are signs of both 
                                                 
75 See Chambers Untimely Interventions (pp. 13-14).  
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the existence of the frontiers of her body and the proof that these boundaries, “the skin of her 
world,” can be punctured (55). 
This gesture, I argue, is a territorializing of Abigail’s body, making it mournable by 
holding in tension individual desire with collective agencement. The marks on her body are a 
method of claiming a pain, a sorrow, a need that is all her own, not even her mother’s. At the 
same time, the method is dependent on the materiality of her body in relation to other bodies. 
She has learned, we have already been told, about the permanence of fire and metal, in contrast 
to the solubility of ink and paper. It may be useful here to think of Réda Bensmaïa’s words on 
Kafka’s writings as emblematic of a writing from the margins wherein writing is “no longer an 
art that proposes to ‘express’ (a meaning), to ‘represent’ (a thing, a being), or ‘imitate’ (a nature). 
It is rather a method (of writing)—of picking up, even of stealing: of ‘double stealing’ as 
Deleuze sometimes says, which is both ‘stealing’ and ‘stealing away’” (18). What is Abigail 
stealing? She is stealing time in both directions (her mother’s past death, her future death). And 
she is stealing her body away—“She who had been taken and taken and taken” (Abani 119)—
from Peter and all the men who exploited and used her body and if it were a body without desire. 
Or a not even a body at all: “It was like she didn’t exist. And she didn’t, because Peter had used a 
fake passport and a forged visa to bring her into the country and she was registered everywhere 
under that fake name, a name she had forgotten. She was a ghost” (112). By giving desire—
hunger, need, lust—a tangible form on her flesh, she creates room for an oppositional telling of 
her life.  
What I suggest is that in Becoming Abigail, the material frailty of the human body 
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becomes a vector for an oppositional narration,76 rendering the unmournable mournable. 
Chambers points specifically to the holding of attention—a commanding of space and energy—
in a narrative situation as a kind of authority or power. Furthermore, he argues that reading can 
“change desire; ‘reading’ is the name of the practice that has the power of producing shifts in 
desire; and desire does not produce just ‘fantasy’ but reality itself” (xii). An oppositional 
narration, in transforming the desire of its other, changes the sympathies of the reader in a way 
that can produce a different reality. This is not unlike what Hoad suggests in his reading of 
Welcome to our Hillbrow, a novel that, he argues, engages in “the political work of reconfiguring 
of the meaning of death of young black South Africans” (117). The novel is an elegy to 
Hillbrow, an impoverished township in Cape Town, home to many migrants coming from the 
countryside. It is spoken by one of the characters in the novel and addressed to another character 
after he dies from AIDS. Hoad notes that in that novel, sexual and nonsexual intimacy between 
the characters—all of whom are outsiders in this already marginal space—is often described in 
terms of body parts—limbs, genitals, facial features—interacting, penetrating, and rubbing 
against each other. Rather than reading this as an objectifying move on the text’s part, Hoad 
argues that what emerges is a shared, physical vulnerability that extends beyond the confines of 
the textual space: “the frailty of the flesh becomes universal and the cultural, national, moral, and 
gendered differences needed to police the reader’s sympathy may fall away” (121). The 
                                                 
76 In Chambers’ Room for Maneuver, he speaks of oppositionality as a complicit tactic in the face of an oppressive 
manifestation of power. In contrast to resistance, which is a strategy to overcome power through a same and equal 
force, oppositionality accommodates power to achieve its own ends: “Oppositional practices help us to maintain 
some sense of dignity and personhood. What this means, however, is that oppositional practices do not really work 
against prevailing systems but, to the contrary, strengthen them by making them livable” (7). Chambers draws on De 
Certeau to think about systems and power and the ways in which narration navigates these relationships. Narration 
itself is embedded in a structure of power—the narrator exercising narrative author-ity over the text and the narratee. 
What Chambers suggests is that “oppositional narrative, in exploiting the narrative situation, discovers a power, not 
to change the essential structure of narrative situations, but to change its other (the ‘narratee’ if one will), through 
the achievement and maintenance of authority in ways that are potentially radical” (12).  
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storytelling that takes place in Welcome to our Hillbrow, thus, functions as a kind of oppositional 
tactic, in which one of the markers (disease) that renders the bodies of the characters 
unmournable becomes reterritorialized as the common ground inhabited not only by the 
characters in the text but by a potential reader of the text. 
I see a similar move enacted in Becoming Abigail, when Abigail uses the frailty of her 
flesh to make her yearning emerge. Hoad in his analysis of Welcome to our Hillbrow notes that, 
“To engage in love, and sex, and to be desiring subjects is to share in this vulnerability” (124). In 
Abani’s novel, in modifying her flesh with objects, Abigail claims her part in this shared 
vulnerability. To some degree, Abigail’s vulnerability in imposed, due to chance, due to the cruel 
intentions of others, and due to prevailing systems of power and how they intersect to exploit 
young Black and immigrant women. Her telling of her relationship with Derek does not resist—
seek to change, via equal force—the systems of power that rendered her experience of migration 
vulnerable in gendered ways, but is does oppose them in making room within them for her 
personhood to emerge. What Abigail does in working wounds into her flesh is signal the degree 
and the direction in which her body’s vulnerability is not only imposed, but also chosen. It is 
chosen because it is proper to the state of being alive and to belonging—to being in relation to 
someone other than the self.  
In Derek’s trial, Abigail pleads on his behalf, testifying and writing letters saying that she 
chose this. Her pleas fall on deaf ears, because the jurors rule “that [Abigail] didn’t know what 
choice was. But she did. She who had been taken and taken and taken. And now the one time she 
took for herself, the one time she had choice in the matter, it was taken away. Maybe, she 
thought, maybe some of us are just here to feed others” (118). The law, once upon a time not so 
long ago, allowed for a white man to take a black girl, of Abigail’s age or even younger, and do 
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what he please with her body. The law no longer condones such action, but Becoming Abigail 
shows how the law still gets to decide, for a young black woman, what she gets to do with her 
body. It is against that denial of choice that Abigail places herself in opposition, insisting on the 
degree to which her vulnerability is chosen, invited, desired.  
I think about my own sympathies as a reader, what structures and experiences police 
them, as I read Becoming Abigail. Abani’s text does not offer easy answers—quite the opposite, 
he is a master of unsettlement and of evincing the subtleties of power relations. I find it hard to 
swallow, difficult to write even, about a fourteen-year old girl, orphaned, forced to immigrate, 
sexually abused, then becoming intimate with her middle-aged married male case-worker and 
not see an abuse of power; I find it onerous to not say, like the jurors, that any consent Abigail 
gives is voided by lack of choice that her situation affords. However, Omise’eke Natasha Tinsley 
speaks of the intimate relationships formed in transatlantic slave ships between enslaved men, 
enslaved women, and also between enslaved persons and the slaver crew members. She argues 
that “these erotic relationships are neither metaphors nor sources of disempowerment. Instead, 
they are one way that fluid black bodies refused to accept that the liquidation of their social 
selves — the colonization of oceanic and body waters — meant the liquidation of their sentient 
selves” (199). In the context of contemporary human trafficking, the love that Abigail professes, 
like the relationships in Kétala could be read as a just such an oppositional queer love: “Queer in 
the sense of marking disruption to the violence of normative order and powerfully so: connecting 
in ways that commoditized flesh was never supposed to” (Tinsley 199).     
Indeed, Abani’s text suggests that turning a deaf ear to Abigail’s telling of her story that 
she burns on her flesh with such urgency is not something that, in the narrative situation that the 
text creates, seems possible, either. In fact, the text presents such a misreading of Abigail’s story 
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as an act of narrative violence that Abigail refused to accommodate. A social worker at the 
courthouse, upon seeing Abigail distraught as Derek is escorted away, misunderstands Abigail’s 
reaction and attempts to soothe her by saying “Don’t you worry, sister, that monster is going 
away for a long time” (120). Abigail’s response to this misreading of her anguish is an eloquent 
and elegant right hook to the woman’s nose, an act that slides into the narration in a quiet line so 
quickly that it barely registers until the following line shows us Abigail licking blood off her 
hand. It is this narrative opposition that bears exploration. In framing Abigail’s narrative as one 
of opposition within a limited room for maneuver, Abani’s text creates a protagonist that makes a 
self emerge despite multiple dehumanizations, while placing the reader in complicity with the 
structures that exploited her. In other words, what Abani’s text can offer, especially when read 
alongside Kétala, is a readerly position that does not take on the mantle of judgment, nor of 
hubris of a savior, but rather the dependency of an interpretive subject.  
The Other Event 
In Untimely Interventions, Chambers speaks of the resistance to what he calls discourses 
of extremity—a half-willed, half-unconscious cultural detournement of the stories emerge in the 
aftermath of events (in his examples, genocide, holocaust, and epidemics like AIDS) that reveal 
the “fault-lines” of society. The tendency, in what he calls aftermath cultures, is to quarantine off 
the event as an aberrance, to claim innocence as the state of normality rather listen to the voices 
that say this violence is a recurring character in their lives. I want to return now to something I 
said in the introduction of this chapter, when I spoke about two events that were coming, at 
similar paces, to the forefront of national attention during and after the Charlie Hebdo attacks. 
These are the migrant crisis (in Europe though I am speaking of France, specifically) and the 
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Black Lives Matters movement (in the USA).77 One of the axes of protest in both of these 
movements was again the invisibility of non-white, non-European/Anglo-American bodies. The 
problem with combating invisibility with its obvious counterpart—hyper visibility—is the risk of 
becoming spectacle, as I will discuss in the following chapter. The preponderance of images of 
people of color that only become visible via the news, cinema, and culture at large, when they 
are broken and battered, can create the counter effect of normalizing the suffering of these lives. 
Furthermore, it can obfuscate the tragedy at the individual level by co-opting it for a collective, 
political purchase.  
The balance between these two—invisibility, with the room to suffer privately, 
hypervisibility, with renunciation of individual suffering—is something that Claudia Rankine 
explores in her essay, “The Condition of Black Life is One of Mourning.” She discusses the 
choices that the mothers of two young black men, 50 years apart, made in the aftermath of their 
son’s violent deaths. When Emmet Till was lynched in 1955 in Mississippi, his mother Mamie 
Till Mobey insisted on an open-casket, public funeral that drew tens of thousands, to demonstrate 
the violence of her son’s death at the hand of a white mob. On the contrary, Theresa McFadden, 
Michael Brown’s mother, fought desperately to be able to get her son’s body off of the street in 
Ferguson where he had been shot dead by police officers, out of the evidence lab, and into her 
hands.78 Rankine argues that this precisely is the central struggle of the Black Lives Matter 
                                                 
77 While the BLM movement was sparked by the death of a young black man, Michael Brown, and quickly tied it to 
numerous, previous deaths of other black men at the hands of police officers, a related movement emerged within it 
that called specifically for more attention of the deaths of black women at the hands of police officers. Say Her 
Name strove to flesh out the picture, naming the names of women who had lost their lives through state violence or 
without the intervention of state justice.  
78 As Rankine argues, “Mobley’s refusal to keep private grief private allowed a body that meant nothing to the 
criminal-justice system to stand as evidence. By placing both herself and her son’s corpse in positions of refusal 
relative to the etiquette of grief, she “disidentified” with the tradition of the lynched figure left out in public view as 
a warning to the black community, thereby using the lynching tradition against itself. The spectacle of the black 
body, in her hands, publicized the injustice mapped onto her son’s corpse. ‘Let the people see what I see,’ she said, 
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movement: “to keep mourning an open dynamic in our culture because black lives exist in a state 
of precariousness. Mourning then bears both the vulnerability inherent in black lives and the 
instability regarding a future for those lives” (June 22, 2015). The key here is the openness of 
mourning, that is to say, the open-endedness of the process. An insistence that lives still hang in 
the balance, that it is not a singular and completed episode of the past to which we need to find 
closure, but that the future is still at risk. 
What the process of reterritorializing as mournable through an insistence on the (shared) 
materiality of human bodies can offer, I suggest, is precisely this keeping open; a kind of shared 
consciousness of the ongoing and inter-relational precarity of human life, that removes itself 
from the visibility/invisibility axis. Let me try saying it another way: speaking about the 
unmournability, rather than the invisibility, of certain bodies can create a structure of feeling that 
invites the reader to recognize in themselves both a measure of complicity—a contribution to the 
context that has created both suffering and the erasure of the suffering—as well a measure of 
empathy for those who suffer. It might keep alive the personal, private, individual dimension of 
pain that these deaths bring; a pain that is complex and contradictory, whose subversive nuances 
risk being pushed aside when they are recuperated to make a collective point.  
As fate would have it, the day I was brushing the final broad strokes on the earliest 
version of this chapter was the same day that a second violent eruption took place in Paris. On 
the Friday evening of November 13, 2015, 130 people were killed in a series of shootings and 
                                                 
adding, ‘I believe that the whole United States is mourning with me.’ […] McSpadden, unlike Mamie Till Mobley, 
seemed to have little desire to expose her son’s corpse to the media. Her son was not an orphan body for everyone to 
look upon. She wanted him covered and removed from sight. He belonged to her, her baby. After Brown’s corpse 
was finally taken away, two weeks passed before his family was able to see him. This loss of control and authority 
might explain why after Brown’s death, McSpadden was supposedly in the precarious position of accosting vendors 
selling T-shirts that demanded justice for Michael Brown that used her son’s name. Not only were the procedures 
around her son’s corpse out of her hands; his name had been commoditized and assimilated into our modes of 
capitalism.” (Rankine, June 22, 2015) 
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suicide attacks at several restaurants and a concert hall in the densely frequented 10th and 11th 
arrondissements of Paris, as well as in the Stade de France just outside of Paris, during a France-
Germany soccer match. These were quickly identified as terrorist attacks, the organization Daesh 
released a statement claiming responsibility for the attack, and as the investigation continued, it 
was revealed that the assailants were young men that had been recruited by Daesh and fought in 
Syria.  
Even more so that with the Charlie Hebdo massacre, there was an immediate, 
transnational response, messages of solidarity, altars, moments of silence. That 130 could die in 
one fell eruption of violence was perhaps unsurprising; that it could happen in Paris touched a 
nerve, at least in the Western world. It was the jouissance, the insouciance, of going to a cafe 
terrace with a loved one on an unusually warm November evening, that was attacked, said many. 
But even more rapidly than in January, the reminders—sometimes voiced angrily, sometimes 
voiced self-righteously, sometimes simply voiced—that more media attention and political 
attention had been lavished on this one attack than on numerous, similar atrocities in other, non-
Western parts of the world, notably a very similar suicide bombing in Beirut just days before, 
came streaming in. These voices insisted that drinking a glass of wine on a terrace is not an 
assault on a fundamental liberty, because that is a luxury; that that to another person, a more 
salient marker of liberty would be the ability to wear a veil without having one’s professional 
prospects put at risk, without being subjected to the alienating regard of people who see your veil 
as a sign of your unwillingness to belong to the nation.  
I admit that I am one of those voices, and I do not doubt the necessity of raising those 
voices. The question that remains, for me however, is how to affirm the mournability of those 
unmournable bodies in Beirut, in Syria, or here in the West from where I work and think and 
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write, in such a way that softens the resistance to thinking about any tragedy other than the one 
that hits closest to home, rather than entrenching the distance. How to affirm the mournability of 
all lives in such a way that does not blind us to the inequalities of suffering, that some lives are 
more frequently and more deeply at risk; how to practice solidarity in a way that expands our 
notion of fundamental human rights, rather than redrawing in stone the outlines of liberty. This 
is, I argue, what the processes of mourning enacted through Kétala and Becoming Abigail invite 
the reader to do. To be more attuned to a mutual precarity, and a mutual dependency, unevenly 
distributed across an assemblage of bodies, to acknowledge moment of complicity and to believe 
that what touches one part of the field ripples out across it. 
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Chapter Three: RETURN 
 
Discourses of extremity 
In the previous chapter, I began exploring how fiction portrays humans and objects acting 
as an assemblage with distributed agency. I argued that through this portrayal that is attuned to 
the power of material bodies, the stories that end up being told are ones that provide new modes 
of being and belonging in a diasporic experience. They provide these new modes of being and 
belonging by queering79 the temporal and geographic orientation of diasporic desire, and they 
also deploy more capacious affective structures that allow the reading experience to open ways 
of creating networks of readerly solidarity that acknowledge complex relations of power and 
privilege. In this chapter, I press on this idea of humans and nonhuman material bodies working 
in assemblage, but I move the realm of exploration outside of the pages of literary narrative. I 
examine specifically the human-object assemblage’s ability to represent historical events that fall 
outside of the scope of the normal human experience in commemorative exhibition spaces. 
Furthermore, the previous chapter considered the stories of two individuals that struggled to find 
a place in the memory of the nation the left behind but also struggled to make a home abroad. 
This chapter examines collective histories that contributed to the formation of a black African 
diasporic identity, but are also considered to be a part of universal history, and the tensions that 
                                                 
79 Through the work of Chapter 2, I use “queer” as a verb to describe the action of turning away from or 
undermining the relationship with the subject’s other (e.g. woman as man’s other, the colony at the metropole’s 
other, a Black man as a White man’s other) in a way that destabilizes patriarchal and heteronormative practices, 
structures, and meanings. 
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commemorating for both subject positions poses. These histories are those of transatlantic 
slavery and colonial exploitation of human labor and human life. 
To set the stage for this storytelling of experiences that appear too far removed from the 
daily human experience to be adequately communicated in the fullness of their brutality and 
tragedy, we would do well to turn to Ross Chambers, whose work I discussed briefly in the 
previous chapter. I alluded to what Chambers calls discourses of extremity, and how these 
discourses pose particular obstacles to narrative affects. Chambers defines discourses of 
extremity as falling into a larger category of parasocial discourse, which he describes as, 
“discourse that addresses a culture assumed to be general, mainstream, or dominant on behalf of 
subjectivities identified as marginal or (in Deleuze and Guattari’s sense of the word minor) 
minoritized” (33). The classic example he cites are narratives of holocaust survivors published as 
memoirs or represented in plays, movies, and other settings. Chambers argues that this type of 
discourse poses challenges both at the moment of enunciation—how can one possibly narrate 
such a traumatic event accurately and adequately—but, even more so, it poses challenges to 
reception. The difficulty lies less in saying and more in making heard. This unwillingness to 
receive (hear, see, absorb) such narratives springs from two sources: the narratives point to 
failures of the values of a dominant culture and are thus unwelcome stories; and the narratives 
appear so far removed from daily existence that they seem irrelevant or impossible to relate to.  
Narratives (or other representations) of extremity thus, according to Chambers, must 
master the “art of untimely intervention, seeking to introduce an awareness of untimeliness into a 
culture that prefers to live in time as if the past had no place in the present and did not haunt (i.e., 
inhabit) it” (191). This is particularly necessary in what Chambers calls aftermath cultures, 
societies “regulated by a culture in which collectively traumatic events are denied, and if 
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necessary denied again” (xxi).80 How then, can discourses of extremity awaken aftermath 
cultures and make the experiences of which they testify a central concern? How can they rework 
the understanding of culture as not one of uninterrupted evolutionary progress, but one in which 
disturbing events are as much a part of the fabric of culture as are the moments of humaneness? 
How, in other words, can they represent these events in such a way that they can be understood 
and accepted as the fault lines that define and shape the social continent?81 
Chambers’s account of discourses of extremity and the challenges of narrating such 
discourses in aftermath cultures maps out well on the subject of this chapter: the transatlantic 
slave experience and colonialism. It is a part of global history that is considered to be both 
unforgettable and yet unspeakable. Like other collective traumatic events that resulted in the 
systematic loss of human life at the hands of other humans, there are frequent calls to 
commemorate it, and yet its conceptual impossibility puts it in constant danger of being 
forgotten. We must find a way to think the unthinkable—but how? I suggest that Chambers’ 
analysis of how testimonial writing navigates these challenges and this context can illuminate a 
reading of slave memorial sites and other sites of representation of this history. And, I will 
suggest, bringing his analysis to bear specifically on the narrative told by human and nonhuman 
material bodies acting together excavates narrative strategies that harness the multisensory 
                                                 
80 For Chambers, “These are the cultures in which drastic failures of justice, decency, tolerance, humaneness—of 
‘culture’ itself in one of its senses, in which it is synonymous with civilization—are experienced, no so much as part 
of an everyday experience of misery (as AIDS is added to homophobia and racism or to the harshness of ghetto 
existence, in urban America; or as military and judicial violence, torture and rape are added, among Mendh’u’s 
people, to ordinary daily oppression and exploitation), but as something unique, without precedent and consequently 
unspeakable” (xvii) 
81As Chambers puts it, “the occasions on which—with increasing frequency, it seems—‘culture’ lets us down are 
the occasions on which human culture reveals something crucial about itself: an essential fault-line running through 
it, or a ‘dark-side’ that is not accidental but rather constitutive, definitional. The violence that ‘culture’ holds at bay 
is actually something that culture itself is perfectly capable of producing, something that it does produce, qua 
culture, with frightening regularity” (xx) 
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affects of materiality, and thus work against the totalizing visual strategy of colonial 
representation. 
*  *  * 
Often, Chambers argues, the approach to testifying is understood as a precise, vivid 
account that re-creates the witnessed experience, particularly in “cultures such as those of the 
West that have inherited a long tradition of understanding representation itself mimetically—as 
for example we do in legal definitions of testimony, in which the witness is expected to give an 
exact account of experience, or in the desire of many historians to recapture the past wie es 
eigentlich gewesen (as it really was)” (xvi). Thus, this is a tradition that relies on the visual, both 
of the initial witnessing and the subsequent testimony. Eyewitness accounts are considered to be 
the most authoritative, giving their testimony both a claim to authenticity and a right to speak.  
Chambers proposes something different. He suggests that, “contrary to received opinion, 
testimonial writing is not so much a descriptive practice (whether historical or fictional) as it is a 
symbolic practice […] it performs a captation, capturing its readers’ attention and redirecting it 
toward the obscene, that in culture which is otherwise culturally occulted: known but not 
acknowledged” (35-36). In other words, discourses of extremity such as testimonial writing 
function not by representing the event but by turning attention to something that is known in the 
present but unavowed. Narratives that operate effectively within discourses of extremity are 
those that, rather that representing the past, allow the past to haunt their narration. Examples 
discussed in previous chapters include Chris Abani’s Becoming Abigail, and the story that Sarah 
Doraghi tells about a pillowcase and her mother’s perfume. Both of these narrative disrupt the 
normality of the present temporal by pointing to a future that did not come to be. 
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Chambers thus argues that the narrative strategies that produce a vivid haunting rely not 
on a mimetic relationship to the past, but on a relationship based on 1) indexicality 2) asyndenton 
and 3) rephrasing. With indexicality, Chambers is alluding to Charles Pierce’s definition of 
semiotics in which signs function by iconicity, indexicality, or symbolism.82 Indexical signs do 
not mimetically represent but rather point to what they mean, as smoke points to fire or the 
growling of a stomach points to hunger, because of a material connection that exists between 
them. Asyndenton is a rhetorical device in which “a lack of grammatical or structural binding-
gap—is counterbalanced and compensated for by a continuity of thought that seems stranger that 
the (elided, interrupted) grammar” (249). The uncanny smoothness of asyndenton, a sentence 
that is bound together by meaning but not by structure, turns attention to what is present but 
masked. I propose that asyndenton echoes the relationship between translation and diaspora 
proposed by Brent Hayes Edwards which I will turn to later in this chapter. Finally, rephrasing 
for Chambers evokes the tactical reutterance that discourses of extremity must perform: restating 
the past, which has likely been stated and restated many a time, in such a compelling way that it 
becomes new and open and unfinished83.  
So, to recapitulate Chambers’ argument, discourses of extremity are the narratives in an 
aftermath culture that call attention to past calamities that, if not outright denied, have been 
relegated to the periphery of societal concerns and identity, in part because they are thought to be 
closed, over, ‘dealt with,’ in a manner of speaking. It is difficult to make discourses of extremity 
                                                 
82 Charles Pierce formulated a non-Saussurean model for understanding the relations between signs and objects of 
signification, which he separates into three (sometimes overlapping) categories: resemblance called iconicity (a 
drawing of an apple evokes the contours and colors of an apple); actual connection, called indexicality (an apple tree 
produces apples); or rule, called symbolism (temptation, in Judeo-Christian traditions, is associated with a fruit, often 
an apple).  
83 This is not unlike Claudia Rankine’s call in the previous chapter to keep the mourning of black lives an open 
dynamic, despite the seemingly endless accumulation of deaths of people of color. 
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heard because of the overpowering desire by the aftermath culture to treat those calamities as 
aberrances of human culture (in both its senses) rather than as outcomes of human culture. 
Discourses of extremity overcome that resistance through non-mimetic rhetorical strategies: 
indexicality, asyndenton, and rephrasing. These strategies succeed in making narratives heard 
because, rather than describing the past, they capture and turn attention to the places where the 
past simmers under the surface of the present, which Chambers calls a détournement.  
This narrative détournement, or turning away from a plotted trajectory, enabled by extra-
mimetic, materially-oriented aesthetic strategies, I will argue later, is not about discovering a 
hidden truth or seeing something in its true colors for the first time. Instead, it is about modifying 
the texture and affect—terms I will develop further on—of the spectator’s experience. Indeed, 
share Eve Sedgwick’s “intuition that a particular intimacy seems to subsist between textures and 
emotions” (2003; 17). Her probing observation that “Even more immediately that other 
perceptual systems, it seems, the sense of touch makes nonsense out of any dualistic 
understanding of agency and passivity; to touch is always already to reach out, to fondle, to heft, 
to tap, or to enfold, and always also to understand other people or natural forces as having 
effectually done so before oneself, if only in the making of the textured object,” (14) points to 
the rich possibilities for rethinking agency and subjectivity that exploring the properties of matter 
that call on a multi-sensorial investment on the part of the spectator/reader holds. 
I suggest that narratives of transatlantic slavery and colonialism in Africa fall into the 
category of discourses of extremity, and face the same resistance that Chambers speaks about. 
However, rather looking at written narratives, I want to explore this particular discourse of 
extremity in the material form of exhibitions and memorial sites that commemorate this 
traumatic history. The aim is not to be comprehensive, but rather to see how some of these 
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aesthetic moves function through the material elements of two sites. The first site is Exhibit B, 
which is a travelling performance-installation created by Brett Bailey, a South African 
contemporary artist, which faithfully recreated scenes from slavery and European colonialism on 
the African continent using live actors and recreated props and stages. The second site is the 
Cape Coast Castle Slave Memorial and Museum in Ghana, one of the largest slave holding forts 
along the Gold Coast that was turned into a memorial site in the 1970s and named a UNESCO 
world heritage site. I want to tease out the visual, spatial, and material orientations of the 
narrative strategies that these sites employ. I will propose, like Chambers, that the power that 
such representations may have comes from the non-mimetic détournements in the aesthetics of 
the site. Unlike Chambers, I will add that the power is not merely one of holding and turning 
narrative attention, but of pushing affective positions into each other, pressing onto the 
suppleness of desire. In some ways, this joins Chambers’ earlier work on oppositional narration 
and how it changes the desire of its other. However, I will look at the particular power of 
material objects to do this affective work, and, at how it happens in assemblage, modifying and 
being modified at the same time. 
Shards, Splinters, Scenes: Staging Slavery and Colonial History 
It was a glimmering pile of shards caught my eye, when I saw a photograph of the 
entrance of the Théâtre Gérard Philippe (TGP) in the city of Seine-Saint-Denis that borders 
Paris. Protestors that were attempting to stop the performance of a piece called Exhibit B had 
shattered the glass door to the theater’s lobby, and the shards spilled onto the floor, a glittering 
mineral carpet that seemed to accuse as much as it warned of a splintered social bond.  
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Figure 10 Shattered Door at Théâtre Philippe Gérard, Saint-Denis, France. Photo by Hugo Haytham for Le Monde. 
Exhibit B, a performance piece by white South African artist Brett Bailey, is a live installation 
that portrays 12 scenes, spanning 200 years, of the oppression of black peoples. From scenes of 
slavery to scenes of immigration deportation, the performance catalogues the myriad ways in 
which the color of black skin has sanctioned its abuse. The performance lasts about 20 minutes, 
with only a handful of spectators allow into the exhibition space at the time. The actors do not 
speak, do not move; they are directed instead to lock eyes with the spectators as they pass by 
each tableau vivant. After the spectators exit the installation, a new group of viewers is brought 
in. The actors stay where they are, still immobile, still silent. 
Bailey described his performance as coming out of the lineage of the 19th and early 20th 
century exhibitions of African men and women in Europe at World’s Fairs, but, “Rather than 
portraying ‘the native in his natural surrounds’ as human zoos did, each installation shows the 
brutality subjected upon asylum seekers in the EU or inflicted upon colonial subjects. […] 
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Exhibit B is not primarily a work about colonial-era violence. Its main focus is current racist and 
xenophobic policies in the EU, and how these have evolved from the state-sanctioned racism of 
the late 19th century” (Bailey 2014, np). To Bailey and his supporters, the vivid representation 
past and present atrocities was a transparently anti-racist gesture. The performance spoke for 
itself, denouncing racism and enacting an anti-racist action through the enunciation of the 
brutality of racism. And yet, to several hundred protestors, many of them people of color and 
several of them artists, the visual recreation of racist acts does not, in itself, constitute an anti-
racist action “sans ambiguïté,” as French Minister of Culture Fleur Pellerin, who defended 
Bailey, categorized it.  
The glittering carpet of broken glass at the entrance of the TGP that caught my attention 
as I watched the events unfold, stood in stark visual dissonance to the slickly-shiny, smelly, dirt-
compacted floor of the “Male Dungeons” at the Cape Coast Castle Slave Memorial site that I had 
visited in Ghana a few months prior. And yet, both were floors that betrayed the feet that walked 
on them. As I pored over photos of the protests, a torrent of images came in: the red stripes on 
the glass doors of the theater, the white posters with black ink slogans carried by the protestors, 
the policemen in uniform, the heavy coats and scarves to withstand the winter clime worn by the 
protestors, the translucent drops of milk spilling down a protestors face as she attempted to 
soothe the effect of the police forces’ tear gas. The images I collected from the Exhibit B 
coverage steadily invaded the archive of my photos from the Cape Coast Castle Slave memorial 
and its own door, The Door of No Return, memorable for other reasons. My archive of 
photographs from that site depicted peeling white walls, lines of black cannons looking over a 
turquoise ocean, dark damp dungeons, marble plaques inscribed with hopeful statements, the 
shimmering and speckled covers of the visitor comment books that I read over and scanned. As 
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these images began to occupy, side by side, my computer screen, it became clear to me that both 
of these spaces and objects were, through their own methods, telling a story of fracture even 
though their intent was to mend broken bonds. 
In other words, this strange and disparate assemblage of objects created a force of their 
own. Though Exhibit B is a contemporary work of art and the Cape Coast Castle is a historic site 
turned into a memorial and museum, I was struck by the resonances between them, more similar 
than different in the end. Both sites emphasized their reliance on archives as a way to secure their 
claim of “authentically” representing a brutal past; both mediated the experience through motion, 
as the visitors were required to move in the built space; both included performative elements, as 
the visit to Cape Coast is a guided tour, with the guide acting as a storyteller as the visitors move 
between the different rooms in the fort; both elicit strong reactions, positive and negative; both 
claim that the experience they offer is designed to touch all people, but the interpretations of the 
experience appear to diverge sharply along racial lines; and perhaps most importantly, both sites’ 
mission is to raise awareness of the past in order to promote healing and empathy in the present.  
While I contend that both sites do not quite live up to this—not simple—mission, it does 
appear that the Cape Coast Castle comes closer to the goal of setting in place structures for 
empathy. For me, these structures of empathy become possible because of the way the site 
deploys non-human material bodies rather than human bodies in their representation of the past, 
and because it taps into the non-visual material properties of human and non-human bodies. 
While it is to some degree inadvertent, the Cape Coast Castles narrative strategies are, in a way, 
gestures of translation rather than gestures of mimesis. I argue that multisensory translation as a 
mode of narration in exhibitions, instead of mimetic representation, allows for more effective 
engagement with visitors’ empathies. I suggest this is especially true when there is room made 
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for humans and objects to work in assemblage, as this opens affective pathways that are less 
easily accessible when the visual comes first. 
“Unambiguously Anti-racist” vs. “Reproduire ≠  Critiquer” 
In 2014, two Parisian cultural institutions, the Théâtre Gerard Philippe de Saint-Denis 
(TGP) and the Centre 104, programmed Exhibit B to perform at the end of the year. Both of these 
institutions of are located outside of the city center, far from the historic opera and playhouses 
are located. They are, instead, found on the much more ethnically diverse and economically 
disadvantaged north end of Paris. The performance was to take place first at the TGP, on 
November 27-30, and then at the Centre 104 in the 19th arrondissement from December 7-16. 
The performance had been previously shown in France, notably at the renowned theater festival 
in Avignon in the summer of 2013. It had been well-received at the festival, applauded as a brave 
work that the festival program described as forcing the public to confront the humanity of 
objectified peoples, and contending that, “Son installation nous enjoint à nous positionner face à 
la réalité historique d'une propagande colonialiste brutale et manipulatrice, mais aussi face au 
racisme latent qui perdure de nos jours” (Festival d’Avignon, n.p.). When it came to Paris a year 
later, however, the reaction was the polar opposite.84 
Before the show opened in Paris, several community actors began organizing to protest 
the performance. These included the existing associations the Brigade anti-negrophobie (BAN) 
and the Conseil représentatif des associations noires de France (CRAN), as well as a collective of 
primarily artists of color who eventually because a loose association called Contre Exhibit B. 
                                                 
84 The location of the performance in Paris almost certainly influenced the public reception. In comparison to the 
Festival d’Avignon, a program whose primary audience is international theater aficionados who have the means to 
travel to and stay in a picturesque town in the South of France during the summer, Saint-Denis and the 19th 
arrondissement of Paris are socially and racially diverse areas that have few and modest cultural institutions. Many 
of the cultural institutions in the area cater to these residents, the Centquatre in particular is a mixed used space that 
has open areas that can be used for skateboarding, dancing, free tai-chi classes. Its programming includes 
contemporary concerts and dance parties as well as more challenging theater pieces.  
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This collective started a petition that eventually gathered over 20,000 signatures and brought a 
suit to court demanding that the performance be shut down. The protesters also included a 
stalwart member of the Front de Gauche organization, the British-born professor John Mullen 
who became one of the go-to spokespeople for the movement after publishing a widely read post 
on his blog. The collective and other community actors attempted to organize a public debate 
with the artist Brett Bailey and the director of the TGP, Jean Belleroni, before the performances 
began. According to some of the organizers, one meeting with Jean Belleroni, the director of 
Théâtre Philippe Gérard, and Didier Paillard, the mayor of Saint Denis, was eventually 
scheduled. The concerned members of the collective and other residents attended the meeting 
expecting it to function as a round table conversation. Instead, as described by one of the 
protestors, the director and the mayor lectured them about the importance of art and suggested 
that their concerns about the performance were all due to a misinterpretation of the piece: in 
short, that they didn’t “get” art.85  
With the performances set to open as scheduled, the collective decided to organize a 
protest in front of the theater on Exhibit B’s opening night. This may also have been influenced 
by the protests in London just a few months earlier when the Barbican Center organized for 
Exhibit B to be installed at The Vaults, an off-site contemporary arts space. The performance in 
London was met with similar resistance: petitions to suspend the show, requests for discussion 
with the organizers that were denied, and protests on opening night that forced their way into the 
theater. The momentum from the London protest washed over to France. Like in London, police 
forces were present at the opening night, as were other human rights organizations that supported 
                                                 
85 I attended a public conversation with John Mullen and one of the other organizers of the collective against Exhibit 
B, organized a few months later as part of the Semaine Anti-Coloniale in February 2015. During this debate, the 
panelists spoke about the meeting and my description comes from their report. I have been unable to find any press, 
statements, or other transcriptions of what happened at that meeting.  
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Exhibit B in the name of freedom of speech and artistic expression. The Observatoire de la 
libérté d’expression, a committee formed by the Ligue des droits de l’homme (LDH), had 
delegates on site who attempted to mediate between the different groups and speak to the 
spectators as well as Belleroni and the different organizers. The agitated crowd eventually 
broken through the theatre’s door, creating that magnificent carpet of glass shards and ending the 
performances for the night. The following weeks saw peaceful protests and the attempts at legal 
action. The Observatoire, in their lengthy report published in May 2015, said that at this point it 
attempted to organize a public debate, but that the Contre Exhibit B collective refused to 
participate. The judge ruled that the performance was not anti-racist and that the freedom of 
expression must be upheld. The show went on as scheduled at the theater, and though its run at 
the Centre 104 was shortened by two days, the performances scheduled for those days were 
simply added to other nights and to the night of December 12th, which was originally had no 
performances scheduled.  
Though the collective was unsuccessful in ending the performances, they did draw in a 
lot of media attention. The mainstream’s—and particularly the cultural mainstream voiced by 
magazines such as Télérama and Le Monde’s culture pages—analysis of the debate can best be 
summarized by Michel Guerrin’s article :  
Ce rejet n’est pas tant esthétique que communautaire. Marre de voir des Noirs 
réduits à leurs habits de victimes, et d’occulter leur révolte. Marre que le décideur 
(le metteur en scène) soit blanc et ceux qui exécutent (les acteurs) soient noirs. 
Marre que les Noirs soient sous-représentés dans la culture en France. Marre que 
le pouvoir blanc colonial ne soit pas figuré. Le monde 12.04.2014, np 
The outcry based not on aesthetics, but on identity politics. Black people have 
been reduced to victimhood, their revolutionary efforts occluded, for long enough. 
Black people (the actors) have had to follow the directions of white decision 
makers (the artist) for long enough. Black people have been underrepresented in 
French culture for long enough. White colonial power has been left anonymous 
for too long.  
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In essence, the mainstream coverage tended to cast the protestors as engaging in a debate about 
identity politics and institutional disparity, but not about “art.” The journalists who were pro-
Exhibit B appeared to latch on to only the parts of the protesters argument that focused on who 
gets to tell the story of slavery and colonization—the part of the argument that claimed that Brett 
Bailey, a white man that grew up with all the privileges of apartheid in South Africa, was not in 
his right to tell their story. Those who were pro-Exhibit B also focused on the protestors’ 
frustration at the fact that in cultural institutions in France—which are largely financed by the 
state—there are very few people of color in positions of power. Thus the few representations of 
black or of African peoples and cultures are for the most part selected or created by white 
decision makers. In other words, the media and institutional defenders of Exhibit B believed that 
the Contre Exhibit B collective and their allies were decrying the fact that people of color, 
particularly black people in France, are spoken about and spoken for but never given the 
opportunity to speak for themselves. And while some of them conceded to the point about 
structural racism, they did not seem to think that the protestors had anything meaningful to say 
about Exhibit B as a specific aesthetic proposition.  
I find it curious that, Guerrin (cited above) and others explicitly cast the arguments as not 
being about aesthetics. And because it wasn’t about aesthetics, it became about freedom of 
speech. And yet, while disallowing the possibility that the protestors were making aesthetic 
interpretations, the performance’s supporters were also basing their arguments on an aesthetic 
judgment. To cite just one example, Didier Paillier, the mayor of Saint-Denis wrote an open 
letter responding to the petition the protesters sent to him to cancel the performance. In it, he 
says that he has not seen piece (and will not be able to see it—much like many of the protestors 
who were, on the contrary, criticized for making an interpretation before seeing it themselves). 
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He stresses that he must uphold freedom of speech, yet adds: “Je ne partage pas l’interprétation 
que vous faites de la proposition de Brett Bailey au TGP. […] Exhibit B est une dénonciation 
claire de la domination, de l’esclavage, du racisme à travers les siècles de notre histoire, à 
l’encontre des personnes noire, y compris sous ses formes les plus actuelles” (Pallier 2014 n.p. [I 
do not agree with your interpretation of the work of Brett Bailey at the TGP. (…) Exhibit B is a 
clear denunciation over two centuries of domination, slavery, and racism against Black people in 
historical and present-day forms]). Paillier thus, on the one hand, suggests that the artists’ right to 
expression must be protected, and on the other hand suggests his decision to protect the 
performance comes from his interpretation of the artist’s message as anti-racist. Similarly, since 
Bailey, his actors, and others had always insisted that the intention of the piece was to denounce 
racism past and present as well as the lingering effects of colonialism, the judge that was ruling 
on the suit against the performance decided Exhibit B was not an act of hate speech and that 
shutting it down would be a violation of freedom of expression, particularly artistic expression, 
which is always susceptible to differing interpretation.  
The casting of the protesters’ charges as ones of identitarian concerns rather than as 
aesthetic concerns created an impasse; each side unable to hold a debate since the terms of the 
debate were unavowed. I am interested in this silencing of the aesthetic valence of the debate (or 
rather, its silencing when the affective interpretation of the aesthetics on the part of the protesters 
differed from the interpretation of those in power and in proximity to the arts). Contrary to the 
prevailing media interpretations, I contend that there was, in fact, a discussion of the value and 
the effectiveness of the aesthetic dimension of Exhibit B carried out by the protestors. The 
lengthiest discussion from this point of view comes from the article that Christine Eyene, a 
research fellow in contemporary art at the University of Central Lancashire and a black French 
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woman, published on her blog Eyonart. In this denouncement of Exhibit B, Eyene brings to light 
several concerns of the aesthetic order, including, among other critiques, the voyeuristic aspect 
of the spatial organization of the performance; its emphasis of seeing rather the speaking; its lack 
of performative, visual, or material innovation. Since Eyene’s subject of research is aesthetics, 
contemporary art, and the representation of black bodies, one could say that it is not surprising 
that she takes on the aesthetic dimension of the debate. However, a more careful and open 
reading of the protestors complaints reveals that aesthetic engagement was a central part of the 
protest movement, even among the ranks of non-specialists.  
Most notably, one of the picket signs carried by the protesters read “Réproduire ≠ 
Critiquer.” 
 
Figure 11 Protest sign "Reproduire ≠ Critiquer". Photo by Hugo Haytham for Le Monde. 
Defenders of Exhibit B often lauded Bailey’s careful investigation of archival material to visually 
re-create the scenes in his tableaux. The protestors, on the other hand, had strongly divergent 
interpretation of this aesthetic approach of realism. What they contended through their simple 
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slogan was that replicating the visual conditions of a situation of oppression does not necessarily 
critique, undo, or otherwise shed light on that oppression—and that it can, in fact, through its 
aesthetic choices and its context of production, reiterate oppressive power relations. One news 
source, Libération, did catch on to the aesthetic concerns of the protestors, as an opinion piece 
co-written by several of its journalists stated: “Les protestataires font de la politique, et mènent 
un débat esthétique. Ils et elles posent le problème de la représentation de leur oppression, de 
celle de leurs ancêtres, de la place des «Blancs» dans l’installation, celle des spectateurs et de la 
programmation du théâtre subventionné” (12.11.2014, np, italics mine [These are political 
protests that debate aesthetics as well. The protester formulate the problem of representing their 
oppression, their ancestors oppression, the role of white people in the installation, the role of the 
viewers and of the theater’s programming which receives subsidies]). In essence, this article 
noted that the issue that the protestors had with the performance was not merely that the 
oppression of black peoples was being represented by someone who benefitted from that 
oppression, but the aesthetic choices that guided the representation. That, for example, if Bailey 
was faithfully recreating scenes as they would have happened, why were only the (black) victims 
and not the (white) perpetrators pictured? Or why were the black actors only depicted as victims? 
Why were the victims allowed to “accuse” only with the gaze and not with words? It was not 
merely the conditions of production (i.e. a white man telling the story of black people’s 
exploitation) that the collective took issue with but the aesthetic vision of the production.  
The phrase “unambiguously anti-racist” was echoed amongst the official statements 
released in defense of Exhibit B. What the protesters were suggesting, which few of the 
supporters seemed to understand, was that a representation could be anti-racist in its intent, but 
nevertheless employ aesthetics strategies that—along with the institutional biases affecting its 
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production—could perpetuate rather than critique existing racial dynamics. This brings me to the 
ideas I want to work out in this chapter. I argue that the protesters were critiquing the aesthetic 
choice to employ visually-oriented strategies of representation; they contended that aesthetics 
that rely on the visual is an ineffective narrative strategy to memorialize, mourn, or educate a 
public about past systems of racial oppression and their ongoing consequences. I suggest that 
when we look at how Cape Coast Castle represents this same history of racial systems of 
oppression, we find an aesthetic strategy that is materially-oriented rather than visually-oriented. 
While the memorial site’s intentions resemble Exhibit B’s, its aesthetic tactics deploy a different 
logic to enact their critical work. The aesthetic strategy at Cape Coast, based on projection, 
proximity, and indexical relations, introduces other potential problems. However, the 
associations that it renders possible are powerful, unruly, sometimes ugly assemblages that 
nevertheless may provide ways out of Exhibit B’s impasse. In the end, I will argue that the 
materially-oriented aesthetic strategy that emerges at the Cape Coast Memorial site functions 
much like translation does in the way it sets a relationship between the original and the translated 
object that opens affective pathways and modes of thinking about the past that are better suited 
for the critical work of remembering and undoing past systems of oppression and their ongoing 
consequences.  
“Je ne peux pas dire que je ne sais pas, que je n’ai pas vu 
To a certain degree, I would argue that the most important thing that the protestors 
revealed was that though it may have intended to denounce racism, Exhibit B was itself a product 
of the structural and institutional racism that favors white people as producers of high culture and 
black people as the bodies through which cultural labor is performed. However, the protestors’ 
denouncement of the visually-oriented narrative strategy employed by Exhibit B merits 
exploration. I say that Exhibit B employed a visually-oriented narrative for several reasons: it 
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reduced human and non-human material bodies to their visual properties, it employed these 
bodies as signs that functioned via resemblance and symbolism, and it sought, via these moves, 
to make the power dynamics of the colonial gaze explicit. In Bailey’s own words, the power of 
Exhibit B comes from making visible a visual relationship: “It is about looking and being looked 
at. Both performer and spectator are contained within the frame” (Bailey 2014, np). To make the 
gaze take center stage, he removes all other elements: plot, dialogue, and bodily movement are 
notably absent. Bailey wants the spectator to see, and to become self-conscious of the fact that 
they are seeing. Seeing the objectification of humans through systematic oppression is, for 
Bailey, the solution for present-day racism. Alexandre Fandard, a biracial actor who worked with 
Bailey twice on Exhibit B, called the experience eye-opening, saying that by working on the 
production he became aware of his own ignorance of the colonial past and its relationship to the 
present-day racism he experiences in France. Fandard suggests that this is the experience of the 
visitors as well: “Le spectateur en sortant se dit : ‘Je ne peux pas dire que je ne sais pas, que je 
n’ai pas vu’ ” (Reith, n.p. [The viewer, upon exiting, tells themselves: ‘I cannot say that I didn’t 
know, that I hadn’t seen]). The public sees examples of historic and present-day systemic racism, 
and acknowledges what they have seen, and this, for Bailey and his supporters, becomes a 
transformative knowledge. 
To see, and to see yourself seeing, then, was Exhibit B’s aesthetic strategy for 
deconstructing the racist legacy of colonialism. This was a visually-oriented strategy not only in 
its intended effect (making the gaze visible) but in how it reduced all human and non-human 
bodies to their visual properties. Part of this was the intent to make visible the dehumanization of 
people through their objectification: their rendering into inanimate, passive objects, devoid of 
will and agency. Fandard speaks of how the utter stillness of the human actors invited a 
confusion on the state of their personhood: “Certains visiteurs, lorsqu'ils découvrent les tableaux 
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ne se rendent pas tout de suite compte que ce sont des vraies personnes qui les composent. Et 
lorsqu'ils le découvrent, ça fait un choc” (Reith, n.p.). When spectators realize the human body 
on the stage is not an inanimate mannequin but a live, “real” human, they “see” objectification; 
the confusion becomes an accusation, as the viewer realizes they have committed the crime of 
seeing an object in the place of a person.86  
In essence, Bailey is creating visual analogies—an aesthetic strategy related to mimesis 
that relies on drawing perfect parallels, tight equivalences. In another scene—the one which 
Fandard plays—a black person in contemporary clothing, feet bound and mouth taped shut, sits 
with arms tied to the armrests of an airplane seat that is placed on shipping palettes.  
 
Figure 12 "Immigration" tableau in Exhibit B. 2013 Avignon Theater Festival. Photo by AFP/Franck Pennant. 
 
                                                 
86 I will push back on these categories of human and nonhuman, animate and inanimate, later in this chapter, but for 
now I will let them stand as they are how Fandard, Bailey, and many others processed what was happening in 
Exhibit B.  
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A series of numbers are pasted to his chest as a sort of name-tag. The actor represents an asylum 
seeker. Bailey, in nearly all of his descriptions of Exhibit B speaks of how the work is supposed 
to criticize EU policies that dehumanize and take away the rights of refugees. In this scene, the 
human body is likened to an object that can be packed up a shipped away at the whims of 
international accords, without the “object” having any say in the matter.  
The visual properties of the human bodies and the costumes, props, and stage elements 
also functioned via resemblance and symbolism. This is best explained through an analysis of 
one of the tableaux, called “Lodgement d’un Officier, Brazzaville 1903.”  
 
Figure 13 "Le Logement d'un officier" in Exhibit B. 2013 Avignon Theater Festival. Photo by Christina Reynaud de Lage. 
This tableau is a historical recreation, built to perfectly resemble what an officer’s room in the 
Belgian Congo would have looked like. The wallpapered room is decorated with hunting 
trophies, black-and-white photographs (including one of bare-chested black men kneeling in 
formation with uniformed white officers flanking them on each side), and a single bed. On this 
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bed, a black woman sits, undressed from the waist up and with her back towards the audience 
that approaches the tableau.  
 
Figure 14 Close-up of "le Logement d'un officier" in Exhibit B. Barbican Center London. Photo by DR. 
A cast-iron collar and chain drapes her neck. The resemblance—historically researched, 
meticulously reproduced from photographic archives—between the visual properties of the 
material bodies of the objects and the actor and the room as it would have existed in 1903 in 
Brazzaville is emphasized. The visitor sees the same thing that an officer a hundred years earlier 
would have seen upon returning to his chambers in the evening. In other words, the spectator 
becomes an eyewitness to the sexual exploitation that was current in the colonies.  
In fact, just by entering the performance, there is an aesthetic gesture that places the 
spectator in the position of the white perpetrator. As mentioned, Bailey lists “the visitors” as one 
of the material elements of his installation’s composition, the way labels will list what an art 
piece is made of (e.g. “oil on canvas”). The Observatoire de la libérté de la creation, which 
published an extensive report analyzing and responding to the criticism Exhibit B received, 
praised this move and concurred with Bailey’s explanation that making the viewer aware that 
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they are looking and being looked at is one of the ways in which the piece deconstructs racism. 
They write, referencing the performance when it took place in Avignon: “Cette place [de 
spectateur] est assignée d’entrée : une jeune femme de couleur impose le silence complet avant 
d’appeler dans un ordre aléatoire, à intervelles réguliers, le numéro de chacun; et, dans ce jeu 
disicplinaire, le public d’Avignon se découvre blanc” (2015, 15 [This role [of being The Viewer] 
is assigned at the entrance. A young woman of colors demands utter silence before calling in 
random order and at regal intervals, the number of each visitor. In this disciplinary game, the 
public in Avignon is faced with their whiteness]). The spectator is thus not merely witnessing 
scenes mimetically resembling those of the past, ‘as they really were’, but the act of witnessing is 
revealed as violent. The spectator occupies the subject position of witness—and thus of 
perpetrator.  
I point out how these function via resemblance and symbolism because I will later speak 
about Pierce’s other semantic rule, indexicality, and I will suggest that as a rhetorical strategy of 
representation, it is a more open-ended and productive mode. However, what I want to point out 
here is how Exhibit B’s aesthetic strategies work primarily by tapping into the visual properties 
of human and nonhuman bodies to create analogous relationships. It furthermore reinforces the 
hierarchy of the visual by suggesting that it is through exposure—both of the violent content and 
of the violent gaze—that art can provoke a particular affective reaction that deconstructs the 
systems of oppression based on race that are the legacy of European colonialism and transatlantic 
slavery. Bailey’s reasoning is that the problem that needs addressing is ignorance—people do not 
know how past and present systems of oppression are intertwined, and if the see it as it really 
was, they will know and this knowledge will be transformative. The problem that I identify in his 
line of reasoning is not just that “seeing” such a thing “as it really was” is impossible, but that 
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visuality itself has a long history of being employed as a colonizing tool. As Renée Green, a 
contemporary African-American artist whose oeuvre interrogates the historical representations of 
black people, states, “The act of looking can be deceptive, and that relates to notions of seeing 
and knowing: what you see is not equivalent truth, because perception is something that’s 
learned and constructed” (Harkvay, 2). This is in stark opposition to Fandard’s claim that Je ne 
peux pas dire que je ne sais pas, que je n’ai pas vu. For Fandard, and, it would seem, Bailey and 
many of his supporters, the act of looking reveals a “truth,” rather than being itself a product of a 
pre-existing system of power.  
Green’s artistic work is influenced by Edward Saïd’s groundbreaking scholarship that 
demonstrated how Western European and American knowledge about the Orient was built out of 
visual and discursive descriptions of its geography, people, social systems, etc, all made by 
Western individuals and institutions—and guided by Western economic and political interests. In 
other words, understanding of the Orient was constructed externally, through the gaze of an 
outsider. Furthermore, this discourse of the Oriented, regardless of how “factual” it claimed to be 
in its contents, methods, or analysis, was an exercise of power: “dealing with [the Orient] by 
making statements about it, authorizing views on it, describing it, by teaching it, settling it, ruling 
over it: in short, Orientalism as a Western style for dominating, restructuring, and having 
authority over the Orient” (3). In V.Y. Mundimbe’s The Invention of Africa, Mundimbe works 
specifically on the case of the African continent and the knowledge produced about it, where, 
like for Saïd’s Orientalism, knowledge is one of the ways in which power is constructed, not 
undone. This argument, and its visual element, is taken up and developed to speak of colonial 
interest and travel writing more generally in Mary Louis Pratt’s Imperial Eyes: Travel Writing 
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and Transculturation in which once again the act of looking at an “Other” becomes a mean of 
conquering, settling, and ruling.  
There is, furthermore, a history specific to black skin that enabled its exploitation via 
measures of hypervisibility, the most canonical example of it being Frantz Fanon’s Black Skin, 
White Masks, in which he recounts the pivotal moment when a young white boy on the metro in 
Paris notices him and says to his mother, “Maman, regarde le nègre, j’ai peur” (84; [‘Mama, see 
the Negro! I’m frightened!’] Markmann 112). This moment, that crystallizes for Fanon the fact 
that it is through being seen that his subjectivity is constituted, “par l’autre, le Blanc, qui m’avait 
tissé de mille details, anecdotes, récits,” (90; [by the other, the white man, who had woven me 
out of a thousand details, anecdotes, stories] Markmann 111) embodies the specifically visual 
axis that constitutes what Fanon will call the racial corporeal schema. 
Here Claudia Rankine’s voice from the previous chapter chimes in and echoes, noting 
how the most intimate a painful moment of life—death—is for a black person today is rarely a 
private one, but rather one that is commonplace in every place: fiction and factoids, courtrooms 
and courtroom TV dramas. She insists: “Dying in ship hulls, tossed into the Atlantic, hanging 
from trees, beaten, shot in churches, gunned down by the police or warehoused in prisons: 
Historically, there is no quotidian without the enslaved, chained or dead black body to gaze upon 
or to hear about or to position a self against” (n.p.). Her words strike an uncanny rhythm with 
James Baldwin’s words, several decades earlier, given at a lecture in London: “I don’t know how 
you discover what it means to be black in London, but I know what it means, how you discover 
that it in New York […] I know how you watch, as you grow older, literally—now this is not a 
figure of speech—the corpses of your brothers and your sisters pile up around you. And not for 
anything they have done” (transcript; emphasis mine). What all three of these (among other) 
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critics point to is that black bodies, particularly those suffering from physical or moral harm, are 
already exposed—overexposed even—and become the image with and against which living 
people of color are positioned.87  
Fandard’s claim, then, that the spectators exiting Exhibit B can no longer say they that 
they don’t know, that they haven’t seen, misses the mark. The spectators have already seen, their 
whole long lives, the objectification and exploitation of black bodies. When Bailey’s Exhibit B is 
examined in this context, one begins to wonder what, if anything, distinguishes the imaginary of 
colonial exploitation and slavery produced through his sets and actors from the pre-existing 
imaginary that operates conscious-and-unconsciously outside of the installation. One wonders if 
Bailey’s insistence on sameness, his attempt to critique by creating an exact equivalence may 
actually be what betrays his critique, working against his artistic intention.  It is shortsighted to 
think that mere sight, the gesturing of revealing, necessarily enacts affective change. Seeing, 
knowing, knowing-through-seeing, operate through the same logic that made it possible to 
exploit and objectify other humans. In other words, Bailey is perhaps not wrong in saying that 
ignorance of the history of exploitation and its particular visual language is one of the factors that 
enables continued structural exploitation of people of color. Nevertheless, “seeing” that 
imagery—representing it through aesthetic strategies of mimesis—may do more to reproduce the 
power dynamics of the gaze than increase understanding of its damage, much less undo its 
damage. Furthermore, the affective positions it opens—calibrated horror, shock, pity, guilt—do 
not do enough, it seems, to tug and splinter profoundly new desires into being—the kind of 
desire that says seeing-knowing is not enough. 
                                                 
87 See also Gilman (1985), Mitchell (2010), Singer (2010), Strother (1999), Wright (2000) for discussions of 
black—and particularly black women’s—bodies as hypervisible objects and the construction of race, gender, and 
sexuality. 
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Discourses of Extremity and Translation 
Let us return to the beginning, to the rhetorical tactics that Ross Chambers identified as 
crucial to a discourse of extremity. These were a deployment of the indexical nature of signs, an 
insistence on asyndenton, and an uncanny rephrasing that makes what is already known new 
again. What I want to trace in this section is how Brent Hayes Edwards’ theory of diaspora as 
translation maps onto the rhetorical tactics outlined by Chambers. I do so not only because of the 
resonances that immediately appeared when I read the two theories together, but because the 
question that Edward attempts to answer via this reworking of diaspora as translation is the same 
question that the two case studies in this chapter—Exhibit B and the Cape Coast Slave 
Memorial—attempt to answer. That question is, how do we create a sense of belonging across 
geographic, temporal, and racial differences, given a long history of exploitation along those 
lines of difference that continues in the present? And how can this sense of belonging be turned 
into something that undoes that exploitation, rather than merely mask it in the name of 
reconciliation?  
For my work, of course, part of the answer lies in changing the way we understand 
material objects as holders of the past. In fact, I will argue that if we speak of material objects as 
translators, rather than witnesses, of the past, we can encourage affective structure that facilitate 
that nuanced sense of belonging. Before we get to that, however, let’s look at the relationship 
between translation, diaspora, and the rhetorics of discourses of extremity. What matters about 
the rhetorics that Chambers identifies is their effects: how it opens up what aesthetics can do. 
First, with indexicality, it creates a connection that is not based on visual resemblance but rather 
a material connection, and this material connection may be one that can traverse temporal and 
geographic difference. When an object is used to represent—that is, to call into the present—a 
past event, then, rather than visually standing in for events as they really were, they can be used 
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as indexes to point to connections between past and present. With asyndenton, a narrative can 
allow for a sensation of both continuity and rupture: grammatical rules are broken but the flow of 
the sentence’s thought continues. With rephrasing, resistance to reception can be broken by a 
changing of the stage. These are, in other words, affective outcomes. They encourage a particular 
affective response by the reader and open a space in which the reader can position herself in 
relation to the narrative that is being told. 
When I examine Edward’s argument that diaspora can be understood as a practice of 
translation, it turns out that practice also implies a set of rhetorical strategies—ones that echo, 
interestingly, the rhetorical gestures that Chambers elucidates. Edwards speaks of translation as a 
form of detour rather than a retour (return) to an original provenance. Translation is a future-
oriented movement, whose imagined audience is future readers in another place. It also has a 
serial nature to it—translations are often re-translated, contested, or may inspire further 
translations in other languages. Edwards links this outward moving gesture to the Glissantian 
notion of detour: “The discontinuities and disjunctures in any translation . . . might be best 
described not a predetermined failure but as the rich complexity of a modern cultural practice 
characterized above all by what Édouard Glissant calls ‘detour’ ” (22). This distancing and 
disjuncture from a previous starting point, I argue, resembles the rhetorical effects of 
indexicality. It is the material connection between the original and the translation (a translator 
worked on a text to produce another text) that constitutes their relationship, rather a visual, aural, 
or even semantic resemblance. Translation puts indexical relationships in place; it supports or 
creates affinities, in other words, between distinct bodies.  
Another notable aspect of translation that Edwards highlights is the décalage that 
constitutes articulation. He calls translation a “process of linking or connection across gaps—a 
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practice we might term articulation” (11). He furthermore notes that anatomically speaking, 
“Articulation is always a strange and ambivalent gesture, because finally, in the body it is only 
difference—the separation between bones or members—that allows movement” (15). 
Extrapolating the articulation of bones and ligaments to the articulation of words, Edward 
proposes that while translation makes links across conceptual gaps, it also removes (décaler) 
other rhetorical prosthetics that were propping up or bridging conceptual gaps in the original 
enunciation of the text. This echoes Chambers’ description of the rhetorical effects of 
asyndenton, wherein a disjuncture is bridged but the jutting, odd rhythm of sentence’s suture is 
nevertheless palpable. 
The final point of Edwards that I will touch on is translation as a gesture that reworks the 
frame. Drawing on David Scott, Edwards emphasizes that framing is a gesture that places a text 
in relation to the conditions of it enunciation and the forces that governs its discursivity 
(paraphrasing from Scott 1999, 83). In other words, there is attention drawn to the stage and 
setting of the text—and this stage and setting are reworked, reframed. This matters because the 
shifting of the frame allows the center or content to be reworked as well. It alters the gaze in such 
a way that new thoughts may become possible. As Edwards puts it, when he studied the 
exchanges between black intellectuals in the United States and France in the period between the 
two World Wars, it became evident that “certain moves, certain arguments and epiphanies, can 
only be staged beyond the confines of the United States, and sometimes in languages other than 
English” (4-5). This reworking of the frame to reword the content resonates with the rhetorical 
effects of rephrasing discourses of extremity as described by Chambers. Rephrasing involves a 
re-direction of attention to the conditions that make it difficult for the speaker to speak (a 
traumatic event, somehow survived, and both the speaker’s survival and the trauma of the event 
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seem unjustifiable beyond description), and for the speaker to be heard (the discomfort of 
witnessing, even if by proxy, a traumatic event).  
If the rhetorical gestures of translation and their effects resemble those of discourses of 
extremity, I wonder what might happen if, in representing those collective traumatic events of 
the past, we adopted a multisensorial aesthetics of translation, rather than an aesthetics of 
mimesis? This is the question that I pose at the Cape Coast Slave Memorial site. For even if 
many of the elements seem to be represented in a fairly conventional manner of trying to vividly 
recreate the human exploitation that took place in that site, there are moments when the material 
objects and physical space appear to détourner the narrative. The relationship they invite with 
the past is not one of re-creation but of projection, and I am calling this a materially-oriented 
memory work. 
Cape Coast: Materially-Oriented Memory Work  
The Cape Coast Memorial, like Exhibit B, attempts to do two things. It strives to tell the 
story of the transatlantic slave trade, a discourse of extremity whose extent of human suffering 
and depth of human-to-human exploitation is difficult to communicate. And it believes that 
telling this story is necessary to ensure a more just world, free from systematic exploitation along 
racial lines. How they tell this story—what kinds of aesthetic strategies the sites employ and how 
these strategies create associations, relations, and practices of relating past to present—differs 
starkly. Whereas Exhibit B is a visually-oriented experience, the Cape Coast Castle taps into the 
extra-visual material qualities of the spaces, the setting, and the objects it deploys in its story-
telling. In other words, it asks the visitors to turn their attention not to what they see, but what 
they are smelling, standing on, touching, hearing. Rather than asking them primarily to look, it 
ask them move through certain physical spaces, to enact gestures, to call on those non-visual 
 172 
senses and, ultimately, to use this assemblage of physical actions and sensation to call the past 
into the present through a deep imaginative engagement.   
The site at Cape Coast, I should explain, was initially a commercial fort built in the 16th 
century by the Swedish Africa Company to support their trading activities along the coast, 
notably the gold trade. 
 
Figure 15 Cape Coast Castle and Memorial Site. Photo courtesy of author. 
It changed hands various times, ending up as a British possession in the 17th century and was 
increasingly used as a holding center in the transatlantic slave trade. The British reconstructed 
and expanded it in the late 18th century in part to expand the cells where captives could be held. 
Though it came under the care of the Ghana Museums and Monuments Board in 1957, at 
Ghana’s independence, and was named a UNESCO World Heritage site in 1979, it wasn’t until 
the early 1990s that the site was heavily restored and a museum exhibition was added in one 
section of the castle to talk about the history of the region and the slave trade. The museum 
exhibition is set in one wing of the fort, but the majority of the castle has been restored to what it 
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looked like in the late 18th century, without museum panels or explanations, the idea being that 
the visitors will experience it in a state that similar to what it would have been like during the 
transatlantic slave trade.  
 
Figure 16 Cape Coast Castle. Photo courtesy of author. 
The entrance fee to the memorial includes a guided tour of this section of the castle, and 
while some visitors may wander off before or during the tour, most of the visitors do participate 
in the guided visit—in fact, the memorial site staff is fairly insistent at herding wayward visitors 
that have wandered off into joining a guided tour. This “memorialized” area of the castle and the 
guided tour is the portion of the space that I will be analyzing, based on several on-site 
observation days I did during the period of May 1-4, 2014 and a follow-up observation day on 
August 6, 2017.  While much ink could be spilled on the museum portion of the visit, it is the 
physical space of the castle and the way that this space is animated by the tour guides and 
visitors that is the most pertinent to this dissertation’s study of people and material objects telling 
stories together. 
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How then, does the assemblage of people and objects tell the story of the transatlantic 
slave trade in this site? I said earlier that the site calls on the non-visual material qualities of the 
objects at the memorial site; what I mean by this is that the organization of the site and the tour 
calls attention to the castle’s materiality and the how this matter occupies space. The castle and 
material objects in the site are not presented for visual assimilation, but as vibrant bodies that 
exist outside-but-not-quite of the visitor’s own bodies. In other words, their materiality is 
emphasized. Susan Pearce, in defining what objects do in museum collections, expresses it like 
so: “The materiality of objects means that they occupy their own space, and this is how we 
experience them. Whether we bark our shins against them or put them in our pockets, we 
understand that where one of them is, nothing else can be” (Pearce 1992, 16). This materiality, I 
noticed, was constantly called upon to shape the visitors’ experience at the memorial site. 
The guided visit beings in underground dungeon, which is quite dark, lit only by a small 
stream of sunlight from small cutout windows on the top of the high walls.  
 
Figure 17 Male Dungeon Entrance. Cape Coast Castle. Photo courtesy of author. 
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The guides, in all the tours that I followed, repeatedly draw the visitors’ attention to the floor in 
this space, which at first glance looks like matted dirt, a glossy brown. They point in particular to 
a section of the dungeon where a brick floor is visible, and point out how the brick part is a few 
centimeters lower than the brown dirt floor on which we are standing.  
 
Figure 18 Excavated section of floor in Male Dungeons. Cape Coast Castle. Photo courtesy of author. 
The guides proceed to explain that the brick is the original floor, which was excavated by a team 
of researchers. They explain that we the visitors are standing on the residue of the hundreds of 
bodies that were kept in the small space, the residue of men that were trapped there, often so 
tightly packed there was barely room to sit, for months at a time. These men had to perform all 
the normal human bodily function in that room. They ate there, defecated, got sick and vomited, 
bled, cried, the guides say, adding that perhaps even bodies were left to decompose there… all of 
these bodily and organic excrements collected on the floor, got trampled and packed down to 
become the layer that we are standing on today. The guides point to the small size windows, and 
their placement high along the ceiling of the underground dungeon. This configuration stifles 
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both the light and the air circulation. The dungeon has retained hints of a foul smell —some 
visitors will be covering their noses and mouths during this presentation. The guides tell us that 
what we smell is that human residue of the men held captive in this space.  
These claims, specious88 and barbaric, that we are sensing the decomposition of human 
matter, cause an effect. It is this effect, elicited through the narrative and aesthetic deployment of 
the material presence of the castle, which is the object of this dissertation’s analysis, not the 
historical accuracy of those claims. The history, and the local and global factors that animated 
the development of slave trade heritage site and the tourism around them along the Ghanaian 
coast, is a worthy subject that has been studied, notably by Christine Kreamer (1999), a 
Smithsonian curator who was deeply involved in the UNESCO-funding renovations to the 
memorial site that created the museum wing of the castle. However, what I am pursuing is the 
intersection between aesthetics and materiality that enable a narrative projection into discourses 
of extremity. The concept of postmemory as theorized by Marianne Hirsh can be useful in this. 
Postmemory is a belated, often collective, remembering that links people to the traumatic events 
lived by previous generations. Of particular importance are the creative processes of 
postmemory, in its cross-pollination with imaginative impulses: “Postmemory is a powerful form 
of memory precisely because its connection to its object or source is mediated not through 
recollection but through projection, investment, and creation” (Hirsh 8). At the Cape Cost Castle 
memorial site, I will argue, the material elements of the slavery narrative set off these processes 
                                                 
88 After the abolition of the translatlantic slave trade, the site continued to be used as a trading point, and later 
became a British army training facility. There is understandably skepticism about the material and historical 
accuracy of claiming that the biological matter in the cells can be primarily attributed to human residue of the men 
held captive there. However, what interests me is the tour guides insistence on reading the space in this way, 
regardless of the exact composition and origin of the biological traces in the room.  
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of projection, investment and creation. The results are mixed—stunning, troubling, banal—but 
may open more capacious ways of connecting to that troubling history than Bailey’s Exhibit B.  
Standing in that empty but evocative room at Cape Coast Castle, I think of the room in 
Kétala where Mémoria’s objects assembled to expose the material traces she had left in and on 
them, and used this residue of contact to trace out the mutual constitution of their lives. In the 
dungeons at Cape Coast, it is the human tour guides that do the work of giving voice to, 
narrating, tracing a story, but the gesture is similar: a calling attention to the material traces, to 
the residue of what-was-once-visible, and building the narrative out of this residue. The 
relationship this gesture sets in place between past and present, going back to what Charles 
Peirce and Chambers note, is an indexical rather than a mimetic one. It is a gesture that points to 
its subject rather that re-presenting it mimetically. One could liken this to the rhetorical figure of 
synecdoche, in which a part stands in for the whole or, more precisely in this case, the effect 
signals a cause. What the visitor sees is thus not exactly the thing to be seen, but it is intimately 
related to it. It is its residue.  
Moreover, it is not through the act of seeing (and seeing oneself see) that the past 
becomes vivid, palpable, present. Instead, it is through proximity and projection. The visitors are 
not asked to see the men held captive in the dungeon, but rather to apprehend the experience of 
being held captive in the dungeon through smell, through the physical discomfort of being in a 
dark, dank room, and through recognizing their physical proximity to even the barest traces of 
what may be residue of the human bodies that once sweated and suffered in that space. Here 
again I sense an echo with Jane Bennett’s theory of vibrant matter, in which human action and its 
effects is best understood as the product not of a single human being or beings, but the product of 
“an animal-vegetable-mineral-sonority cluster with a particular degree and duration of power” 
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(22). What makes it possible to hear—to not turn away from nor minimize—the extent of the 
human exploitation and suffering that happened in this place is turning attention to the material 
residue in the room, and inviting it act upon the living human bodies in the room. This narrative 
strategy recalls the story told by Mémoria’s dress in the previous chapter, whose fibers soak up 
and commemorate the sweat of Mémoria’s excitement. Any sensory reaction that the Cape Coast 
Castle’s presentation provokes is, of course, microscopic and temporary in relation to what 
would have been lived by people who were held captive there. Nevertheless, what is interesting 
is that the burden of being an eyewitness falls not on the visitor but on the material objects and 
space of the memorial site. It is the materiality of that space that witnessed the exploitation and 
suffering and now tells the story through its effect on the visitors.  
The role of the visitor thus becomes not of being witness à la Brett Bailey, of seeing-and-
knowing, but of being in proximity: holding a space for the material traces to do their affective 
work. This proximity is accompanied by a projection—an imaginative and sensorial 
investment—that likewise calls the past into the present. By provoking those sensations of 
discomfort and captivity through the material residue that persists in that space, the presentation 
by the guides attempts to transpose the past experience of the slaves onto the present bodies of 
the visitors. This echoes the mourning practices discussed in the previous chapter, in Chris 
Abani’s Becoming Abigail, whose protagonist does not rely on the image of her mother to 
remember her, but rather finds way to modify and inscribe her flesh with imagined memories.  
The sensory projection in Cape Coast is accompanied by a sequencing of physical 
gestures that likewise serve to call into the present the past experiences of the people held captive 
in the space. The visitors are guided through the fort in the supposedly the same sequence that 
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the men and women held captive would have experienced it, with a plaque mapping out the 
proper way to move through the castle.  
 
Figure 19 Directional map at Cape Coast Castle. Photo courtesy of author. 
The tour begins at the male dungeon, which the visitors are told was the principal holding space, 
and continues through the corridor to the room where the captive men would have been weighed 
and measured in preparation for shipment across the ocean, and then the tour continues through 
another corridor to the door which would have led the men to the slave ship. The visitors step 
through the door and find themselves of the ocean shore that meets the castle’s edge. 
This door, which marks the final point of the tour, is called the Door of No Return.  
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Figure 20 Door of No Return. Cape Coast Castle. Photo courtesy of author. 
The name was given to the door because once the captives exited that door and boarded the slave 
ships, they would presumably never again set foot on the African continent.89 However, the 
visitors are not asked only to re-perform this physical gesture of stepping out, but to intervene in 
and change the narrative. Once all the visitors are out of the castle, the guides tell them they 
must now complete the gesture that the captive men and women were obliged to leave 
unfinished: the visitors must return through the door. 
                                                 
89 The historical accuracy of the “Door of no Return”—whether is it actually the exit that the men and women 
would have been led to towards the ship—at the Cape Coast Castle is contested. What is notable is its symbolic 
power, and how it has become an essential trope in the telling of this story. Nearly all of the forts that serve as 
memorial sites along the Ghanaian Coast and up the West coast of Africa have a door designated as a “Door of no 
Return.” In fact, and the Ghana National Museum in Accra, the section on the history of the transatlantic slavery 
includes a “replica” door: at the end of the section, the visitor walks through a tiny corridor labeled “Door of No 
Return” with a curtain draped over the entrance.  
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Figure 21 Visitors walking thorugh Door of No Return. Cape Coast Castle. Photo courtesy of author. 
The guides explain that this action will demonstrate that the door has now become a door of 
return; that the descendants of slaves throughout the world are now welcome and free to come 
back.  
Again, the past is called into the present not through mimesis but through another 
rhetorical relationship: asyndeton. This, as Chambers explains it, is a tactic that creates a 
continuity of thought despite a grammatical disjuncture. In the case of the Cape Coast Castle, the 
continuity that is created by this physical gesture is a narrative one: the descendants of slaves and 
the visitors standing in for them “return,” bringing the story to a (happy?) end. The narrative of 
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continuity belies a temporal rupture—that 200-year gap between the departure and “return,” but 
it also belies other ruptures which will become clear later on. For now, what is important to point 
out is how the memorial’s employment of the material space of the castle and their moving of the 
visitors through the space makes a narrative intervention that strives to close this temporal gap.  
The memorial not only invites the visitors to intervene in and change the narrative—to 
be, in other words, narrative agents in assemblage with the materiality of the castle—but also to 
project themselves into the place of the men and women that were to be sold as slaves in the past, 
and to their descendents in the present. The memorial site presents this memory work as essential 
and self-evident, and as the solution to “understanding” the future and thus preventing similar 
exploitations. This is clearly stated in a memorial plaque installed in 2010 during then-President 
Barack Obama. 
 
Figure 22 Memorial Plaque. Cape Coast Castle. Photo courtesy of author. 
It reads as follows: 
In Everlasting Memory 
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Of the anguish of our ancestors. May those who died rest in peace. May those 
who return find their roots. May humanity never again perpetuate such injustice 
against humanity. We, the living, vow to uphold this 
This rhetoric suggests that the work of remembering can do justice (rest in peace) to the past, 
bring reconciliation (find their roots) in the present, and change (never again perpetuate such 
injustice) the future. The “We, the living” is meant to be all-encompassing, effacing geographic, 
racial, linguistic and economic differences among the visitors and joining them in the shared 
undertaking of preventing future injustice. This is one of the attempts at smoothing and closing 
the narrative that, while well-intentioned, I find problematic, as, it turns out do some of the 
visitors. However, before I turn to how the visitors use the material space of the memorial site to 
rupture the smoothing of the narrative, a few more observations must be made about the “we” 
that the memorial site seeks to bring together.  
First, if Exhibit B implicitly puts the visitor in place of the perpetrator—the subject who 
does violence if only by looking—the narrative at the Cape Coast Castle memorial site invites 
the visitors to invest—perhaps even identify—with the subject position of the victim. Such an 
invitation carries its own set of risks and limitations which I will address later. For now, I will 
note that the investment comes through, as mentioned, the moving through the space of the 
castle, the multi-sensory investment in its material qualities, and the symbolic physical gestures 
such as the stepping through the Door of No Return. However, unlike Exhibit B, the perpetrators 
of this violent history are at times brought into focus. This is enacted by a calling upon the 
material space of the site to work as a narrative agent.  
Throughout the tour, the guides will emphasize what I call the spatial hypocrisy of the 
built environment. While in the first dungeon, the guides will point to the ceiling of this room 
and ask the visitors to deduce what part of the fort they are standing under. The guide reveals 
that there was a church built directly above the dungeons, so, to paraphrase the words of several 
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guides, while the congregation sang songs of praise and asked for mercy from the heavens, they 
did not show mercy to the prisoners directly below them. Similarly, the guides will point out how 
the Governor’s residence, located in the tower of the fort, is spacious, with tall windows that 
have breathtaking views over the ocean and invite the salty sea breeze. They remind the visitors 
of dank darkness of the dungeon rooms, with miniscule windows placed high on the ceiling to 
minimize light and heighten security. The sensory experience of standing in airy officers quarters 
reinforces the disparity between the captive men and women’s experience and that of the 
officers. 
In addition to analyzing how the material environment participates in the narrative 
strategy of Cape Cost Castle, I wanted to examine material traces of the visitors experience. 
What kinds of projections, investments, and creative interventions into the narrative, if any, were 
visitors making through the material supports offered by the memorial? At the Cape Coast 
Castle, there are visitor books dating back to 1970 in which visitors could write their name, 
address, and a little note.90 The first ones have little, if any, commentary; an “Interesting history” 
or “Tragic story” seems to be the most common notes, contained on a single line of a column 
about two inches long.  
                                                 
90 These books are not classified or archived. They are kept in rough order on a shelf in the Museum director’s 
office on site. Since the room is not temperature controlled nor airtight, some of the older books are in quite delicate 
condition, with frayed and yellowed pages and fragile covers. Though I was unable to document every book, I was 
able to photograph all of the pages of seven books at Cape Coast Castle dating from 1988 to 2014, and three at a 
similar memorial site, the Elmina Castle, in April 2014. In August 2017, I was able to photograph excerpts  of the 
current visitor book.  
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Figure 23 Cape Coast Visitor Book. Full-page view, 4.23.1970-1.25.1973. Photo courtesy of author. 
When one opens up the notebook and lays it flat, one sees that each page starts the list over 
again, and the writing of the visitors is cramped, hurried. However, starting in the mid 1990s, the 
visitor lines extend across both pages, making the column for visitor comments twice as long. 
The visitor comments expand with this form. 
 
Figure 24 Cape Coast Visitor Book excerpt. From volume 10.2.2010-8.17.11. Photo courtesy of author. 
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It is impossible to tell whether the memorial site staff changed the layout to accommodate 
lengthier comments or whether the layout invites this, but either way, the change is notable. The 
visitor comments start taking over several lines, some even writing paragraph-length comments.  
Though there are many that react to the site in a similar way as in the earlier comment 
books, expressing appreciation for the site or affirming the importance of commemorating this 
history, many more take on a personal tone. In addition, many of the visitor comments expressed 
a desire to share a personal narrative, speaking of the journey they took to visit this place, of their 
parents, grandparents, or children. The earlier versions of the visitor comment books had a 
column for the visitors to note down their address, however, the ones from the mid-1990s 
onward asked not only for the address but for the nationality of the visitor. This placing of self 
geographically and genealogically can be read as an invitation, perhaps, to place one’s personal 
history within the collective work of memory at the site. 
Often, visitors seemed to catch on and adopt the posture of remembering the past at a 
physiological and intimate level as suggested by the material narrative of the tour guides. One 
visitor self-identified as coming from Senegal and the United States notes, “Getting to actually 
visit the dungeons was pretty intense. It made you feel like you were actually there in the past” 
(I.S. 12.28.2010). The sentiment is echoed in Ghanaian-New Yorker Muriel Appram’s statement 
that “The tour was exceptional the area allows a feel of the time in which slavery took place” 
(5.13.2011), while someone who signed their name as Mary ! Sha’Toka simply says, “Today I 
got to relive my past and understand my future” (7.22.2011). At first glance, the visitor books 
seem to signal a seamless integration of the personal into the collective, enabled and abetted by 
the material environment and affects of the space, that allow the memorial site to tap into an 
uncanny vividness by pointing to the past as something that is haunting, barely visibly, the 
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present. As Susan Pearce suggests, material objects “alone have the power, in some sense, to 
carry the past into the present by virtue of their ‘real’ relationship to past events” (24). In a way, 
the walls, floors, cannons and windows of the castle witnessed the human exploitation of the 
slave trade in the place of the visitors, whose physical proximity to these vicarious material 
witnesses allows them to better apprehend the event and its traumas and to participate in writing 
the future-history of this space: “I felt a sense of pain, suffering and death in the premises, 
particularly the dungeons. The statement on the plaque that ends with the prayer that ‘May 
humanity never perpetuate such in-humanity against humanity’ is ours. I also pray.” (Opeyemi 
A. A.; Dec 19, 2010; Fig 19) 
However, as the visitor books themselves become witness of time, these horizontal 
surfaces memorialize other kinds of investments, projections, and interventions that rupture the 
narrative smoothly presently by the memorial site. There are comments that insist on persistent 
inequalities, interestingly, unabolished inequalities that are born out of those very geographic and 
genealogical differences recorded in the visitor books and that could provide axis of affinity. For 
example, reacting to the differences in entrance fee for local versus international visitors, a 
visitor named Cleopatra Dixon who cites herself as Jamaican-English and coming from London, 
writes, “Why do I have to pay the WHITE MAN’s rate, when I was originally stolen from here 
by him? This is a travesty” (4.10.2012). She is not the only diasporic African to take issue with 
the local/non-local definition. This splintering along the geographic lines that were supposed to 
be surpassed by genealogical ties is even rawer when the genealogy becomes an issue as well. 
Some visitors express anger at seeing “white people” or Europeans in the memorial sites, 
claiming that the descendants of the victims should not have to share their mourning with the 
descendants of the perpetrators (“wicked and evil EUROPEANS”), or even calling for them to 
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be banned from the site. Interestingly, other visitors from various racial backgrounds 
occasionally react to these comments with statements such as “We must forgive” or “One love,” 
either in their own message, or by writing in the margins next to the comment, even though the 
person who left the first comment is presumably gone and will not see the response left by the 
visitor that responded days, weeks, or even months later.  
 
Figure 25 Visitor responding to previous comment. Cape Coast Visitor Book volume 10.2.2010-8.18.2011. Photo courtesy of 
author. 
Very occasionally, a comment will point to the silence around the fact that there also would have 
been local peoples who aided the British and other Europeans in the slave trade. 
Though the guided tour does not invest as much time in calling the figure of the 
perpetrator to the forefront, when the visitors bend over the books to materialize their thoughts in 
ink and on paper, the figure of the perpetrator looms large. Some visitors of white European 
descent express feelings of guilt and shame for the role that their ancestors would have played in 
the past. A British man writes, “It is horrific to envisage what my ancestors did” (Tom 
McLaughlin, 12.27.1992); another man writes “Embarrassing to be a Dane, when you hear about 
the history here” (Trine Huusom 3.27.1998). Others react to the comments that they should not 
be there, as Marianne Vetter from Switzerland who calls it “VERY SAD THAT SOME BLACK 
PEOPLE” do not want white people at the site, stating the “WE HUMANS” need to know our 
mistakes in order to learn from them (3.8.1998). On the other hand, Lape and Eni from Nigeria 
write, “White people—PAY US” and add a smiley face (9.30.2012). These visitors may all 
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belong to “We, the living,” but the visitor books create a space, if marginal, where the unavowed 
ways in which visitors belong differently to this history are traced.  
I wonder, then, if the unity, the “We, the living” stated in the commemoration plaque that 
seeks to sweep up all of humanity, might be what Edwards calls a prosthetic unity. Calling on 
“we the living” to bear the burden of memory is a rhetorical strategy that mobilizes a broad 
unity, but at the expense of effacing the way the economic, political, and social burden of the 
history falls unevenly on the living. Edwards notes the way translation in the black diaspora has 
been and can be a mode that “forces us to articulate discourses of cultural and political linkages 
only through and across difference in full view of the risks of that endeavor” (13); it can map the 
ground for a unity that holds space at its center for that resistant kernel of décalage91, a unity that 
begins by tracing the fractal fault lines that mean that any common ground we stand on will 
always be shifting. This non-prosthetic, limping unity is not, I would argue, what the Cape Coast 
Memorial site intended to create, but the materially-oriented aesthetics of its narrative make it 
possible to see the need for it, to call out for it, to claim it.  
*  *  * 
I have pointed mostly to failures, shortcomings, blindsides in the memory and reconciliation 
work of both a contemporary art performance-installation and a memorial. My intent, however, 
is not to criticize Cape Coast or Exhibit B for failing to perfectly do the impossible. Rather, my 
intent is to sift though the rubble and find those shards that are cutting in the right places. Despite 
the fracture that is traced on the pages of the visitor notebooks, what I find interesting is that all 
of these different voices and affinities are held together in the same material space. That 
                                                 
91 What Edwards calls “the kernel of precisely that which cannot be transferred or exchanged, the received biases 
that refuse to pass over when one crosses the water. It is a changing core of difference; it is the work of ‘differences 
within unity,’ an unidentifiable point that is incessantly touched and fingered and pressed” (14).  
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proximity, these ugly feelings butt up against each other, ripple across other visitors’ 
experiences. The pages of the comment books, with the visitor narratives written—in blue and 
red and black and other inks, in sometimes illegible writing, in all caps or cursive, some with 
robust and rounded letters and others spiky and lean—one after an other, sometimes coexisting 
peacefully, other times inviting or receiving confrontation, form an arbitrary community, 
bounded by the edges of the 8x11” pages. That co-habitation in the same space exemplifies the 
problem of belonging: “We the living” sharing physical space, material resources, cut across 
with different textures of longing. This “We the living,” is, I would argue, not a statement of 
natural unity but of inherent dis-unity, and the memory work that can be performed via aesthetics 
is not to find what we the living have in common, but find ways to elicit the desire to work 
across and with unsettling, unsettled, difference; to reroute desire and affects towards this 
unwelcome, but deeply needed, work.  
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Chapter Four: ENCOUNTER 
 
“Glissant, in particular, has outlined the task of the postcolonial intellectual: it is to give shape to a nonessentialist 
aesthetics tied to the emergence of occluded oral cultures, to the articulation of a reality that emphasizes relational 
patterns over autonomous ones, interconnectedness over independence, isomorphic analogies over unified totalities, 
opacity over transparency…” 
Françoise Lionnet, Autobiographical Voices, 245 
 
Encounter.  
I encountered Julien Creuzet on May 5, 2016 at the Dak’Art Biennale of Contemporary 
African Art. We had met previously, but the meeting with his artistic practice, which I call an 
encounter because it braided itself into my critical practice and changed its texture, took place in 
the second floor of a bookstore in the Mermoz neighborhood of Dakar, when Creuzet read 
excerpts of his poetry. “Read” should be understood loosely: he did not read as much as pace his 
text, circling out from the spot by the wall where he had discreetly placed himself before 
erupting into movement. He breathed the words into a small amplifier attached to his hip, 
rustling the syllables to the sway of a scraggly tree branch he had collected earlier on the street. 
The amplifier changed the timbre of his voice, layering it with nonhuman frequencies and 
increasing the density of its grain. He had not memorized the text he was performing, instead, he 
read from an iPhone, his voice slithering over lines of the poem that appeared on the screen. 
Creuzet composes and collects phrases on this device—his magic wand he calls it, keeper of and 
participant in his compositions. The poem emerges at the moment of reading, as he scrolls and 
snatches up fragments, all the while sauntering around the audience. My encounter with 
Creuzet’s artistic practice rendered tangible what I had been struggling to imagine through 
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words: a nonessentialist aesthetics that operates between and through the human and the material 
while nevertheless drawing from the particular cultural context of embodiment.  
In this chapter, I am investigating how such an aesthetics can shape the way we articulate 
the relationship between diaspora and the world. More specifically, I will consider what Julien 
Creuzet’s oeuvre suggests for a sense of self that emerges from the particular context of the black 
African diaspora, but moves through and cohabits with differently marked bodies and cultural 
environments. The previous two chapters traced some of the narrative and aesthetic forms and 
strategies deployed to claim belonging in a diasporic formation, either individually (Chapter 2) 
or collectively (Chapter 3). This chapter turns attention to how a self belongs to diaspora and the 
world—and, how the world belongs to diaspora. In that sense, it is like Chapter 1 in that it is 
concerned with the co-habitation of bodies that have undertaken different journeys; unlike 
Chapter 1, it does not explore how this co-habitation is imagined from the standpoint of the 
social body of the nation, rather, it seeks to articulate a non-hierarchical relationship that can 
nourish the particularities of embodied experiences, leveraging difference for rather than against 
inclusion. The question I pose to Creuzet’s artwork—or rather, the question that Creuzet’s work 
asked of me—is how might the forms he creates, forms which seek to materialize the 
relationship between the human and nonhuman, forms that press at the categories of agency and 
embodiment, braid themselves into a larger practice of diasporic ethics and aesthetics?  
Though Creuzet’s artistic practice will be the focal point of this chapter, a few words 
about his biography are necessary as they inform his work—and my reading of it. Creuzet is a 
multimedia artist of Martinican descent who was born in France, just outside of Paris in Le 
Blanc-Mesnil. He “returned” to Martinique soon after his birth and was raised there. An overseas 
department of France, Martinique is one of the islands in the Lesser Antilles archipelago. Its 
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currency is the Euro, its official language is French, its residents are citizens of France with all 
the rights of French citizens, and the Department of Education runs the school system as it runs 
all the schools in other departments. Thus, politically, it is part of the French national territory, 
yet geologically it a separate body located thousands of miles of ocean away from the mainland. 
Politically, it belongs the European Union, though as an Outermost Territory of France, it is not 
part of the Schengen Area nor the EU Value Added Tax Area. Geologically, it is part of a 
volcanic arc of islands, the Lesser Antilles, that defines the easternmost boundary of the 
Caribbean. Linguistically, though French is the official language, nearly the entire population 
speaks Antillean Creole. Culturally, the inhabitants are descendants of African men and women 
who were enslaved and brought over to work the sugar plantations, mixed primarily with Indo-
Martiniquais (descendants of indentured laborers from India of Tamil origin), Amerindian, and 
French.  
The history and culture of Martinique is deeply entwined with the story of colonization, 
slavery, and the African diaspora. As a geologic topos situated outside of France, we could 
consider it a marginal space, and yet this topos holds space for the whole history of a global 
encounter. To be from Martinique is to be the product and process of diaspora. One could 
consider Creuzet a diasporic artist because of this Afro-Caribbean ancestry. However, Creuzet’s 
personal biography complicates this diasporic identity even further, given that he was born 
outside of Paris, left for Martinique, and eventually went back to France to attend an école des 
beaux arts, and has more or less remained there since, though his residencies take him to other 
parts of Europe, the United States, and Africa. In this regard, he is a migratory subject, as well as 
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a product of diaspora. Yet, even though he is regarded as a “stranger” when he is in France,92 he 
moves across these geographic bodies with the privileges of French citizenship, as Martinique 
belongs politically to France. Thus, just as it is imprecise to say that Creuzet “returns” to 
Martinique, it is imprecise to say he “immigrates” to France. I choose to place him in this context 
of double displacement—both diaspora and migration and neither one—not only because, as I 
will argue later, his work invites it, but because I believe it can usefully trouble the notion of 
boundaries as external entities, and complicate the ideal of multicultural assimilation propagated 
by France that reinforces the norm of national Republican identity (see Chapter 1). How might a 
discourse of national identity change, if attention is paid to the strangers that are already in the 
national body? But also, how might pressing on the overlap between diaspora and migration 
serve to better account for entangled and mobile subjectivities?  
However, Creuzet’s oeuvre is relevant to my investigation of the different ways that a 
diasporic sense of self is constructed or expressed not only for his personal biography, but for the 
aesthetic approach he employs. As the examples in this chapter will illustrate, his works tease out 
the meeting point between mediums. His mixed-media sculptures rhyme visually with each 
other, his performances blend in writing and writing is part of the performance, the aural quality 
of his performed poetry is dense and malleable material that he sculpts through movement, while 
the texts he writes down are displayed as visual objects. His work, furthermore, explores the 
meeting point between the self and its subjective expression. An implicit “I” haunts many of his 
                                                 
92 As touched on in Chapter 1, France’s “prevailing discourse of colorblind indivisibility, designating nonetheless an 
unmarked normative whiteness intrinsic to a powerful Republican ideology expressed in the narratives, symbols, and 
representations of French national identity” leave no space and no cultural scripts for a nonwhite French identity 
(Keaton et al., 2012; 2; italics mine). As a result, people of color are implicitly assumed to be non-French 
immigrants are descendants of immigrants regardless of their actual birthplace, citizenship, or country of residency. 
See Tricia Danielle Keaton, T. Denean Sharpley’Whiting, and Tyler Stovall’s edited volume Black France/France 
Noire for a comprehensive discussion on the relationship between Blackness and Frenchness and its recent changes. 
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exhibition projects and individual pieces, with the titles and texts that accompany his sculptures, 
installations, and videos written in the first person. The texts slip in autobiographical (or 
plausibly autobiographical) details—though, as I will discuss later on, where this “I” begins and 
another subject’s “I” begins is often opaque. Similarly, his artworks frequently implicate his 
physical body, either by a live performance, by filming himself in the video art, or by 
incorporating personal, intimate belongings (e.g. clothing) that symbolically as well as materially 
bring attention to way race, gender, and cultural identity imprint themselves on a body.93 There is 
furthermore a strong presence of transportation vehicles in his filmic process. Creuzet often films 
from inside of moving vehicles, capturing not the vessel itself but the movement of the 
environment around it. The ocean, as well as the landscape or plant life from Martinique, appear 
frequently in his oeuvre. These elements together create a visual vocabulary that refers, if 
obliquely, to movement across geographical bodies—in other words, to migration—and its 
relationship to practices of identity. 
Before moving on to a discussion of Creuzet’s work in this context of human movement, 
I want to consider my choice and use of the word migration as an analytical lens. Terms such as 
immigrant, refugee, exiled person, the displaced person, the nomad, and diasporic subject are 
political as well as social categories that speak to particular conditions of movement. Though 
they may overlap, it is important to keep these distinctions alive. I say this because there is a 
tendency, in critical and popular discourse, to deploy migration metaphorically in such a way 
that literal migration becomes erased (see Ahmed 2000, 80-86). Migration in such a deployment 
                                                 
93 Clothing, serving as a modular surface and “second skin,” has been strategically deployed by black men in Paris 
to counter the invisibility and refashion the image of black men in a white-dominated and Euro-centric culture that 
has no cultural scripts for black agency (see Tanya Camela Logan’s dissertation Dressing Masculinity Among Black 
Men in Paris since the 1970s ). Creuzet’s choice to incorporate articles of clothing into his artworks must be 
considered in this context of negotiating cultural identity and agency.  
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becomes a sign for the transgression of boundaries, and becomes generalized as a foundational 
aspect of human: something “we” can all claim as a shared experience, regardless of the 
specificities of each of our lived experiences. Iian Chambers, for example, will use migrancy to 
speak to identity and thought as dislocated processes in themselves, a form of transgressive 
thinking that assumes the privilege of choice: choosing to transgress, choosing to dislocate 
oneself, from a home one already has. Similarly, Rosi Braidotti speaks of nomadism as a way to 
form a new practice of subjectivity that works against linear thinking and rootedness. The 
conflation between the different experiences and conditions of movement within phenomena 
such as migration and displacement, risks making movement across geographic areas appear as a 
choice, one we all have equal access to and one that produces equal effects. It also creates a 
binary in which “home” is immobile, stable, and preconstituted. 
I am sensitive to Chambers and Braidotti’s arguments—and their desire to work against 
the limitations of essentialized thought and identity. However, I suggest that scholars must (1) 
keep the embodied and particular lived experiences of migration in conversation with its 
metaphors, in order to account for the multiple conditions and effects of migration, and (2) that 
making migrancy the privileged site of transgressive thinking can lead us to miss the opportunity 
to examine the ways in which home-making and being-at-home can become generative sites of 
resistance, opposition, and contestation as well. In keeping migration and related terms first and 
foremost as experiences that must be examined within their temporal, historical, material 
specificities, we are better able to pull back and examine how such experiences are deployed as 
metaphor in order to rework those very metaphors that condition our critical and popular 
understanding of experiences of human movement across geographic and geologic boundaries. I 
treat these different phenomena as isomorphic analogies: some of their structures correspond 
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though the whole is not the same. The aim of identifying the parts of the whole that are 
analogous is not to arrive at a new truth of diaspora and migration. Rather, the hope is to develop 
a discourse that deploys nonessentialist aesthetics, building solidarity across difference while 
holding space for the particular and the political, not only in experience of migration but in 
experiences of being-at-home. 
Opacity in the Narration of the Self: Glissant and Bennett in Conversation 
As I will demonstrate, Creuzet’s process and poetics of narrating the self resonate with 
the challenges to being and belonging (and its narration) that Kétala, Becoming Abigail, Exhibit 
B, and the Cape Coast Castle brought up. The works I will analyze come from two of Creuzet’s 
recent exhibitions, and one publication titled J’ai quitté Paris [I left Paris]. One of the 
exhibitions is an ongoing project titled Opéra-Archipel [Archipelago-Opera] to which Creuzet 
has added pieces, variations, and publications since it was first exhibited in 2015. The other is a 
small collaborative exhibition, titled Corps sans tête [Headless Body], that was installed at a tiny 
art gallery in Paris in January 2017. Important to my reading of Creuzet’s oeuvre will be 
Édouard Glissant’s theory of the poetics of relation. In La poétique de la relation (The Poetics of 
Relation; 1990), Glissant sketches a literary history of cultural identity, noting in particular the 
tension between a vision of human culture that tends to extol unity, essentialism, and universal 
truths, and one that mixes, relativizes, and particularizes. He traces the development of tropes 
like the nomad and the exiled, and of processes like diaspora, creolization, and migration, and of 
theories of identity and culture that have been formed out of or against these elements. Overall, 
Glissant aims to propose an open-ended model of being. He envisions a process of self-definition 
that is predicated on Relation as opposed to Unity: an identity that is forged through encounters 
with others.    
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While a Glissantian poetics of relation is complex and can be read in contradictory ways, 
there are a few specific elements that are salient to Creuzet’s oeuvre and the work of this chapter. 
I will briefly outline these aspects, rather than perform an extensive reading of Glissant’s poetics 
of relation, since such a reading is beyond the scope and interest of this project. What I do need 
discuss in some detail is how the notion of encounter works in La poétique de la relation, and 
what opacity contributes to this poetics. First, as mentioned, in Glissant’s poetics, the self is 
created out of interactions with people, places, and cultures—one’s own and, more importantly, 
others’. What he takes care to complicate is that, even when the encounter contains an element of 
chance or surprise, the conditions that make the interactions possible may be historically 
contingent. In other words, not all encounters are created in equal conditions. So while in his 
poetics, relation (encounter, interaction, transformation) is positively charged, the circumstances 
and the moment of encounter itself may produce or be the product of be violence and deep 
injustice.  
In fact, Glissant begins La poétique de la relation with five vivid pages that describe the 
belly of a slave ship on the transatlantic passage. For him, this is a transformational moment in 
the history of the world. People from different parts of the African continent encounter, in the 
closest of quarters, each other. They are thrown into a fraught relationship with people from 
Europe and the Americas. The lives they will build, the social organizations that will erupt from 
this violent encounter (the plantation system, the structure of colonial administration, the 
translatlantic trade) will radically transform the history of the world.94 Though the world was 
                                                 
94 This experience of displacement and remaking of social and cultural relations was not chosen nor lived 
consciously by the individuals who were forced or born into systems of slavery. Glissant notes: “Les peuples qui ont 
fréquenté le gouffre ne se vantent pas d’être élus. Ils ne croient pas enfanter la puissance des modernités. Ils vivent 
la Relation, qu’ils déchiffrent” (20; [People who have been to the abyss do not brag of being chosen. They do not 
believe they are giving birth to any modern force. They live Relation and clear the way for it] Wing 8).  
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always already in relation, for Glissant, this moment births a new world whose survival will 
depend on living in and being open to perpetual Relation. Thus, while living in, being open to, 
Relation is universal in that Glissant sees it as both an ability and a necessity for all cultures if 
they are to coexist—peacefully, and equitably—in the world, it is particular in that it has 
particularly marked the African, diasporic experience.95 And even more particularly the African 
Caribbean experience. This propensity for relation, that holds diasporic experiences at the center 
rather than the margins, I will call, after Glissant, an archipelagic consciousness96: an 
identification with diaspora that recognizes the historical conditions of its emergence, and looks 
out at the world from this place of diaspora, so that “symbiotic transcultural exchanges among 
groups interacting in systematically creative states of tensions” becomes a practice of diaspora 
that is proper to the world (Lionnet 9).  
This brings us to the other element of Glissant’s notion of encounter that will be 
important to understand for my analysis of Creuzet’s work: irreducibility. Though Glissant 
stresses that all parties are modified in the encounter with others, he also insists that there is a 
kernel of difference that persists. Encounter does not erase; it multiplies. This is why he will 
build his poetics out of Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari’s concept of the rhizome. Glissant 
proclaims:   
La racine est unique, c’est une souche qui prend tout sur elle et tue alentour ; 
[Deleuze et Guattari] lui opposent le rhizome qui est une racine démultipliée, 
                                                 
95 He is, at the same time, fond of reminding his listeners that all humans initially dispersed from the African 
continent—Africa as the cradle of humanity. Nevertheless, he will reclaim this propensity to relation as a condition 
of the African existence, saying: “Consequently, we can say that in the African condition there is a kind of vocation 
to go elsewhere. And when there is a mixture of African and something else—well, it’s Africa that’s dominant, 
because of that vocation, not for racial or historical reasons” (Ostrander and Mosaka 2015; 60).  
96 The notion of the Archipelago, more than Paul Gilroy’s formation of the Atlantic, in Glissant’s poetics, better 
captures the principle of Relation: “The diaspora is exploding forth everywhere; it is not concentrated in a single 
area. So for me the Atlantic is a continent, not an archipelago. And we are inhabitants of an archipelago. […] So I’m 
not an Atlanticist, nor am I continental. I think that archipelagization of the deportation of the Africans is a reality, a 
precious one” (Ostrander and Mosaka 2015, 58) 
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étendue en réseaux dans la terre ou dans l’air, sans qu’aucune souche y 
intervienne en prédateur irrémédiable. La notion de rhizome maintiendrait donc le 
fait de l’enrancinement, mais récuse l’idée d’une racine totalitaire. (23) 
The root is unique, a stock taking all upon itself and killing all around it. In 
opposition to this [Deleuze and Guattari] propose the rhizome, an enmeshed root 
system, a network spreading either in the ground or in the air, with no predatory 
rootstock taking over permanently. The notion of the rhizome maintains, 
therefore, the idea of rootedness but challenges that of the totalitarian root. (Wing 
11) 
A rooted bit of the self persists, but this root is spreading outward and allying itself with other, 
horizontal roots that reach out and out rather than deep and down. And for Glissant, it should be 
like so. He vehemently insists that multiplication does not lead to a “blending into some 
indescribable soup” (Ostrander and Mosaka 2015; 62). Rather, the points of contact make more 
differences visible even as they trigger mixing. 
The emphasis on irreducible elements of identity, that persist as differences, lead up to 
the final element of Glissant’s poetics of relation that I wish to introduce to my discussion of 
Creuzet’s oeuvre. That is the concept of opacity. If irreducibility points to a persistent 
multiplication, opacity conveys a persistent incommensurability. It accentuates the 
untranslatable: that which cannot be understood, that which will never be limpid. In the previous 
chapter, I discussed how Brent Hayes Edwards argues for translation as one of the key diasporic 
practices, because it makes space for “the kernel of precisely that which cannot be transferred or 
exchanged, the received biases that refuse to pass over when one crosses the water. It is a 
changing core of difference; it is the work of ‘differences within unity,’ an unidentifiable point 
that is incessantly touched and fingered and pressed” (14).  The untranslatable, that which 
remains opaque, signals for Edwards the moments of difference and disagreement without which 
diaspora as a unifying territory would reproduce the oppressions and exclusions it sought to 
maneuver around.  
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It is no surprise that Edwards’ phrases step in rhythm with Glissant, who likewise 
considers holding space for opacity an inevitable and essential move of the archipelagic 
consciousness. Glissant is careful not to exoticize this quality, refusing to make it proper to the 
Other. Opacity is part of every culture, and does not signal a closing in on oneself. On the 
contrary, one’s own opacities might remain invisible to one’s owns eyes without Relation—
without an encounter with difference. Glissant argues for the importance of holding space for 
opacity because he insists that understanding will never be the outcome and it must not be the 
impulse to encounter and interact with another:  
Il ne m’est pas nécessaire que je le ‘comprenne’ pour me sentir solidaire de lui, 
pour bâtir avec lui, pour aimer ce qu’il fait. Il ne m’est pas nécessaire de tenter de 
devenir l’autre (de devenir autre) ni de le ‘faire’ à mon image. Ces projets de 
transmutations—sans métempsycose—sont résultés de pires prétentions et des 
plus hautes générosités de l’Occident. (207) 
To feel in solidarity with [the other] or to build with him or to like what he does, 
it is not necessary for me to grasp him. It is not necessary to try to become the 
other (to become other) nor to ‘make’ him in my image. These projects of 
transmutation—without metempsychosis—have resulted from the worst 
pretentions and greatest of magnanimities on the part of West. (Wing 193) 
Glissant, in other words, warns against assimilating difference, as assimilation is a remaking of 
difference into sameness. The structures of feeling that animate empathy cannot be predicated on 
comprehension, because empathy must cut across not only difference but disagreement. 
Moreover, as discussed briefly in the previous chapter through Edward Saïd’s work, knowledge 
and power work in concert to reproduce uneven economic, social, and political relationships. 
This was perhaps the hubris that led to the failure, as discussed in Chapter Three, of Exhibit B to 
create solidarity and action across racial lines: the hubris of believing that one can see and 
understand the position of another “as it really is.” Trying to see through difference, attempting 
to render it as limpid as a window to another world, may create a mirror. 
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I will return to opacity during my analysis, but before moving back to Creuzet, I want to 
bring in a discussion of Jane Bennett’s work on vibrant materiality that I’ve touched on in 
previous chapters. Despite a shared interest in developing an ontological vocabulary that moves 
away from the binaries that structure humankind’s relationship with reality, Bennett’s work in 
the field of political philosophy has been overlooked in cultural studies. Bennett proposes that 
our understanding of human vs. nonhuman, organic vs. inorganic, live vs. dead matter conditions 
the field of human agency and thus limits the possible sources and resources for action. She 
suggests that if humanity is going to exist ethically and sustainably, we must consider how 
actions are not solely the product of human will, agency, and consciousness, but the products of 
human and nonhuman material bodies interacting together. Bennett seeks to narrate and 
“experience the relationship between persons and other materialities more horizontally” and 
promotes “an understanding of agency as a confederation of human and non-human elements 
[that would] alter established notions of moral responsibility and political accountability” (2010; 
10, 21).  
Bennett’s project of reworking the models of agency resonates with (Françoise Lionnet’s 
reading of) Glissant: “it is only by imagining nonhierarchical modes of relation among cultures 
that we can address the crucial issues of indeterminacy and solidarity. These are the issues that 
compel us in this fin-de-siècle, for our “green dirt-ball” will survive only if we respect the 
differences among its people” (5). I believe that in bringing Bennett’s work to bear on our 
understanding of the ontological conditions of living in, with, and through diaspora, we might be 
better able to respond “to the task of the postcolonial intellectual” that Françoise Lionnet 
articulates via Glissant: “to give shape to a nonessentialist aesthetics tied to the emergence of 
occluded oral cultures, to the articulation of a reality that emphasizes relational patterns over 
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autonomous ones, interconnectedness over independence, isomorphic analogies over unified 
totalities, opacity over transparency…” (Lionnet 245). Indeed, Glissant’s open-ended model of 
being in the world, built on encounter and interaction, shares a vocabulary in parts with 
Bennett’s metaphysics. Bennett’s attention to encounter and interaction between (materially) 
differing bodies, as well as her emphasis on flattening traditional hierarchies of power and 
multiplying sources of action and empathy, if it does not echo Glissant, it at the very least 
rhymes with him, despite the divergent context.97  
Interestingly, one of the points where Bennett and Glissant converge is Deleuze and 
Guattari. Glissant, as mentioned earlier, proclaims that “La pensée rhizomatique serait au 
principe de ce que j’appelle une poétique de la Relation, selon laquelle toute identité s’étend dans 
un rapport à l’Autre” (23; [Rhizomatic thought is the principle behind what I call the Poetics of 
Relation, in which each and every identity is extended through a relationship with the Other] 
Wing 11). Bennett, on her side, takes up the related notion of assemblage as one of the principles 
of her theory of vibrant materiality. Riffing on Deleuze and Guattari’s A Thousand Plateaus, 
Bennett describes assemblages as “ad hoc groupings of diverse elements, of vibrant materials of 
all sorts” (23). She puts this notion at the core her work, explaining: “an idea that I will put to 
                                                 
97 The first divergence to note is Glissant’s cultural emphasis, while Bennett situates her discussion in an ontological 
conversation. In other words, while Glissant is proposing a model of being, he is building his investigation and 
argument out of the context of culture; he explores the linguistic, racial, and political conditions that shape the field 
of human action. Out of the specific condition of being black and Antillean, Glissant proposes a universal poetics. 
Bennett, on the other hand, hones in on the way the material, rather than cultural, environment conditions the 
possibilities for human agency and subjectivity, seeking to extrapolate a new ontological vocabulary from this 
investigation. I in no way mean to suggest that the cleavage between these two contexts and contributions—the 
cultural vs the material, the poetic vs. the ontological—cuts cleanly. On the contrary, the edges rag at and overlap 
each other. There is an implicit (Anglo-American and continental philosophic) cultural context to Bennett’s work. 
Her examples come primarily from events that have taken place in the United States, and in her own life as a 
professor at an East Coast university. Her theoretical grounds have their (rhizomtic) roots in German, French, 
British, and American philosophy and literature. And Glissant, if working out of and paying attention to cultural and 
historical conditions, is nevertheless proposing a model and mode of being—an ontological understanding of these 
conditions, after all.  
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work for vital materialism, is this: bodies enhance their power in or as a heterogeneous 
assemblage” (23). In both the rhizome and the assemblage, we see the importance of 
heterogeneity and of relation: disparate elements, but moving together, if momentarily, in the 
same direction; or inhabiting, for a time, the same context. And: making something happen.  
Thus, for me, Glissant and Bennett converge and diverge. Their separate fields of inquiry, 
and the problems that they seek to address, have relegated them to separate spheres of reading. 
Reading them together, however, exposes elements that are under-articulated in each of them, as 
a rhyme might hone attention to a particular syllable or sound. Creuzet’s oeuvre, I will argue, 
materializes and may help us articulate the convergences and divergences of Bennett and 
Glissant’s theories. In so doing, his work may model ways of being and belonging that do not 
structure the narrative of the diasporic experience through the logic of departure, arrival, nor 
return. And finally, his work may provide a way of thinking about touching and being touched, 
in a collective social body, that creates favorable conditions for the ethical encounter between 
differentiated strangers.  
Des bouts de nous-mêmes: Aesthetics of Texture in Migration Stories 
In the works by Creuzet that I have selected for this chapter, the idea of a heterogeneous 
multiplicity is evident from the start, in their two titles. As art critic Noémie Monier notes in her 
review of Opéra-Archipel: 
le choix de termes ne doit en effet rien laisser au hasard : “opéra,” en référence à 
cette forme d’art total où l’espace scénique est celui où convergent musique, 
chant, mise en mouvement du corps et composition visuelle et plastique; 
“archipel” renvoie à une espace géographique où la proliferation d’îlots est 
conditionné par l’alternance entre immersion et submersion qui caractérise les 
points de rencontre entre terre et mer 
the choice of terms is, indeed, no coincidence: ‘opera’ referring to that total form 
of art in which, in the theatrical space, music, song, bodily movement and visual 
and sculptural compositions converge; ‘archipelago’ recalling a geographic space 
where the proliferation of little islands is determined by the transitions between 
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immersion and submersion that leave their mark on the meeting points between 
land and sea  
Le Chassis 2016, 1598 
As for Corps sans tête, a body without a head, this image points to a self whose coherence does 
not come from a sense of being-whole, but from being dis-membered. There appears to be both 
multiplication and modification in the images evoked by Creuzet’s titles. There is separation of 
members but also a sense of paradoxical assemblage: geologic and biologic bodies that are held 
together by a cleavage, and are in the process of becoming.  
The closing lines of the poem Creuzet wrote as an extended title of the Corps sans tête 
exhibition read as follows: “des bouts de nous-mêmes, / nos organes externes, mis en relation” 
([bits and ends of our-selves, / our external organs, set in rapport]; translation mine) The image 
these words offer may seem puzzling: our bits and ends, cut off from a body, the separation 
allowing them to become external organs that interact with each other. Reading these lines in the 
gallery in Paris, I was immediately transported to another space: the room in the novel Kétala 
where Mémoria’s belongings gather together to tell the story of her life (see Chapter 2). As they 
tell this story, they repeatedly insist “Chacun de nous est une trace de l’histoire de Mémoria; si 
on nous sépare les uns des autres, il ne restera plus rien de notre maîtresse ” ([Each one of us 
holds a trace of Mémoria’s story; if they separate us from each other, nothing will remain of our 
mistress]; 17, translation mine). As I showed in Chapter Two, in the process of telling Mémoria’s 
life story, her material belongings become a part of her, and she a part of them. Given this 
intimate and mutual constitution, one could think of her belongings precisely as external organs. 
They are vital pieces of her organism, though they operate in the space outside of the skin of her 
                                                 
98 All translations in this chapter are mine, unless alternative bibliographic information is cited. 
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body. Calling Mémoria’s belongings her external organs rhymes99 with Sarah Doraghi’s 
language at the Musée National de l’histoire de l’immigration, who called the pillowcase she 
donated, which smelled like the mother she left behind in Tehran, a bit of umbilical cord (see 
Chapter One). The repeated appearance of material belongings that function as external organs in 
migration narratives bears exploring. 
What does thinking of nonhuman material bodies as external organs allow us to do? It 
may echo what Brent Hayes Edwards describes as the essential work of understanding diaspora: 
“it forces us to articulate discourses of cultural and political linkages only through and across 
difference in full view of the risks of that endeavor. […] Articulation is always a strange and 
ambivalent gesture, because finally, in the body it is only difference—the separation between 
bones or members—that allows movement (13; 15). Let us separate, then, bones and members, 
organs and “des bouts des nous-mêmes,” and see what happens in this space of movement.  
* * * 
I go back to that gallery in Paris, to the Corps sans tête exhibit. A red sweater hangs on 
the wall. This is one of Creuzet’s sculptures, whose full title is as follows: 
En sueur, fatras, vieux baton. 
couleuvre, couleur, roi des 
hommes. 
Ta tige de roseau est devenue 
ton canon. 
Mon pull en laine 
                                                 
99 As Charles Baxter develops it, rhyming actions in narratives are plot points that produce uncanny resonances with 
other moments of action. These resonant events do not serve to predict, rather they serve to reflect: “Prophecy run 
forward gives the prophet the power of forecasting and a habit of denunciation. Prophecy run backward, into 
rhyming action or déjà vu, gives the participant power of understanding. A forward prophetic power is worldly and 
has something to do with magic and foresight; a reverse prophecy, a sense of rhymed events, is unworldly and has to 
do with insight. It moves us back into ourselves” (Baxter 619). Though Baxter speaks of rhyming actions within a 
single text, I strive to note the rhyming actions between texts. The “rhymes” are not conscious citations or explicit 
intertextual references. Framing these repetitions as rhymes rather than as instances of intertextuality allows me to 
tease out connections not only between texts, but across mediums, objects, and events. It serves in this dissertation 
as a mode of reading non-linearly, emphasizing the rhymes and resonances rather than causes, effects, and lineages.  
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loge l’hémoglobine, 
après un hiver toujours rude 
dans le Doubs.  
2017, pull-over, canne à sucre, aubier de chêne, corde, cable, électrique, citron 
 
Sweating, jumble, old stick. 
garden snake, color, king of 
 men. 
 Your reed’s stem has become 
 your cannon. 
 My wool sweater 
 hosts red blood cells, 
 after a still harsh winter 
 in Doubs. 
 2017, sweater, sugar cane, oak alburnum, rope, electric cable, lemon 
Is this red sweater, presumably worn by the artist during his winter residency in Besançon in the 
Doubs department of France, an external organ? The stanza of the title-poem that ends with the 
line about “nos organs externs, mis en relation” begins with the question: “Comprends-tu le sens 
de notre entemêlement ? / Te fais-tu à l’idée que l’espace de La Maëlle Galerie, / sera le lieux où 
tout prendra corps” [Do you understand what our mingling means? / Can you accept that the 
Maëlle Galerie’s space / will be the place where everything will take for]. The Maëlle Galerie is 
the space in Paris where this exhibition takes place. The poem identifies it as the site where 
everything will take form (take on a body, literally, in French). The stanza speaks of a triple-
headed serpent (three artists collaborated for this exhibit). Furthermore, it evokes, perhaps, the 
night of the exhibit opening: “On that grand immortal evening we will toast this moment / of 
sharing, bits and pieces of ourselves / our external organs, placed in rapport” ([On trinquera le 
grand soir immortel cet instant / de partage, des bout de nous-mêmes, / nos organs externs, mis 
en relation]; translation mine). Given that the poem speaks of the place of the exhibition itself, of 
the a mixing of mediums and of a three-fold collaboration, one can infer that the “bouts de nous-
même” that are set in conversation are the different artworks created by the three artists to 
inhabit the dialogic space of the exhibition.  
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So, to return to my question, is this red sweater an external organ? If yes, what does it tell 
us? Let’s look at it. 
 
Figure 26 En sueur, fatras (...) At Maëlle Galerie in Paris, France. Photo courtesy of author. 
It is a red knit sweater, whose weave creates a nubby texture. It is suspended at an angle, with the 
sweater’s arms reaching up and to the left. Electric cables and rope bind together four pieces of 
wood (oak sapwood, as the label notes, which is a tree’s tender, young wood, full of sap) to form 
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a single, irregular staff. This staff is suspended—precariously it seems to me—by a red cable that 
hangs on a small hook in the wall. One of the sweater’s arms is tied tightly at the wrist by this 
red cable, which also wraps around the wood pieces in two places to hold them together. The 
tied-up wrist looks painful. The other sleeve of the sweater is inserted into the staff. The pointed 
tip of one of the pieces of wood juts into the elbow, creating a pointy, unnatural angle and 
deforming the even spacing of the sweater’s textured pattern. From this sharper point, however, 
the left side of the sweater’s torso drapes down, creating a tender fold.  
I am surprised at how alive—or lively, to echo Jane Bennett—this assemblage of wool 
yarn, electric cable, and oakwood feel. Reading the title poem accentuates the sculpture’s 
vibrancy. It is a sweating jumble, the title tells us, and houses drops of blood. This proximity 
with bodily fluids reminds me again of Kétala (discussed in Chapter Two), when Mémoria’s 
dress remembers being drenched in Mémoria’s hopeful sweat the day that she packed up her 
belongings to move to France, dreaming of a better life there. But perhaps it echoes even more 
forcefully with the protagonist in Becoming Abigail (see Chapter Two) who attempts to 
remember the mother she never knew by hiding photos of her mother under her clothes, letting 
the photos chafe at her skin until she bleeds and her skin scabs and scars.  
What each of these examples—the sweater sculpture, the fictional dress in Kétala, and 
the chaffing photos in Becoming Abigail—highlight is an interaction at the surface that results in 
a change in texture: sweat weighs down fabric, changing its drape, its tackiness, its surface to the 
touch; blood dries and leaves rough bits embedded in the skin of a sweater in a sculpture, or the 
skin of a young girl in a novel. It is a tactile encounter between strange, materially differing 
bodies, human and nonhuman, that leaves a textural trace. Though in Kétala and Becoming 
Abigail the interaction takes place primarily at an individual level, and produces textural changes 
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on the human characters and their material belongings, I will argue that through Creuzet’s work 
we can expand the stage where tactile encounter take place. These tactile encounters will provide 
a way of thinking about encounters that texture the social body. 
Texture as an aesthetic element, I will argue, has a particular role in Creuzet’s work. 
Texture, furthermore, will become key reworking the metaphors of and for migration. One 
quality of texture to keep in mind is that it cannot be contained to a single sense. Though closely 
related to touch, it is neither exclusively haptic nor exclusively optic. I can “see” the texture of 
Creuzet’s sweater without touching it (one is not allowed to touch art, after all!), just as you 
might see the texture of a cashmere cardigan at a department store and instinctively reach out to 
touch it to verify that it feels as tender as it looks. Indeed, Eve Sedgwick, in her exploration of 
the relationship between texture and affect, will note that “other senses beyond the haptic are 
involved in the perception of texture, as when we hear the brush-brush of corduroy trousers of 
the crunch of extra-crispy chicken” (15). Another notable quality of texture is that it is not stable 
across scale. Standing on the opposite side of the gallery, I may not notice that Creuzet’s sweater 
is anything but red. It may look smooth from a distance. Only when I’m closer will I see its 
nubby weave. And when I zoom in to the photos I took of it, I may no longer want to use the 
word “nubby” to describe it, preferring “hairy” because at this scale, the individual tiny threads 
that are twisted into strands of yarn rear up their fraying heads. 
The multisensorial and unstable nature of texture may be a rich way to begin thinking of 
the splitting of skin in a tactile encounter. The skin can be thought of as a boundary. The edge of 
a ‘me’ that keeps me from becoming ‘you.’ Or, the surface that makes you ‘Other.’ As 
mentioned in previous chapter, Fanon, in Black Skin, White Masks, evinces with surgical 
precision how black men’s skin functions as a totalizing signifier of their Other-ed subjectivity in 
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the wake of the colonial encounter, in spite of the shared language, education, and citizenship 
with white French inhabitants of the metropole. The epidermization of Otherness is the legacy of 
slavery and colonialism that haunts the formation of social bodies today.100 Ethnographer 
Clifford Geertz, in a famous lecture in 1985—delivered, coincidentally, at the place where I 
write, the University of Michigan—argued that the increasingly cosmopolitan world in which he 
predicted we would live was one where “Foreignness does not start at the water’s edge but at the 
skin’s” (112). Skin, thus, is the boundary that moves with the body. It carries with it a set of 
associations that can invite identification or rejection. And yet, like many boundaries, skin is an 
imperfect border.  
Foreignness may start at the skin’s edge, but the skin is a responsive surface. Feminist 
philosopher Sara Ahmed notes: “the skin that contains the body is also where the atmosphere 
creates an impression; just think of goosebumps, textures on the skin surface, as bodily traces of 
the coldness of air” (2006; 20). Environmental factors create bodily traces: dry skin in a hard 
wind; peeling blisters in a strong sun. Geographical movement—migration, displacement, 
diaspora—results in encounters with different environments. Because of this, Ahmed proposes 
that, “migration involves reinhabiting the skin: the different impressions of a new landscape, the 
air, the smells, the sounds, which accumulate like points, to create new lines, or which 
accumulate like lines, to create new textures on the surfaces of the skins” (1998, 9). Ahmed 
enriches our understanding of skin as signifier of difference by paying attention to its 
modularity—its non-essential traits that might (at times willingly, at times less willingly) be 
modified. 
                                                 
100 Lisa Lowe writes that “Race as a mark of colonial difference is an enduring remainder of the processes through 
which the human is universalized and freed by liberal forms, while the people who created the conditions of 
possibility for that freedom are assimilated or forgotten” (7). 
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The different environments that Ahmed describes are not solely material, but social, and 
their effects are socially textured as well as materially textured. Ahmed writes, “Feminist, queer, 
and critical race philosophers have shown us how social differences are the effects of how bodies 
inhabit spaces with others, and they have identified the intercorporeal aspects of bodily 
dwelling” (1998, 5).  In other words, “difference” is not the pre-existing baggage that each 
person carries with them into a particular space. Rather, differences are produced through the 
process of bodies arriving, and dwelling, in a particular space as I discussed in my reading of 
Chandra Mohanty and Audre Lorde’s narratives in the Introduction to this dissertation. I wonder, 
then, if the story of migration could be told not through the plot structure of arriving, as the 
Musée national de l’histoire de l’immigration tells it (see Chapter 1), but as a story of texturing. 
If, as Ahmed claims, “migration involves re-inhabiting the skin” (2006; 9), what can the textural 
trails in Creuzet’s aesthetics tell us about migration and its metaphors? To put it differently, what 
would a story of displacement, diaspora, migration, tell us if its narrative plot traced not the 
dispersal from an origin, nor the integration into a destination, nor a desire for (an impossible) 
return, but the changing texture of skin along a journey? The sweater’s blood-red, goose-bumped 
texture, the way sharp boughs pierce the sleeves, suggest that the texturing will be at times 
violent, though the softness of its weave and drape also suggest elements of tenderness in 
texturing. The subsequent sections will follow Creuzet’s textural trail to examine its relationship 
to a potential nonessentialist aesthetics of diaspora and migration. 
Sa peau décosue: Tactile Relations in the Aesthetics of Texture  
The sweater acted as Creuzet’s second skin for one long cold winter, a barrier between 
him and the frigid air. Its nubby texture makes me think of goose bumps. This textural similarity 
invites us to imagine the sweater as Creuzet’s second skin. All the more so knowing that it 
contains the traces of his sweat and blood. Creuzet has amputated this second skin and stretched 
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it out on a wall, binding it to other material bodies (the oak wood, the electric cables). What does 
this gesture tell us? How does this gesture tell a story, particularly a story of being and 
belonging? In the poem that accompanied the Corps sans tête exhibition, one line reads: “His 
cadaver writhing, unstitched skin / gutted, blue lattices” ([Son cadavre gisait, sa peau décosue / 
éviscéré, des entrelacs bleus]; Creuzet 2017). The body bursts out of its seams in this line, oozing 
out of the boundaries that the skin sets. “Blue lattices” strikes me as a surprisingly pretty way to 
describe intestines, and I hold on to that color, blue. 
In another exhibition at a different gallery in Paris—a larger one, on a small street a hop-
not-even-a-skip away from the imposing Centre Georges Pompidou for contemporary art—I 
encounter a pair of denim cut-off shorts. These cut-offs hang upside down, one leg pinned to a 
blue panel. It is another one of Creuzet’s sculptures, this one titled D’une intensité, cyan (…) 
[Cyan, of a certain intensity (…)].  
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Figure 27 D'une intensité, cyan (...) at Galerie Dohyang Lee in Paris, France. Photo by Aurélien Mole. 
In this sculpture, the pinned-up leg of the shorts’ hangs flat, its outer edge falling away from the 
wall in a flaccid fold. The frayed denim edges clump, like mold, into small white tufts that sprout 
from the lighter blue of the jean material. The other leg splays out, akimbo. This leg envelopes a 
clear vase that peeks out from the leg opening. The vase fills out the leg and waist as if there 
were a limb inside. The tautness of this leg accentuates the emptiness of its partner leg. From the 
vase hangs a piece of driftwood, connected by a delicate bead necklace. The driftwood, which 
might be two pieces of wood cobbled together, has an oblong, flattish bottom and a V-shaped 
branch protruding out of it.  
Somehow, in my notes hastily written in the gallery, I had noted down this object not as a 
piece of driftwood but as a shoe. It could be shoe-like, with the V-branch recalling a flip-flop 
sandal, or the graceful recline of a high-heeled sandal’s strap. But it could resemble many other 
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things. I suspect that my misremembering was provoked by the driftwood’s position directly 
below the short’s leg, and the way that the slim string necklace connects the two objects as a 
fleshy leg, like a string piercing through beads, would connect pant to shoe. This assemblage of 
materially differing objects embodies the kind of multiplicity that Glissant speaks about. The 
sculpture is composed of heterogeneous parts and its identity comes out of these parts, but it 
becomes something when I enter the assemblage: when I, observer, writer, critic, encounter and 
engage it, within the conditions it offers me.101   
In a similar fashion, I encounter an earlobe. In Cyan, an abstract drawing is attached to 
the top of the blue panel where the jean cut-offs hang. The drawing is of a misshapen oval with 
contours traced on the inside. It reminds me of an ear. Again, it could resemble many things, or 
no thing at all. It could be that I have a habit of tugging at my own ear when I write, so this 
particular bodily appendage is absent-mindedly on my mind as I go through my photos and 
struggle to make out what this drawing could be. Writing is, after all, another tactile encounter, 
between hand and keyboard or pen and paper, between writer and subject or writer and reader.102 
These conditions shape what comes out of the encounter. Though I bring my body into this 
encounter, I also suspect that the drawing’s placement above the shorts, roughly where a head 
might be had these shorts been right-side up and inhabited by a body, invites the interpretive leap 
                                                 
101 As I discuss in the Introduction, my critical approach is informed by what Françoise Lionnet describes as a 
noncoercive feminist reading practices: “to allow my self to be interwoven with the discursive strands of the text, to 
engage in a form of intercourse wherein I take my interpretive cues from the patterns that emerge as a result of this 
encounter—in other words, it is to enjoy an erotics of reading somewhat similar to Barthes’s in The Pleasures of the 
Text” (28). What I signal in my encounter with Creuzet is how his artistic practices shapes my critical practice, but 
also how my particular set of (embodied) experiences of reading, writing, thinking and traveling and braided into the 
fabric that he offers me to play with.  
 
102 As Probyn will argue in Writing Shame, “Writing is a corporeal activity. We work ideas through our bodies; we 
write through our bodies, hoping to get into the bodies of our readers. We study and write about society not as an 
abstraction but as composed of actual bodies in proximity to other bodies” (Probyn 76) 
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to the earlobe. I act on this assemblage of material forms as it acts one me; they become my 
external organs or I theirs.  
The heterogeneous material elements of the sculpture contain a number of possible 
outcomes, and my corporeal engagement with it activates some, but not all, of them. Cyan, d’une 
intensité (…) thus renders tangible one of the key elements of Creuzet’s poetics and process: 
placing individual forms into relation. The piece of wood, the pair of shorts, the drawing, the 
beads, the vase, each exist on their own. Individually, they function materially (hold flowers, 
hold a body), they function semantically (a gift necklace that reminds you of the giver, a piece of 
sea debris connotes wandering and exploration), the function aesthetically (they might catch an 
eye or not). But placed together, something else emerges from them that exceeds the individual 
stories and forms. The fact that they inhabit the same space contributes to this. However, the 
specific placing of each material form—how they are positioned in relation to each other—is just 
as important, so that a piece of driftwood connected to a short leg may evoke a shoe, because of 
its proximity to this particular piece of clothing.  
In this sense, Cyan, d’une instensité (…) like most of Creuzet’s oeuvres I would argue, 
share something profound with Bennett’s theory of agency as not being located in the human, but 
being the result of the materiality of a potential “animal-vegetable-mineral-sonority cluster with 
a particular degree and duration of power,” whether or not this cluster is recognized as acting 
together (23). Creuzet’s heterogeneous clusters create effects, due to suggestive power of the 
material forms that are drawn into relations. The relations are ones of suspension (beads to 
driftwood), of completion (cyan to red), of expansion (vase to short leg), of elongation (oakwood 
to sweater sleeve), and more relations that escape my grasp. The possible associations—
equivalence, opposition, analogy, repetition, etc.—that the objects provoke are less than infinite, 
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but many more than one.103 In addition, most of these relations, I want to emphasize, are 
stubbornly tactile. Not only because the possible associations are the effects of the different 
material forms touching on each other, and not only because the textural difference between their 
materials is striking, but also because tactile relations produced the individual forms in the 
sculptures. For example, in the case of the driftwood, water and wind caressed the driftwood till 
its bark peeled away and its heartwood was sculpted into strange curves of a silky grain. The 
texture is the outcome of the tactile relation, and makes visible the potential past encounters just 
as it activates potential future encounters. 
Because the relations shift and unfold in response to each other, these resolutely unruly 
relations invite us to draw isomorphic analogies—deep structural similarities despite differing 
surfaces—with sculptures in other exhibitions, in other locations. This is the case with En sueur, 
vieux fatras, the sweater-sculpture, which I propose has a rhyming relationship with Cyan, d’une 
intensité (…). Though part of a separate exhibition, one that took place before Corps sans tête, 
elements from each of the two sculptures can be paired into a series of visual couplets. The 
central element of En sueur, the sweater, covers the top half of the body, while the central 
element of Cyan covers the bottom half. The two items share the same function, and complement 
each other, though they do not complete an outfit. Furthermore, one item of clothing is red and 
the other blue; cyan, specifically, its title tells us. Removing red light from white makes cyan 
appear and inversely, mixing red and cyan light, white appears: another complementary—but not 
totalizing—relationship. Why cut-off shorts, instead of regular, whole, shorts or pants? Are pants 
                                                 
103 “It’s easy to get juiced up about a concept like plurality or multiplicity and start complimenting everything as 
such. Sedgwick was impatient with that kind of sloppy praise. Instead, she spent a lot of time talking and writing 
about that which is more than one, and more than two, but less than infinity. This finitude is important. It makes 
possible the great mantra, the great invitation, of Sedgwick’s work, which is to ‘pluralize and specify.’ (Barthes: one 
must pluralize, refine, continuously’)” (Nelson 2016, 77-78). 
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without legs an echo of a Corps sans tête, a body without a head that is the title image of the 
other exhibition? Once again, these images fall into step without creating a perfect repetition, 
forming a visual rhyme. The visual couplets formed out of individual elements in these two 
sculptures thus invite us to bring into relation works that are not temporally or geographically co-
present. Moreover, they create isomorphic analogies rather than a unified totality.  
Through the term isomorphic analogies, I am echoing Françoise Lionnet, who speaks of 
one of the features of a nonessentialist postcolonial aesthetics being a mobilization of 
“isomorphic analogies over unified totalities” (14). She employs these terms, it appears, to evoke 
how a nonessential aesthetics would work, not to define or outline their meaning. Drawing from 
mathematical definitions of isomorphism, I take Lionnet’s “isomorphic analogies” to signal the 
mapping of a set of corresponding relationships between two separate entities. More specifically, 
a map of corresponding relationships in form and structure (rather than similarities in surface or 
appearance) that preserves the outcome of that particular set of relationships. Though the two 
entities are not equal, the parts of them that correspond to each other answer the same question—
they contain the same information. An aesthetics that deploys isomorphic analogies, I thus argue, 
that builds connections by mapping, tracing, or drawing out similar structures within parts (of 
forms, concepts, images) rather than between wholes. It is such an aesthetics, I contend, that 
Creuzet’s use of fragments and textures practices. 
Ce vieux bout de bois: Opacity in the Aesthetics of Texture 
Perhaps, it may seem, we have strayed far away from discussing a sense of self. What 
does this pile of objects have to do with telling a story of being and belonging in diaspora? The 
poetic texts that Creuzet writes to complement his visual pieces complete the picture. For the 
Jangal (…) mon dawa exhibit, Creuzet co-writes an opening text with Emilie Renard, a curator, 
art critic, and not-infrequent collaborator with Creuzet. The text begins as a letter addressed to a 
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‘Julien,’ presumably Julien Creuzet. These opening lines allude to the many voyages ‘Julien’ has 
taken, over lands and seas starting with his birth in the Paris suburbs and his early departure to 
Martinique (just like Creuzet). The letter states, “De ces traversées, tu gardes le rythme des 
mouvements intérieurs, une façon de relier les choses entre elles, de passer entre ici et là-bas, 
entre toi et l’île ou la ville que tu habites, entre ta main et les objets que tu saisis” ([From these 
crossings, you maintain the rhythm of internal movements, a way of linking things to each other, 
of passing from here to there, from you to the island or the city where you live, from your hand 
to the objects it grasps]; Creuzet and Renard 2016). Movement between different geographies 
becomes a gesture of collecting; crossing a form of linking the objects of this collection together. 
That image of a hand grasping at an object—enclosing the object in the privacy of its palm—is 
an intimate one: it speaks to being moved by something, moved enough to move it with you.104 
In all of the journeys Creuzet takes, what does he reach out to, what does he hold on to?  
The text then switches from second-person address ‘You, Julien’ to first-person singular. 
This invites us to read the ‘I’ as Creuzet’s authorial voice. This voice begins by describing a 
rubber tree, balata, that grows in Martinique and other tropical locations. ‘Balata,’ it turns out, is 
also the name of a regional reserve and botanic garden famous in Martinique. Balata, however, is 
also the name of a Palestinian refugee camp in the West Bank, established in 1950 and housing 
27,000 people today. A few stanzas down, the poem reads:  
Ils ont mis le feu au pavillon (Savare), 
pour faire fuir les migrants,  
sur la presqu’île,  
                                                 
104 This image, coincidentally, creates a visual symmetry with the promotional video for the Galerie de dons at the 
Musée national de l’histoire de l’immigration (see Chapter 1). In this five-minute video created for the gallery’s 
installation, a few of the immigrant donors were interviewed with the object they donated to the museum, and during 
the interviews the camera frequently zooms in on the object which is fondled in the hands of the speaker. I am not 
suggesting Creuzet’s poem is a direct visual citation; what my reading practice aims to do is probe at the patterns 
that emerge when the human-material object relationship is mobilized in conversations around social belonging. 
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paraît-il ? 
Comment savoir,  
le pourquoi des braises chaudes ?  
They set the (Savare) warehouse on fire, 
to chase the migrants out, 
on the meander, 
so I hear? 
How can we know 
the why of the warm embers? 
Creuzet and Renard 2016 
These lines refer to an arson that happened on April 25, 2016, in the city of Caen in the north of 
France. Caen is an inland port city, connected to the English Channel by two rivers that merge at 
Caen. The merging rivers form a ‘presqu’île.’ This terms refers to a body of land that is, literally, 
an almost-island, surround by water on most sides; the name in French comes from binding 
together “presque” which means ‘almost’ and ‘île’ which means ‘island.’ A presqu’île can jut out 
from the mainland into the sea, or it can be found inland, when a rivers splits, as in Caen.105 The 
Savare warehouse mentioned in the poem is located on Caen’s presqu’île. Caen is not far from 
Calais, where in March 2016, the French police forces, on national orders, razed a migrant 
settlement where thousands of people lived while they waited for a chance to cross the English 
Channel into the UK. A couple dozen undocumented immigrants, having lost their shelter in 
Calais, had moved to Caen and were squatting in the Savare warehouse. This warehouse was set 
on fire in April, a month after the immigrant men and women moved in. 
The poem thus places, one after the other, the island of Martinique, a refugee camp on the 
West Bank, and another migrant camp on an almost-island in France. The histories of the bodies 
of land, the political forces that spurred the waves of migration, the relationship between the 
                                                 
105 A similar geologic body, called a meander or méandre in French, is formed when a river snakes so tightly that it 
nearly cuts off a thin bend of land. I’ve translated “presqu’île” as “meander” instead of “peninsula” or “almost 
island” in part to come closer to the rhyme of “presqu’île / parait-il” with “meander/hear,” and in part because the 
polysemic nature of “meander” comes closer as well to the polyvalent associations the “presqu’île” evokes.  
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people living on those lands and the land are distinct. The poem does not appear to be drawing 
analogies nor equivalencies between them, but their proximity makes them part of the same 
poetic body. In the next few lines of the poem, Creuzet evokes some of the quotidian, subtle 
moments of racism he experiences—no one sitting next to him on public transit, people 
assuming he’s in need of money. He says, “Je suis ce tas d’histoires, / sans incidence” [I am this 
heap of stories / to no end]. He suggests then, that he is all of these stories, but also appears to 
suggest that the stories are not necessarily relevant to each other: they are brought together as a 
heap, something messy and lacking coherence, significant only for its quantity not its quality. 
Though alluding to experiences of displacement—and resistance to—displacement, the poem 
does not draw neat equivalences between Creuzet, the refugees on the West Bank, the migrants 
in Caen, and the “they” that set fire to the warehouse. The different experiences and geographies 
are not mirror images of each other, nor are they polar opposites. The lack of neatness referred to 
by the choice of the word “tas” hints at the under-determined nature of the relationship between 
these stories; the poem proposes no obvious ending. 
Instead, I would argue, these different stories function as presqu’îles in an archipelagic 
formation: separate bodies that are each geologic traces of a past seismic movement.106 If the 
bodies of land that form an archipelago are separate in the present, their past might nevertheless 
be interwoven, occluded by the waters that cover their shared volcanic roots—or their shared 
continental shelf. If there are hints of a connected past, the future, on the other hand, remains 
open-ended. Continental shifts produced the conjoined separation, but future relationships, while 
conditioned by this past, cannot be predicted solely on its basis. Connections are invited when 
                                                 
106 Archipelagos generally fall in one of three categories, determined by their geologic origin. The volcanic activity 
of subduction zones in the middle of the ocean create “oceanic islands.” “Continental fragments,” meanwhile, are 
land masses that have separated from a continental mass due to tectonic displacement. Finally, “continental islands,” 
found next to a continental coast, are part of the same continental shelf, partially exposed.  
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Creuzet places them next to each other in his poem, but again, but each of the presqu’îles resists 
equivalence or assimilation. If the sculpture I discussed in previous sections invited a reading of 
material forms as folding into and onto each other, this poem appears to stress the ways in which 
that folding does not, nevertheless, efface historical, political, and geographic particularities—
nor their unfinished entanglements. 
The resistance to definition—the opacity of these relations—is all the more striking 
because of the closed syntax of this particular poem. While enjambment plays a significant role 
in some of Creuzet’s other poetic texts, in this poem, the line breaks coincide perfectly with the 
grammatical breaks of his sentences. Even the question phrases line up neatly, the question 
marks often falling at the end of the stanza, and always at the end of a line. This syntactical 
wholeness, creating isolated, self-contained clauses and sentences, contrasts with the geographic 
enjambment of the content of the lines. It reads as if one thought does not have time to settle 
before being interrupted by another; the overpowering heat of Martinique’s Balata Gardens still 
there lingering in the air when the poem switches abruptly to the cold Normandy spring in the 
warehouse in Caen. One location is jutted up against another, boundaries demarcated by the 
syntax but broken by the proximity of other locations: an island, almost.   
What is it then, that the separate bodies of land evoked by the poem will share? What will 
become their common ground in the poem? In the next stanza of the poem, Creuzet once again 
brings together the human and nonhuman to illustrate how his particular embodied experience 
fits in a larger web of historic displacement and migration. Creuzet writes: 
Je suis ce vieux bout de bois,  
acajou de Cuba,  
et bien que je sois dans ton ici,  
je suis d’une densité rare. 
I am this old wood end, 
Cuban mahogany, 
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and even if I am in the place you call here, 
I have an unusual density. 
Creuzet and Renard 2016 
Here, Creuzet (the narrative ‘I’) likens himself to wood from a tree native to Martinique and 
other Caribbean islands and parts of the Americas. This wood, Cuban mahogany, because of its 
density and even grain, was used for ship-building when the Spanish, British, and French 
empires claimed territories in the Caribbean and set up plantations. Soon, because of the wide 
diameter of the mahogany trees allowed for large, even boards to be cut, and because of its 
brilliant red color, mahogany became the wood of choice for high-quality furniture makers in the 
British colonies in North American, and soon in Europe as well. France and England, with their 
Caribbean colonies, could directly import this fashionable wood, while other European countries 
bought the imported wood form them. Today, Cuban mahogany is rare, having been 
overharvested during the peak of the mahogany trade.  
This is a history, not unbrutal, that draws together disparate continents. In this sense, 
Cuban mahogany can be read as a “contact” object in the sense in which Mary Louise Pratt 
develops the term to “invoke the spatial and temporal copresence of subjects previously 
separated by geographic and historical disjunctures, and whose trajectories now intersect. […] A 
‘contact’ perspective emphasizes how subjects are constituted in and by their relations to each 
other. [It stresses] copresence, interaction, interlocking understandings and practices, often 
within radically asymmetrical relations of power” (5-6). This would be one—not unproductive—
way to read the relation Creuzet sets in motion, through his poem, between his being and the 
piece of wood. By linking himself to this wood, Creuzet hearkens to the structures of movement 
that connected Africa, Europe, the Americas and the Caribbean for centuries, leaving none of the 
places unchanged, though some profited at the expense of the others. The contact perspective 
illustrated by the Cuban mahogany in Creuzet’s sculpture emphasizes the specificity of 
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Caribbean migration in Europe, conditioned by a history of colonial (over)exploitation, labor, 
trade, commerce and craft. The poem had opened placing several traumatic displacements (Caen, 
Balata) in cohabitation through Creuzet’s poetic body, but here it maintains the particularities of 
the Caribbean experience alive. 
At the same time, mahogany is not the only type of wood or tree parts that Creuzet 
incorporates into his sculptures. And in the poem, he mentions specifically the density of this 
particular wood. It appears, thus, that the power of the Cuban mahogany comes not simply from 
its contact history, but from its particular material qualities. What does the material quality of 
density do for Creuzet? How does holding on to the density of this wooden piece set another 
story in motion? It is certainly important enough that he repeats this word a little later in the 
poem, saying, “Je suis d’une densité rare, touffue” ([I have a thick unusual density]; Creuzet and 
Renard 2016). “Touffu” connotes thickness, but also a bushiness, as one may speak of a bushy 
brush, forest, or jungle. Though a dense wood describes a weight, and evenness to the grain, 
which speaks of texture, the choice of “touffu” heightens the textural connotation. If texture has, 
in other artworks, functioned as the trace of an interaction, here texture creates a barrier to it. In 
other words, if texture is an effect bodies acting on each other, it can also be a reaffirmation of a 
boundary between two bodies.  
I would argue that the choice of mahogany wood, known for its density, and the repeated 
attention to this particular material quality in the poem opens a space for opacity. As discussed 
earlier in the chapter, a Glissantian poetics of relation honors opacities. By this, Glissant means 
acknowledging and making room for that which cannot be assimilated, that which cannot be 
limpidly translated, in the moment when “I” encounter an other “I.” In one elegant phrase near 
the end of his book, Glissant declares, “Des opacités peuvent coexister, confluer, tramant des 
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tissus dont la véritable compréhension porterait sur la texture de cette trame et non pas sur la 
nature des composants”(204, emphasis mine; [Opacities can coexist and converge, weaving 
fabrics. To understand these truly one must focus on the texture of the weave and not its 
individual components]; Wing 190). Glissant envisions opacities as coexisting threads that can 
weave a fabric. Or, weave a story, since “une trame” in French is both the weave of a textile and 
the plot of story.  
I want to press on the idea that a true understanding of this process would tell use 
something about the texture of the weave (or plot), not about the nature of the threads that made 
it up, and how this relates to the embodied experience of diaspora and migration. This weave, or 
tissage in French, becomes the foundation of Françoise Lionnet’s understanding of métissage as 
an aesthetic concept, position, and strategy. Lionnet draws deeply from Glissant’s writings on 
métissage and pairs them with Nancy Morejón’s mestizaje to point to how telling the history, 
post-slavery, of cultural intermingling requires not a blending out but a braiding in of gender and 
race as well as culture and language. Métissage, because of its etymological roots in the Latin 
mixus which referred primarily to a cloth made of cotton and flax (or two different fibers), is for 
Lionnet a rich metaphor to describe the encounter between different cultures and the subsequent 
forms that emerge from it. As she notes, “it is a neutral term, with no animal or sexual 
implication” (14) and does not refer to a hierarchization as “mulatto” and other Anglophone 
terms do. At the same time, métissage does suggest the mixing of races as well as languages and 
cultures, something a world like “creolization” or “transculturation” does not necessarily capture.  
In addition, as a homonym to the Greek metis, a cunning intelligence and form of 
“savoir-faire which resists symbolization within a coherent or homogenous conceptual system 
since it is also the power to undo the logic and clarity of concepts,” métissage links itself to the 
 226 
arts of transformation and transmutation (16). Lionnet calls this an aesthetics of ruse that “rejoins 
the signifying practices familiar to all oppressed peoples, in particular to the descendants of 
slaves in the New World. Such practices had to be learned by the slaves as survival tactics within 
a hostile environment that keeps them subjugated, relegated them to the margins” (18). In that 
sense, métissage is a strategy à la de Certeau as discussed in Chapter Two, that allows a 
disenfranchised individual to work within structures of power for their own advantage. Lionnet 
deploys métissage as a practice of both reading and writing, attuned to “the relationship between 
historical context and individual circumstances, the sociocultural construction of race and gender 
and traditional genre theory, the cross-cultural linguistic mechanisms that allow a writer to 
generate polysemic meanings from deceptively simple or seemingly linear narrative techniques” 
(29). As a visual practice, I argue, métissage may be expressed through the deployment of 
texture and texturing. Texture, like métissage, functions as a polysemic gesture, linked to 
transformation, the aftermath of an act that has no stable positive or negative connotation, but 
that can become either. Furthermore, as discussed earlier, texture requires a mixing of the senses 
to be apprehended, but the relationship between the sensations may be surprising, or deceptive. 
Something may be soft but bitter, brittle and sweet, fuzzy yet rigid. In that sense texture shares 
the propensity to ruse that Lionnet highlights in métissage. In this final section, I will explore 
how an aesthetics of texture in Creuzet’s work, as a visual expression of métissage, allows him to 
reframe diaspora as a story not of departure and arrival but as a story of texturing. 
Writing Stories of Diaspora as Stories of Touch 
Why texture? Why is the story of texturing more important than the original components, 
or the final product? The last piece of art I want to bring into the conversation is a video-
sculpture titled Opéra Archipel, Cactus, le point en l’air [Opera-Archipelago, Cactus, floating 
tip]. In this video, which runs just over two minutes, an arm, cropped just a couple inches below 
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the wrist, appears at the bottom of the screen. The fingers of the hand stretch out and up. Two 
plastic vases, one red and one black, balance precariously on these fingers.  
 
Figure 28 Video still from Cactus, le point en l'air. 
This hand is not a cactus. The fingers, I suppose, could be spines; they are long, slim, and pointy. 
The vases, perhaps the cactus pears; the black one is roughly the shape of this fruit, the red one 
roughly the right color. Though cactus pears don’t typically grow on the spines, and these 
“pears” spring out of the finger-spines.  
 This video quivers. It is silent, but vibrant. The hand moves throughout the two 
minutes, dancing a precarious dance with the vases that cling to the tipping point. From time to 
time, spectacular rays of black and red light emerge from the glasses. (Cacti, by the way, are not 
known for shooting lasers.)   
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Figure 29 Video stills from Cactus, le point en l'air. 
The hand rotates, dives down, nearly loses the red vase, resettles. At one minute into the video, 
we catch a glimpse of the shoulder to which the arm is attached. Other than this brief sighting, 
there are no signs of the body to which the arm belongs. This unmoored appendage is another 
“bout,” a bit or end of the self. There are few identifying marks on this limb; it is hard to tell the 
height or weight of the body to which this hand belongs, its age range, if it is a genetically male 
or female body. This video defamiliarizes the most mundane of human limbs; to know 
something like the back of your hand in this case would be to not know it at all. Indeed, I would 
argue that the video “capture[s] the alien quality of our own flesh, and in so doing reminds 
humans of the very radical nature of the (fractious) kinship between the human and nonhuman” 
(Bennett 112). Detached from the body, entwined with the vases and light rays, this limb 
becomes its own heterogeneous cluster of materially differing forms, a human and non-human 
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collective that will produce effects (defamiliarization, surprise, unsettlement, perhaps rejection) 
on a viewer.  
I have insisted so far that whatever this assemblage is, it is not a cactus. But, what if it 
were a cactus? What, in fact, is a cactus? A cactus is green. It grows in dry, hot places. A cactus 
stores water in its fleshy stem. A cactus, like Cuban mahogany, is native to the Americas, except 
for one species that grows on the African continent. A cactus has shallow roots that spread wide, 
not deep, like rhizomes, perhaps. Its roots are quick-forming, propagating whenever there is a 
rain fall to reach as much wet soil as possible: they are mobile, spreading wide in order to 
survive. A cactus has spines instead of leaves. Its spiny body is meant to ward off predators, 
though its spines also provide shade to keep the stem cool. It is not inviting to touch, but if you 
were to touch a cactus, you would probably wind up with broken skin, a textural trace of the 
cactus’ spines touching you.  
A tactile encounter can leave a textural trail. A tactile encounter is the touching of two or 
more bodies; the textural trail is the evidence of the tactile encounter, evidence that appears, 
materially, on the surface of the skin. Coincidentally, when reporting on the difficulties the 
Musée national de l’histoire de l’immigration faced during its conception (see Chapter 1), one 
newspaper noted, “La tâche s'avère épineuse puisqu'il s'agit, en quelque sorte, de muséifier un 
phénomène vivant et visible” (Weill 2007 [The task, it turns out, is a thorny one as it requires, in 
a way, museumifying a living and visible phenomenon]).107 As I argued earlier, migration is a 
tactile experience, very often a prickly one. It is a tactile experience literally in that it involves 
inhabiting a specific locality that involves sensorial interactions with other bodies and the 
                                                 
107 The appearance of the word “thorny/prickly” and the evocation in Creuzet’s video of a cactus’s spines are not 
direct citations or conscious intertextual references. However, they do form a “rhyming sequence” as discussed 
earlier (see footnote 98).  
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environment: living in a place might mean touching hot sidewalks or brushing against the sticky 
railing of a subway station or leaning against a leafy tree to catch a cool breeze on your sweaty 
skin. But the textural trail of the experience of migration is also a metaphoric one. A particular 
type of rainfall pelting heavily might trigger memories of a place one used to live; the smell of 
winter wetness on a bridge might be comforting or confusing. Tactile encounters in a locality 
exceed the (built or natural) material environment as well: they have social manifestations. One 
might be stopped-and-frisked on the way to work, or asked for the identity papers one does not 
carry in one’s pocket, or patted on the shoulder for how well one speaks the host country’s 
language. These are tactile encounters, too, and they leave marks, needle at and unstitch the skin, 
in a metaphoric sense.  
So, what is, to riff on Bennett, the “particular degree and duration of power” embodied in 
the materially-differing tactile encounter (soft flesh, sharp spines) evoked by Cactus, le point en 
l’air? What thoughts, actions, and experiences can it set in motion? What models of being and 
belonging can unfold from it? Cactus, with its attention to the hand and fingers that pierce and 
cradle the plastic vases, hones in on the tactile encounter and its textural effects. And yet, it also 
creates a barrier to the tactile encounter. Unlike the previous artworks that I discussed, which 
were three-dimensional sculptures assembled from various material bodies, Cactus is a video, a 
two-dimensional image. Texture, as I mentioned earlier, though closely related to touch, is not 
exclusively apprehended through touch. A spectator of the video might perceive the texture of the 
smooth, hard vases against the fleshy contours of the hand and the ridges of the palm’s skin, but 
touching the video screen will produce a dissonant feeling. Watching the video invites a cross-
sensorial and imaginative engagement with the image, wherein the viewer is asked to see 
something they don’t see (a cactus) and to feel a texture they cannot touch (neither the “real” 
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texture of the hand nor the metaphorical texture of the cactus, only the texture of the screen on 
which the video dances).  
In that regard, the Cactus video moves the spectator in the sense that it pulls them into a 
different sensorial posture, one that is out-of-place with their temporal and geographical 
position.108 But it also might move them in that in might create favorable conditions for empathy 
and imagination. Sedgwick, on the title of her collection of essays, explains the double meaning 
of touch: “The title I’ve chosen for these essays, Touching Feeling, records the intuition that a 
particular intimacy seems to subsist between textures and emotions. But the same double 
meaning, tactile plus emotional, is already there in the single word ‘touching’; equally it’s 
internal to the word ‘feeling.’” (17). Similarly, to move someone is to ‘touch’ someone’s 
emotions, just as it is to change their spatial position. Cactus is a moving picture—that early term 
for film—not only in the sense that it is a series of images the move over time, but in that it 
invites the viewer to consider both the sensory and affective experience of movement, and to 
consider sensory and affective experience as movement. 
* * * 
To return to the letter that opens the Jangal (…) mon dawa poem, the rhyme and reason 
of ‘Julien’s’ déplacements can be found “entre ta main et les objets que tu saisis” ([between you 
hand and the objects you grasp]) ‘there’ and ‘here.’ In other words, the story of displacement 
materialized through Creuzet’s artworks does not structure its plot around departure or arrival or 
                                                 
108 This is not unlike the Cape Coast Castle Memorial (Chapter Three) where the narrative of the guided tour invites 
the visitors into a cross-sensorial engagement with the material properties of the castle. This is an engagement that 
(troublingly) moves the visitors closer to the experience of slavery. In Chapter Three, I argued that this cross-
sensorial identification with the enslaved men and women raised ethical questions about the appropriation of the 
experiences of historical exploited, racialized groups into a universal, “post-racial” narrative. However, I also noted 
how this very cross-sensorial engagement provided ways for the visitors to fracture and complicate the 
appropriation. This chapter considers a different mode of envisioning a collective belonging, in which the tactile 
encounter becomes a way of honoring and making room for fracture, while still generating favorable conditions for 
an empathetic encounter in the larger social body. 
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(imagined) return, plots which are future-oriented or past-oriented. Rather, it tells it through what 
‘Julien’ holds, tenderly, firmly, in his hand in each place: “Ici aussi tu ramasses des coquillages, 
des bois flottés, tu tailles des shorts, tu graves des poèmes dans le bois, tu filmes et montes sur 
ton telephone …” ([Here also you gather seashells, driftwood, you carve shorts, you engrave 
poems on wood, you film and edit on your phone …]; translation mine). The image presented 
here is an active one, with Julien bending down towards seashells, using his hands to gather up 
pieces of wood, to carve, sculpt, type, write, create, discard. He acts out of the place where he 
finds himself, taking up what is within reach.  
This departs from the prevailing metaphors, images, and plots of diaspora narratives in 
that it is present-oriented and the plot is not oriented around a departure point not an arrival 
point. Instead, plot is structured around two elements: the tactile encounter and its textural trace. 
Though it appears to be a simple template, the potential for differentiation is vast. Pressing, 
caressing, smothering, smoothing, piercing, scratching, tugging, jabbing, burnishing, buffing, 
palpating, penetrating, carving, cradling: all of these are tactile encounters, but the feeling of the 
touch is not the same. The levels of pleasure and the levels of pressure vary. Furthermore, the 
textural traces left by these touching gestures also vary. Some are more permanent than others, 
the size, depth, shape, and aspect of the trace differs, as the rosy lines of fingernail scratches will 
differ from the pillow marks left on a sleep-tinged cheek.  
In addition, this image of reaching out and grasping muddies the active/passive pose. 
There is an element of chance, the objects happen upon Creuzet, he does not appear to be 
searching for them, they are part of the place where he is. But, he reaches out to these objects, 
willingly encounters them or is beckoned by them, and works them with his hands. Moreover, 
tactile relations with material bodies trouble a dualistic notion of agency, for as Sedgwick notes: 
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“the sense of touch makes nonsense out of any dualistic understanding of agency and passivity; 
to touch is always already to reach out, to fondle, to heft, to tap, or to enfold, and always also to 
understand other people or natural forces as having effectually done so before oneself, if only in 
the making of the textured object” (Sedgwick 14). To touch is to be touched.  
Not to say that all tactile encounters take place on identical or level playing fields. 
Ahmed insists that we not overlook “how some forms of touch have been means of subjugating 
others, or of forming the other as a place of vulnerability and fear (colonial and sexual histories 
of touch as appropriation, violation, and possession)” (49). She usefully develops the idea of 
economies of touch to account for how touch is valued differently. What I find effective about 
deploying the tactile encounter, as Creuzet does, in a poetics of migration, is that the variations 
of kinds of touch and texture that I mentioned earlier allows for these distinctions to be made. In 
Creuzet’s poetics of migration, the meaning of the encounter can only be apprehended by 
looking at its textural effects. It is broad enough to encompass a number of different trajectories, 
but it’s value, its potential, cannot be determined before its specific course takes place. Neither 
can it be determined by the origin point, destination, or endpoint of the trajectory. 
In this chapter, I have argued that Creuzet oeuvre presents the story of migration through 
the lens of the tactile encounter and its textural trace. This is, of course, only one person—or 
artistic persona’s—way of telling the story. The geographic movements he undertakes are 
marked by privilege in that he has a right to residency in France as a citizen, even if he is socially 
othered as a black man, as an Afro-Caribbean, and as a non-mainlander—the textural variations 
of his story. I am not suggesting that we consider the poetics of Creuzet’s diaspora narrative as a 
sort of model or ideal narrative to be adopted. Rather, I suggest that his practice of creating 
materially-informed metaphors makes them “internally discontinuous, allowing for difference 
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and inequalities between situated subjects” (Tinsley 204). I suspect that the textural variations 
Creuzet’s poetics and process offer up participate in creating the conditions of empathy and 
imagination in the encounters that follow migration. These conditions of empathy and 
imagination are needed to account for the myriad of unique experiences of displacement, 
estrangement, and movement that we clumsily try to address in the all-encompassing terms of 
‘diaspora’ or ‘migration’—and also in ‘nation’ and ‘home.’ The metaphor of the tactile 
encounter, and the textural variations of a skinned boundary, provocatively materialized in Julien 
Creuzet’s oeuvre, is one of the metaphors that, as a concept and a strategy, might favor the 
imagination and empathy needed to provide more inclusive ways of being-at-home in the cross-
section of national identity and diasporic consciousness. 
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Conclusion: Resting and Restless Places 
 
In the last chapter of this dissertation, I argued that Martinican artist Julien Creuzet’s 
deployment of everyday, personal belongings in his artistic practice materializes a way of putting 
parts of differing wholes in relation to each other. It also materializes the textural transformations 
of this encounter between parts. I place Creuzet’s practice in dialogue with Édouard Glissant’s 
poetics of relation—particularly Glissant’s definitions of opacity and encounter—to ask what 
kind of diasporic ethics and aesthetics is enabled via Creuzet’s work. At stake is developing a 
metaphor for the transformations, individual and collective, that happen in the process of co-
habitation and movement across geographies. This final chapter ricochets back to the first 
chapter, that had asked how the personal belongings donated by immigrants at France’s National 
Museum of the History of Immigration (MNHI) enable narratives of belonging to the French 
nation that challenge the model of citizenship that the state imposes on its immigrant subjects—
and indeed, challenge the very understanding of narrative agency.  
The second chapter picked up on the exploration of material agency in narratives, arguing 
that the personal belongings in the novels Kétala and Becoming Abigail work against the 
heteronormative expectations of a diasporic notion of belonging. It furthermore demonstrated 
how the two novels employ an assemblagic notion of subjectivity, in which the ability to elicit 
readerly empathy is produced through the interaction of the shared materiality of human and 
nonhuman bodies. The third chapter continues to probe at the aesthetics of empathy, particularly 
in narratives that reckon with the ongoing effects of transatlantic slavery and European 
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colonialism in the African continent. By comparing Brett Bailey’s Exhibit B and the Cape Coast 
Castle slavery memorial site, the chapter argues that commemorative sites and artistic 
representations that seek to bring such traumatic histories into the present must move away from 
mimetic strategies based on seeing power, and towards aesthetic strategies that emphasize the 
multisensorial qualities of material environments and their objects. Taken together, the four 
chapters, through their own assemblage of material objects, narratives, sites, and people, make a 
case for braiding the critical practices of museology, narrative theory, and object-oriented 
criticism into the study of race and diaspora in the Francophone world. 
Studies of race and diaspora will inevitably intersect with concerns of migration, national 
identity, and gender, and the historical processes that informed them. This dissertation has sought 
to keep a finger on the pulse of these specificities, while also suggesting ways in which creative 
and critical practices can imagine forms of co-habitation, solidarity, and inclusivity in an 
unevenly-resourced, historically-conditioned postcolonial world. What is at stake, in other 
words, is finding ways to tell stories of being-at-home that reduce rather than reproduce the 
inequalities of our predominant modes of producing knowledge and forming collective identities. 
There is no one metaphor to speak of an experience of being and belonging, no one narrative 
with a perfectly pitched plot that will account for the starkly varying experiences of being-at-
home and failing to feel at-home. Metaphors, narratives, plots, and other rhetorical and aesthetic 
devices, nevertheless, move us. And if they move us, they might move us into a position of 
empathy and imagination that is more likely to make being-at-home a state that is always in the 
making, responding to the material bodies that inhabit it, rather that defined by multiple 
exclusions of race, gender, sexuality, and culture.  
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What happens, then, if instead of analyzing the stories of migration and diaspora that I 
have collected in this dissertation as examples of narratives of displacement, we analyzed them 
as narratives of being-at-home? As Wendy Walters suggests, “By redefining the word home, we 
can retain its power as a desire, yet lose its bounded and exclusionary nature. Perhaps we can 
think of a coalitional, processual ‘resting place,’ temporary and nomadic, that black writers 
create through fiction” (xxiv). The relationships between people, sites, and material objects that I 
have traced in these pages have pointed to the desire and creation not of (desti)Nations to which 
one can arrive or return. But rather, of the desire for such resting places, detours on a journey in-
process that can be held on to, returned to, or shared with others. These resting places can map 
out a geography of belonging that allows for both movement and dwelling, that shows how 
nation and diaspora are co-constitutive rather than opposite ends of a binary; that emplacement 
and locality are part of the narratives of diaspora, just as mobility and unsettledness are part of 
the narratives of the nation. 
*  *  *  
If this conclusion is a resting place—where I lay down the various bodies and voices that 
have nourished its pages—I want to keep it nevertheless restless. The desire for resting that I just 
described is matched by an equal desire to revisit, reroute, reach out. From this resting place, I 
can reflect on what materiality can offer further explorations of being and belonging in black and 
African Francophone creative expression and critical work. In other words, from this resting 
place I nevertheless yearn to see what ground this dissertation has yet to cover; I will gesture, 
then, toward two territories on its horizons. 
One, is furthering an understanding of what a queer optics can do in diaspora studies. 
This dissertation, particularly in Chapter Two, has demonstrated that the desire for home in 
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experiences of displacement can be routed through queer geographies that (1) excavate local 
histories of gender and sexuality that are not captured in the colonial constructs of human 
intimacy and (2) imagine practices of kinship that are not bounded by a genealogical 
understanding. This only begins to scratch the surface of what emerges when queer and diaspora 
studies are put into conversation. As Gayatri Gopinath suggests, queer diaspora studies as a 
critical and creative practice shifts not only the geographic orientations of nation and diaspora—
to include the migrations linked with settler colonialism and diasporas within nation-state 
boundaries, for example—but the temporal orientation of diaspora. “Queer desire reorients the 
traditionally backward-looking glance of diaspora,” Gopinath argues, bringing clandestine 
countermemories into the present that undercut the normative scripts of dominant ideologies of 
nation and diaspora (3). These countermemories are forward rather than backward-looking in 
that they are wedded to a speculative practice of archival imagination rather than reconstruction, 
investing in that what could have been rather than the what happened.  
This is the kind of epistemological investment that scholars such as Omise’eke Natasha 
Tinsley (2008, 2010; 2012), Christina Sharpe, Jacqui M. Alexander, Frieda Ekotto, Jafari S. 
Allen, and Saidiya Hartman propose. In different ways, these writers argue that black 
personhood—especially stories of gender, desire, sexuality and even more particularly black 
women’s experiences of gender, desire and sexuality—cannot be found by reading the (literary, 
historical, or anthropological) archive, even when one reads against the grain.109 The sources that 
nourish speculative readings of blackness and queerness, in and out of diasporic formations, are 
necessarily fleeting, often non-visible, and must be apprehended through ripples, wrinkles, and 
goosebumps. It is an epistemological investment that continues in Unsettled Belonging’s 
                                                 
109 See Allen and Tinsley (251) and Diabaté for particularly insightful discussions of imagination, epistemology, 
and the experiences of black women’s sexuality.  
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attention to multisensorial and embodied processes of making meaning that may be particularly 
crucial for understanding the experience of blackness and diaspora (see Alexander pp. 307-308; 
see also Mbembe p. 18).110 
Another terrain that emerges from this dissertation’s restless resting place and is adjacent 
to the queering of diaspora, is a planetary concern. It is said that we are living in the age of the 
Anthropocene, in which human society acts as geologic force, sparking change on a planetary 
scale. An attention to ecological impact of humans runs through much of the work of the 
nonhuman turn—and certainly in Jane Bennett’s analysis that has been so influential in my work. 
I have not made space for planetary concerns in this dissertation, but I do think where the 
dissertation ends seeps over the threshold for a planetary concern. Moreover, I would argue that 
even when studying environmental changes on a planetary scale, scholars must seek to 
understand how the experiences of the environment are lived on local levels, cut through with 
experiences of race and gender and African postcoloniality.  
Indeed, I would contend that there was always already a planetary sensibility in the work 
of Édouard Glissant. His poetics of relation is deeply embedded in a geologic thinking, as the 
material constitution of an archipelago informs his understanding of blackness and diaspora.111 If 
Glissant foreshadowed certain moves that have become key to planetary thinking, Achille 
Mbembe has argued that theory from and about African must engage with what he calls the 
“planetary turn of the African predicament,” contending that “our planet’s destiny will be played 
                                                 
110 “The search for alternative acts of thinking requires the exploration of other ways of speaking; of the visual, of 
sounds, of the senses, and thinking as philosophically and historically as possible about the precariousness of life in 
Africa, the intensive surfaces of power and the various ways in which events coexist with accidents. Indeed, if the 
project is to “rethink Africa”, or, for that matter, to write the world from Africa or to write Africa into contemporary 
social theory, then there is no better starting point than the question of time.  Time is neither uniform, nor 
homogeneous. Structures of temporality in colonial and postcolonial conditions are thoroughly entangled with the 
vicissitudes of the affective, with the subjective play of desire and uncertainty” 
111 Glissant furthermore medidates on Martinique’s black sand beaches to understand the island’s politics as both 
local and global, exemplifying the kind of scalar analysis that studies of the Anthropocene encourage.  
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out to a large extent in Africa” (1). To produce salient knowledge, theory must account for the 
multiple entanglements of humans, technologies, materialities, and environment. Mbembe thus 
suggests:  
If the planet and the human constitute themselves through relations between 
multiple forces, then attempting to simply re-impose an expanded version of 
human subjectivity to all forms and forces will not suffice. ‘Desegregating’ and 
dis-enclaving theory must become a constitutive part of the new agenda. In this 
regard, the planetary library will of necessity be a theory of the interface. […] The 
planetary library project rests on the assumption of the inseparability of the 
different archives of the world – Édouard Glissant’s le Tout Monde. Instead of 
holding them apart, it will recognize them as assets shared with all humans, non-
human actors and self-sustaining systems. It will draw upon each of them while 
drawing them together. 30 
The African continent and African experience become for Glissant the privileged spaces through 
which such theory of the threshold can be formed, contra prevalent perceptions that would put 
the global North as the cause and thus the site through which the Anthropocene must be 
interrogated. 
 The planetary sensibility is not only about juggling multiple geographic scales, but 
temporal ones as well. As Dipesh Chakrabarty points out, “the current conjuncture of 
globalization and global warming leaves us with the challenge of having to think of human 
agency over multiple and incommensurable scales at once” (1). Thinking of human agency over 
multiple scales, for Chakrabarty, includes holding three aspects of the human condition in mind: 
the human as a universal subject in their shared capacity to hold and exercise rights, a legacy of 
Enlightenment thinking; the human as both profoundly same and profoundly different, marked 
by class, history, sexuality, race, etc that gets expressed and encoded according to both local and 
global forces; and the human as a biological species whose collective mode of living impacts the 
planet and puts the human species at risk of extinction. Anthropocene thinking tends to 
foreground the last definition of the human. However, Chakrabarty argues that all three aspects 
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of the human condition must be addressed simultaneously, despite their apparent temporal 
disjunctures and discontinuities.112   
The modes of inquiry proposed by Mbembe and Chakrabarty, I contend, sketch out the 
terrain for a scalar and disjunctive method of inquiry, one that looks at human experience in 
nonhuman systems while holding in place deeply local embodiments of race, gender, sexuality, 
colonialism, etc. It resonates with my statement in the Introduction, where I noted that despite an 
engagement with the nonhuman turn, questions of human experience and human justice 
remained at the core of Unsettled Belongings. This is also the kind of work being done by 
scholars like Vanessa Agard-Jones, who does not claim the posthuman but rather the 
posthumanities. Agard-Jones writes: “I am inspired here by feminist technoscience studies and 
by efforts to theorize a “posthumanities” that breaks down boundaries both between academic 
disciplines and between bodies and their surroundings” (342). Her elegant work braids together 
literary expression, medical anthropology, and environmental history to write deeply local and 
profoundly embodied understandings of blackness, queerness, and the body in the French 
Caribbean, toggling between particular lives and global histories in ways that challenge the 
predominant meanings and metaphors of these signifiers. 
I am drawn to Agard-Jones work because in thinking about the planetary, race, and 
sexuality in the context of French colonialism and African slave trade, the materialities of the 
metaphors she deploys lead to particular modes of making meaning. In her study of queer 
sexualities in Martinique, she explains:  
Nearly everywhere on earth, sand is principally made up of one element —in 
some places silica, in others limestone. Ninety percent of a grain is almost always 
                                                 
112 They also bear being put into dialogue, as Zoe Todd argues in “An Indigenous Feminist’s Take on The 
Ontological Turn,” with indigenous forms of knowledge production based in more-than-human, platenary 
epistemologies that have been taking place alongside the ones in the academy without being acknowledged. 
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just one of those two elements. But the other 10 percent is the percentage with a 
difference — the percentage that, in its difference, matters — the percentage that 
can tell us something about the history of a place. […] While the sand’s referents 
are far from concrete, they provide a model for one way to understand the 
memory of same-sex desire and gender transgression on the island — as diffuse 
yet somehow omnipresent. “Queerness,” then, retains a kind of oblique 
permanence in Martinique that has resonance both in the structure of the sand and 
in the connections made on the island’s shores. Rather than invoke ideas about 
absence and invisibility as the condition of same-sex desiring and gender-
transgressing people, turning to sand as a metaphor for the repository of memory 
may help our analyses engage with more fine-grained and ephemeral presences 
than our usual archives would allow. 340 
Sand, in her essay, allows her to hold together a place (St. Pierre), a referent in the French 
colonial imaginary (as the Sodom of the Antilles), a geologic occurrence and its social 
consequence (the eruption of Mount Pele and destruction of the city), a local site of queer 
transgression (the beach in St. Anne), and a persistent presence in unexpected places (“carried on 
the wind and on our bodies. [Sand] ends up on the kitchen floor, in the backseat of the car, in the 
bottom of my handbag, and in all manner of bodily orifices” [340]). The material qualities of 
sand serve as a tactile archive, a repository of human memory, and a method of scholarly inquiry 
that hold the disjunctures of human and planetary agency in a productive tension. 
I want to close Unsettled Belongings by placing it at the threshold of these scholarly 
terrains—queer diaspora studies and postcolonial planetary theory—letting it be a meeting point 
from which the preceding pages can be read again—or rewritten. It speak, I hope, to what has 
been the goal of these pages: not to “settle” the unsettled belongings of its title, but to allow 
unsettledness to participate in what it means to belong.  
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